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Abstract
Along with its domestic economic transition, China has earned out a series of reforms 
in foreign trade and achieved significant policy changes. This thesis shows that China’s 
export policies moved from strong govermnent incentives to a state of market competition 
while import policies were switched from strict controls to significant liberalisation. In 
particular, the intensive trade policy reform in the 1990s demonstrated that China has been 
moving closer to trade liberalisation in line with most international trade practices.
Besides providing a comprehensive and updated account of China’s trade policy 
reforms, this thesis contributes to understanding of the field by arguing that: (1) Unlike the 
trade policy reforms in some other countries, China seems to be a unique case due to its 
special economic and political conditions, its exclusive reform targets, its cautious reform 
approach, as well as its sensitive position in the world economy. (2) Econometric tests 
carried out in this study showed that China’s trade policy reforms have been effective, 
although not all of them were optimal. China’s move towards freer trade is thus shown to 
be the right choice for the economy and is consistent with the view that trade can positively 
promote growth. (3) China has followed a path of gradual reform with strong government 
intervention. Given the undeniable achievements and the special natures of trade policy 
reform, China’s experience implies that the route to trade liberalisation can be varied and 
must be adapted to the specific conditions in the reforming country. (4) Trade liberalisation 
in China has been less conspicuous in terms of reform measures (for example, tariff 
reductions) made in the past reform period, due mainly to the incompleteness of the market 
economy. (5) The biggest challenge facing China is still how to combine trade liberalisation 
and government intervention, in order to establish a “socialist free trade system”. 
Continuous emphasis on government control may contain the risk obstructing a sustained 
trade policy reform. China needs to adopt a “market-first” reform strategy to complete the 
establishment of a full-functioning market economy. The concept of “Chinese 
characteristics” can only be well-developed in market systems rather than in making use of 
the market forces on the basis of a government regulated economy.
The reforms in the past years have provided a foundation for China to go further 
towards trade liberalisation. China could, and should, move faster toward trade 
liberalisation.
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Introduction
1.1 C h in a : A  F a st  G r o w in g  E c o n o m y
Over the past two decades, China has experienced dramatic changes in its economic 
regime and has achieved rapid growth. China’s transformation from a virtually closed 
economy to a major trading nation has attracted wide attention. Many studies of China’s 
economic reform have suggested that China’s rapid growth was derived from its sustained 
domestic reforms and the opening up of the economy to the rest of the world.
1.1.1 Reform and Open-Door Policies
As early as 1978, the Bulletin of the Third Plenum of the 11th Communist Party Central 
Committee pointed out that it was necessary to introduce the law of value into China’s 
economic system, in order to improve economic performance. Subsequently, many reform 
measures —  from small to large scale and from simple to complex —  were carried out in 
the process of economic transition. Among these reform measures, the most important 
ingredient was the development of market systems. At the 14th Communist Party Congress 
held in October 1992, China finally set its economic reform target as the building up a 
socialist market economy. Through the sustained reform over the past two decades, the 
market mechanism has been playing an increasingly important role in the deployment of 
resources and other economic activities.
Along with the domestic reforms, opening up the economy to the outside world has also 
been an important factor in China’s rapid growth. The opening-up of the economy itself is 
an important part of reforms which mark the transition of the centrally-planned economy to 
an open market economy. The basic components of China’s open policy are openness in 
trade, foreign investment and foreign technology. Of these, the crucial element is trade 
reform, or trade liberalisation. The other aspects of openness are all, to some degree, related 
to the area of foreign trade.
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China’s open-door policy has led to significant changes in the foreign trade regime. 
Reforms in trade, foreign investment and other foreign transactions have produced a more 
open economy in China. The ratio of foreign trade to GDP increased from 9.79% in 1978 to 
a peak of 43.72% in 1994. This suggests that the development of the Chinese economy is 
increasingly linked to the world market.1-1 ] As the world economy is a market-based system, 
the Chinese economy has become increasingly reliant on market forces. International norms 
have been successfully introduced into the Chinese economy. It also suggests that the 
effects of the open-door policy have led to the desire for more reforms in the foreign trade 
sector. China has set up its trade reform target in the establishment of a “socialist free trade 
system”. More importantly, China has carried out a series of intensive policy reforms since 
the early 1990s, signalling a stronger trend towards trade liberalisation.
1.1.2 Growth of the Economy and Foreign Trade: Statistical Evidence
Reform and opening up policy have generated a positive result in economic growth for 
China. Table 1.1 provides an illustration of the rapid growth of China’s economy and 
foreign trade in the reform period. China’s gross domestic production (GDP) was 7,477.20 
billion Renminbi Yuan (hereafter Yuan) in 1997, 8.8% (in constant prices) up from that of 
the preceding year {China’s Scholars A broad9/1/1998). The annual average growth rate of GDP 
in real terms during 1979-1997 was 9.9%, 3.5 percentage points higher than that of 1953- 
1978. This growth rate was much higher than the world average growth rate (3.0%) and 
also higher than that of Asian countries such as Korea (8.3%), Singapore (7.6%), Malaysia 
(7.4%), Thailand (7.4%), Indonesia (6.0%) and India (4.9%) in approximately the same 
period (1979-1994). China’s per capita GNP in 1995 was 4,754 Yuan, 2.88 times (in 
constant prices) higher than that of 1978. The annual average growth rate of per capita GNP 
during 1979-1994 was 8.3%. In constant 1987 prices, the share of China’s GDP in the total 
GDP for the world increased from 2.3% in 1990 to 3.2% in 1994 (Zhang Sai 1995; State 
Statistical Bureau 1996b, 1997b; China’s Scholars Abroad 9/1/1998).
One of the basic reasons behind the rapid growth of GDP has been the dramatic opening 
of the country to foreign trade and investment. The opening-up of the economy led to 
positive policies encouraging the development of foreign trade, in keeping with increasing 
international interdependence. Since reform, China’s foreign trade has expanded rapidly. 
The goal of foreign trade growth set in 1982 was that the total value of imports and exports
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should be doubled twice (reaching about US$160 billion) by the end of the 20th centuiy 
(Chen Muliua 1982). In fact, this target was achieved in 1993 (US$195.70 billion). In 1993, a 
new target was presented to take China into the top ten foreign trading nations in the world 
(China 's Foreign Trade, No. 10, 1993, p. 3).
Table 1.1 China’s GDP and Foreign Trade (1978-1997)
GDP (billions o f  Yuan; %) Foreign T rade (US$ billion; %)
Year Growth Growth Total Growth Growth Growth Trade
GDP rate GDP90* rate Trade rate Exports rate Imports rate Balance
1978 362.41 649.0 20.64 9.75 10.89 -1.18
1979 399.81 10.32 698.4 7.61 29.33 42.10 13.66 36.76 15.67 40.34 -2.01
1980 451.78 13.00 752.9 7.67 38.14 30.04 18.12 32.94 20.02 27.66 -1.84
1981 477.51 5.70 786.6 4.48 44.03 15.44 22.01 19.12 22.02 8.18 -0.01
1982 518.23 8.53 851.5 8.25 41.61 -5.50 22.32 1.56 19.29 -12.36 2.99
1983 578.70 11.67 940.5 10.39 43.62 4.83 22.23 1.37 21.39 12.90 0.85
1984 717.10 23.92 1077.4 14.57 53.55 22.76 26.14 12.56 27.41 24.07 -1.50
1985 896.44 25.01 1216.3 12.91 69.60 29.97 27.35 10.30 42.25 61.98 -15.34
1986 1020.22 13.81 1319.5 8.48 73.85 6.11 30.94 14.12 42.91 1.20 -11.96
1987 1196.25 17.25 1466.2 11.12 82.65 11.92 39.44 25.74 43.21 -0.01 -3.85
1988 1492.83 24.79 1631.1 11.25 102.79 24.37 47.52 20.23 55.27 27.39 -7.74
1989 1690.92 13.27 1701.8 4.33 111.68 8.65 52.54 9.08 59.14 5.71 -6.58
1990 1854.79 9.69 1854.8 8.99 115.44 3.37 62.09 18.15 53.35 -10.12 8.75
1991 2161.78 16.55 2025.3 9.19 135.63 17.49 71.84 14.99 63.79 19.03 7.88
1992 2663.81 23.22 2313.7 14.24 165.53 22.05 84.94 14.28 80.59 22.04 4.16
1993 3463.44 30.02 2625.8 13.49 195.70 18.23 91.74 12.98 103.96 35.01 -12.12
1994 4662.23 34.61 2958.3 12.66 236.62 20.91 121.01 31.71 115.61 11.13 5.25
1995 5826.05 24.96 3270.4 10.55 280.85 18.69 148.77 24.17 132.08 15.29 16.69
1996 6779.50 16.37 3587.6** 9.70 289.90 3.22 151.07 1.55 138.83 5.11 12.24
1997 7477.20 10.29 3904.3** 8.80 325.06 12.10 182.70 20.90 142.36 2.50 40.34
*: GDP90 denotes GDP in constant 1990 prices.
**: Calculated according to published annual growth rates based on comparable prices. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996b, 1997b); IMF (1997); Wen Wei Po  12/1/1998.
Both exports and imports expanded at a rapid pace. Exports in 1997 of US$182.70 
billion were equal to 18.74 times the exports of US$9.75 billion in 1978; while imports of 
US$142.36 billion were 13.07 times the imports of US$10.89 billion in 1978. The value of 
total trade (exports plus imports) increased from US$20.64 billion in 1978 to US$325.06 
billion in 1997. The annual average growth rate of foreign trade between 1979-1997 was 
15.61%, higher than that of GDP in real terms (9.9% in constant 1990 prices) in the same 
period. The average annual growth rates of exports and imports during this period were in 
the top range in the world. Related to the expansion of foreign trade, during the reform 
period, has been the introduction of a large amount of foreign capital into China’s economy. 
The actual used foreign investment in China during 1979-1997 reached US$346,405 billion 
(State Statistical Bureau 1997b; China’s Scholars Abroad 9/1/1998).
Changes in China’s trade regime and policies and the rapid growth of foreign trade in 
the past reform period have been impressive. Many people regard China’s trade reform as a 
success story. However, the fact that China has not been admitted as a member of the 
GATT/WTO,[2] after more than ten years of effort, has forced researchers to rethink China’s 
trade reform. China’s failure to enter the GATT/WTO suggests that reforms of the trade 
regime and policies in China have not satisfied the conditions of free trade, despite the fact 
that China’s economy has become much more open than it was. The question raised here is 
to what extent has China’s trade reform been successful? An appropriate assessment should 
be based on an analysis of China’s experience of foreign trade reform.
This study is an attempt to examine the process of China’s trade reform, and to evaluate 
the role of trade policy reform in the rapid development of the Chinese economy. Special 
emphasis is given to trade policy changes and their impact on China’s economy.
1.2 T he  F r a m e w o r k  o f  T h is  St u d y
1.2.1 The Theoretical Ground 
Free Trade and Trade Protection
In classical economics, foreign trade was considered important for economic growth. 
Adam Smith once explained that international trade is the principal means by which a 
country could extend the market beyond its territory. The development of foreign trade 
allows countries to realise greater specialisation in production, enhanced efficiency in the 
use of resources, and greater welfare. Through liberal transactions between countries (on 
the same basis as these within a country) a rational trade-induced division of labour 
becomes the main underlying condition for economic growth. David Ricardo introduced the 
concept of comparative advantage into the theory of international division of labour and 
showed that specialisation between countries based on comparative advantages may benefit 
all participants of international trade. According to the theory, different countries have their 
comparative advantage in different commodities. That is, a country produces a given 
commodity at lower opportunity cost than another country.1^  Free trade permits countries to 
specialise in different commodities according to their comparative advantage and allows 
each country to consume at least as much of each good as before specialisation. Moreover, 
free trade minimises the real cost of obtaining a given income or quantum of consumption 
for the world as a whole. The implication of Ricardo’s theory is that international trade
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becomes an effective tool for achieving economic efficiency (Gomes 1987, p. 139). The 
domestic economy of international trade participants can be benefited from mutual trade.
Neo-classical economics took over the classical view in regard of the linkages between 
trade and growth. Neo-classical trade theory regards specialisation according to 
comparative advantage yields gains from trade that increase the resources available for 
investment. Alfred Marshall, the first neo-classical economist, pointed out that “the causes 
which determine the economic progress of nations belong to the study of international 
trade” (Quoted by Ronald Findlay, see Findlay 1985). According to Marshall’s theory, foreign 
competition through trade (1) increases the efficiency of domestic industiy; (2) provides 
opportunities for the migration of capital and labour; (3) exerts an influence on the 
steadiness of employment; and (4) assists in the development of large-scale industiy (See 
Gomes 1990, p. 42). Bertil Ohlin, an important trade economist, identified the source of 
comparative advantage as lying in the nature of each country’s factor endowment. Free 
trade policy may lead to the best use of a country’s factor endowments. Each country has a 
comparative advantage in the products that use intensively the factor(s) in relative 
abundance in the country. Furthermore, international trade may have powerful indirect 
effects, exposing people to new ideas and technology which will shift out the production 
possibility frontier (Pomfret 1991, p. 198), Liberal trade policy will increase both domestic 
welfare and global welfare by permitting a fuller international division of labour according 
to comparative advantage.
Clearly, the neo-classical economics tradition regards market liberalisation and moves 
towards freer trade as crucial to improvement in the efficient allocation of resources. 
Haberler (1959) gives a synthetic expression of neo-classical theory on the contribution of 
trade to development:
“First, trade provides material means (capital goods, machineiy and raw and semi­
finished materials) indispensable for economic development. Secondly, even more 
important, trade is the means and vehicle for the dissemination of technological knowledge, 
the transmission of ideas, for the importation of know-how, skills, managerial talents and 
entrepreneurship. Thirdly, trade is also the vehicle for the international movement of capital 
especially from the developed to the undeveloped countries. Fourthly, free international trade 
is the best antimonopoly policy and the best guarantee for the maintenance of a healthy 
degree of free competition.” (Haberler 1959, reprinted in Theberge 1968, pp. 108-109)
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It is also worth noting that, in the course of the development of the neo-classical 
economics, some places have been left for the interventionist/protectionist views.[4] This 
distinguishes the neo-classical concept of free trade from laissez-faire regime (which is the 
real meaning of free trade in classical economics). But in the whole, neo-classical theory is 
understood as one which is based on the idea that prices clear markets. Interventions are 
only allowed as in a minimal mode to correct market distortions, for an efficient allocation 
of resources and the realisation of comparative advantage.
Distinguished from the traditional neo-classical theory, a set of thinking on trade and 
development so-called “neo-liberalism” has grown up and become influential since the 
1980s. The neo-liberalism also persists in the principle of comparative advantage, but 
argues further that imperfect markets are better than imperfect states in resource allocation. 
Anne Krueger (1997, 1995), who is classified as one of the five leading authors of the neo­
liberalism,[5] criticises the phenomenon that the economics profession with consensus on 
principle of comparative advantage misuses the good theory and embraces a highly 
protectionist policy stance. With an assessment based on the East Asian experience that 
developing countries could develop rapidly and would not be necessary to be specialised in 
production of primary commodities, Krueger calls for a deeper integration between 
developing countries and the international economy. Holding the principle of comparative 
advantage, adopting outward-oriented trade strategy and liberalising trade policies are 
considered crucial for industrialisation and economic development in developing countries.
A new growth theory developed in recent years stresses the role of openness in trade 
and export externalities as positive factors in promoting long run growth. This theory holds 
that trade may play an important role in the diffusion of modem technology and know-how 
across countries. With international spillovers of knowledge and technology, a countiy may 
obtain new technology from its counterparts to develop its own potential of comparative 
advantage (Grossman and Helpman 1990). The pattern of international specialisation will also 
be dynamically changed in accord with newly formed comparative advantages in nations. 
By “learning by doing”,1^  a newly open country may opt for the industry with high growth 
potential and experience more rapid economic growth. This is because that the effect of 
learning by doing (imitation) could lower the cost of development for late comers and 
knowledge spillovers from advanced countries become a source for speeding up economic
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growth. On the other hand, imitation by the late comers also has reinforcing effects on 
industrial countries to develop new technology for keeping up their leading positions.
Beside the theories for free trade, there are also arguments backing the requirement of 
trade protection. The oldest and most popular issue of trade protection is the infant industiy 
argument. The essence of the argument is: There are some industries which are initially not 
competitive in the world markets but having a comparative advantage in the long term. 
Such industries in their early stages (i.e., as infant industries) require temporary protection 
by government intervention against their well-developed foreign competitors. Protection 
can be removed once the infant industries have grown up and become able to withstand 
foreign competition.
Structuralism was one of the most influential post-war trends of thought on 
development, especially in the developing world. A key frame of the structuralist view is 
that the world has become a “centre-periphery” dichotomy. The mature industrialised 
economies at the “centre” specialised in manufactures and benefited from scale economies. 
The developing countries at the “periphery” specialised in producing low-productivity 
primary products. These essential differences of economic structure ensure that the gains 
from trade are steered towards the “centre”, and the “periphery” has to be in a dependency 
status in the world economy. Structuralists consider that the unfavourable structure of the 
international economy caused market failure or market imperfection. In developing foreign 
trade, developing countries have to face problems such as terms of trade decline, export 
instability, pervasive infant industries and a maldistribution of the gains from trade. Very 
naturally interventionist trade policy, which tends to inward-orientation, has been adopted 
by developing countries to avoid such unfavourable impacts of the external economy. In 
practice, the import substitution sectors have been promoted by protection in forms of high 
tariffs, strict import quotas and over-valued exchange rates.
More recently, a so-called “strategic trade theory” (or “new trade theory”) concerns 
imperfect competition in international trade and the corresponding government policies. On 
the whole, this theory may not be regarded a protectionism theory. But there is something 
to be noted. This theory is based on two major assumptions. One is that markets are both 
oligopolistic and segmented. Finns are able to affect or change prices in different markets
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and obtain superprofits or monopolistic profits. The other is the existence of economies of 
scale. Trade development (especially the export externality) brings an opportunity to reach 
the effect of increasing return to scale that causes real economic growth. A crucial concept 
of the strategic trade theory is “profit-shifting”. Aggressive government policies aiming at 
economies of scale and export expansion, such as export subsidies, tariffs, and other 
industrial policies, may shift profits from a foreign firm to its domestic competitor. The 
domestic firm may benefit fi'om the effect of increasing return to scale. Although this 
theoiy is built upon the special phenomenon of oligopolistic competition and rarely 
matched the cases of developing countries, the idea for the strategic use of government 
policy is likely to be a new root of government intervention.
The Variety o f Trade Policy
Trade policy had been regarded as a matter of domestic concern. Although the 
principles of comparative advantage and free trade have been widely accepted, there were 
still some questions frequently raised concerning the required underlying conditions which 
would determine attitude towards free trade. Different views on the role of foreign trade in 
economic development prompted economists to explore their policy implications from 
these different approaches. In the absence of a generalised long-term trade policy applicable 
at all times and in all contexts, international trade theories and their associated trade 
policies have historically been classified broadly into free trade and trade protection 
schools.
However, the development of trade policy has been more complicated than what have 
been identified in theories. It is important to make a distinction between prescriptive 
policies and actual policies. The former are normative policy recommendations which 
come from the arguments of economists 011 the basis of normative trade theory, while the 
latter are the outcome of policy-making based on the weight of economic and non­
economic factors. Prescriptive trade policies may be “first-best”, sometimes optimal, given 
that these policies stress the welfare maximisation at both national and international levels. 
Actual trade policies, as affected by political factors, divergence from the “first-best” trade 
policies. The long-lasting controversy between free trade and trade protection has been 
reflected in the differences between prescriptive and actual trade policies.
Before World War I, mainstream economics appreciated the contribution of 
international trade. It was thought that the imposition of tariffs would disturb the optimal 
allocation of resources and lower the potential benefits the countries could obtain. In 
contrast, by enlarging markets beyond national territories, free trade could increase the 
welfare of individual countries and the world economy as a whole. As classical economics 
dominated within the major economies, a free trade system was considered to be the ideal 
situation and was therefore the principle behind trade policy making. In practice, most 
advanced capitalist countries, such as Britain and France at the time, made great efforts to 
develop foreign trade as one of the main sources of investment and economic development.
Although protectionist arguments had some influence on trade policy choice over time, 
free trade theory and policy had not met any strong challenges until World War I , or rather 
as late as the 1930s. The 1929-1933 Great Depression restarted protectionist policy and led 
to a series of discretionary and uncoordinated trade policy changes. In the 1930s, the trade 
policies of the major economies featured high tariff protection. Before World War II, 
protectionist policy developed to a new peak and was accompanied by various trade wars 
(involving tariffs, quotas, and import regulations) between countries.
Soon after World War II, with the rapid recovery of the world economy from the 
damage of the war, economic expansion stimulated by trade development led to a free, open 
and more stable world trade system. Consequently there was a call for liberalisation of the 
international trade regime. The signing of GATT in 1947 ensured that the effort became 
international. The aims of GATT were to provide a set of rules to govern trade between the 
contracting parties, and promote reductions in trade barriers. The main economies in the 
world, at the time, took part in this movement towards trade liberalisation and the number 
of participants increased significantly over succeeding decades. Since the establishment of 
the GATT, great progress has been made in reducing tariffs on industrial goods. Since the 
Tokyo Round negotiations (1973-1979), increasing attempts have been made to reduce non- 
tariff trade barriers. In the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the range of negotiations was 
greatly extended. Through the multilateral negotiations held under GATT, a greater degree 
of trade liberalisation has been achieved. The world trading system has become freer and 
now plays an important role in linking the economies in the world.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, while developed countries were devoted to trade liberalisation, 
the import substitution (IS) strategy, that usually featured numerous protection measures, 
was widely adopted in the developing world. However, beginning in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, this inward-looking trade policy gradually “faded out”. A number of 
developing countries switched over to more outward-looking, export promotion (EP) 
policies. From this shift, in the 1980s, emerged a new round in the liberalisation effort. 
Trade policy reform, either as the result of economic adjustment or as the crucial means for 
launching a new development drive, spread rapidly throughout the developing world.
By and large, free trade policy increasingly has been the main trend in the post-war 
period. However, the road to trade liberalisation has not been without setbacks. Ironically, 
in the late-1970s, developed countries started extending, reintroducing and creating non­
tariff banders to trade, and this trend continued into the 1980s (Page 1993). Protectionist 
pressures once again influenced trade policy-making in all countries. The WTO reported 
that, in the early and mid-1980s, high tariffs were widespread in developing countries and 
non-tariff barriers were common in both developed and developing countries (WTO 1996). In 
developed countries, while tariffs remained low, non-tariff barriers increased significantly. 
Developed countries’ imports affected by non-tariff barriers rose from 25.3% in 1966 to 
48.0% in 1986, almost doubling in the twenty years (Laird and Yeats 1990).
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, in which participants committed 
themselves to continued trade liberalisation, has weakened the momentum of the new 
protectionism. Agreed tariff reductions,^ elimination of non-tariff measures and the 
extension of liberalisation to services and other trade-related areas have brought some 
optimism towards trade liberalisation. The establishment of the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism has greatly increased transparency in the trade policies and practices of the 
WTO members. This shows that the international community is still confident in 
establishing a freer world trade system based on market rules which promotes growth in 
line with comparative advantage.
Trade Policy Reform
The variety of trade policy accommodated the discrepancies in theories. It is an interest 
to note the evolution of thought about trade policy. Corden (1974, 1997) identified three
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stages of thought: free trade as an extension of laissez-faire, trade intervention as the 
second-best for the case of free trade, and trade instrument as the one of the all distortion- 
correcting policy instrumentsJ^ In the sense of the above three-stage classification, the 
evolution of economic thought about trade policy can be understood as the follows.
In the first stage, the classical tradition of liberalism dominated economics thought. 
Free trade was considered a special case of laissez-faire. Under certain circumstance, free 
flows of commodities and perfect functioning of the markets may lead to an optimum with 
maximum welfare for trading parties. Any trade intervention is therefore unnecessary.
The second stage of thought came to the recognition that the presumption for a perfect 
competition in favour of laissez-faire cannot be met. The arguments for intervention in 
trade emerged as that some market failures make free trade inappropriate. On the other 
hand, for the case for free or freer trade, a “theory of the second best”[9] had been 
developed, in support to pursuing a constrained optimum —  a second-best optimum under 
insufficient conditions for Pareto optimality.
In the third stage of thought, important developments have been seen in several aspects. 
First, “the link between the case for free trade and the case for laissez-faire was broken” 
(Corden 1997, p. 3). There is a recognition that some policy intervention may be in need to 
correct distortions. Therefore, in a distorted world, there is no presumption that laissez-faire 
is optimal. Second, there is also no presumption that trade intervention is appropriate 
(Corden 1997; Brenton et al. 1997). Many distortions to be corrected are caused by “domestic” 
factors rather than by trade itself. The first-best instrument that focuses more directly upon 
the distortion should be used instead of trade policy, because trade policy is too remote 
from the distortion. It is not necessary to emphasise the use of trade policy because policy 
instruments themselves also create distortions. In this sense, free trade is optimal. Third, in 
some circumstance when the direct instruments are not used, or cannot be used, trade 
intervention may still be better than nothing (Corden 1997, p. 3). This means that trade policy 
is still one of a wide range of policy instruments for distortion correction. However, in 
using trade policy, it is important to ensure the effect to be beneficial. The choice between 
different policies should follow a principle that the costs of using the instrument will not 
outweigh the benefits.
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Over the recent decades, there are numerous studies 011 the use of trade policy. Most 
importantly, given the relevance of this study, the following aspects need to be noted. First, 
the “theory of domestic distortion” established the principle that most distortion result from 
domestic factors rather than from external trade. Trade policy is therefore not the best 
instrument of dealing with the distortion (Johnson 1965; Bhagwati 1969; Corden 1974, 1997). 
Excessive use of trade instrument could have less effect than the direct means to the 
objective. In addition, trade policy may also create distortion. The significance of the theory 
of domestic distortion is that it restores the argument for free or freer trade. Second, besides 
domestic distortion, there are also trade distortions, especially in a highly protected trade 
regime. Trade distortions are usually reflected in the costs of protection. Many studies have 
shown effective analyses on this topic, covering a wide range of trade policies including 
tariffs, quotas, exchange rate and other non-tariff measures.1-101 Third, a number of analytic 
tools, such as “revealed comparative advantage” index, “trade regime bias” ratio, “effective 
protection rate”, measurement of openness, econometric models, and so on, have been 
developed to measure the effects of trade policy. This enabled researchers to examine trade 
policy in a deeper level and estimate the impacts of trade policies accurately.
With the progress in the recognition of the role of trade policy, changes in trade policy 
became highly demanded in all countries, especially in the developing world. As trade 
liberalisation remains the main trend in the world of trade, developing countries which have 
previously adopted trade protection are faced with the task of reforming their trade policies 
in order to pursue outward-oriented development or obtain stronger incentives for domestic 
growth through trade expansion. The significance of trade policy reform is explicable in the 
following two expectations. First, in a distorted circumstance, trade policy reform intends to 
reduce the excessive use of trade instruments, leaving the distortions to be tackled with 
direct counter-measures. The reduction of trade intervention would enabled that trade flow 
freely, benefiting trade parties with improvement of resource utilisation. Second, with 
regal'd to “market failures”, trade policy plays the role as one of the instruments serving the 
target of market completion. On the whole, the most important task of trade policy reform 
is to restore the constrained natures of market mechanism which has been proven the most 
powerful means to efficiency, and then growth.
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The concept of trade policy reform in economic literature is very close to “trade 
liberalisation”. Or, at least, trade policy reform is regarded as the most important ingredient 
of trade liberalisation. As Thomas et al (1991, p. 10) indicated, “most objections to trade 
policy reform concern measures that are generally encompassed by the term liberalisation”.
But what is trade liberalisation? Economists presented various definitions. Dean et al 
(1994) classified the main definitions of trade liberalisation into four categories. The first 
considers that trade liberalisation should lead to more reliance on the price mechanism, and 
a reduction in the anti-export bias of the trade regime. The second concerns the policy 
action that reduces the restriction of controls. The third emphasises neutrality as the central 
aspect of liberalisation. The fourth is an aggregate definition that includes the ingredients of 
neutrality and liberality. In addition, the fourth may be a phased liberalisation. This regards 
trade liberalisation as going through the phases of “mild liberalisation” (increased reliance 
on the price mechanism and reduced anti-export bias), “intensive liberalisation” (moving to 
neutrality), and “drastic form of liberalisation” (increased liberality).
Edwards (1989a), after a systematic survey of the definitions of this concept, pointed out 
that the definition close to that of the original Kmeger-Bhagwati NBER project would be 
“the most usefiil one”:
“Trade liberalisation is a process that makes greater use of the price system, making the 
trade regime more transparent and bringing domestic prices closer to world prices.” (Edwards 
1989a)
This definition emphasises the dominance of market price mechanisms in the trade process. 
It also contains the requirements of neutrality. With the reduction of anti-export bias, and 
particularly the removal of quantitative restrictions, trade liberalisation would lead to a 
more neutral and transparent regime. As a “process”, trade liberalisation could also be 
earned out in a phased manner.
Based on the spirit of trade liberalisation, Thomas and Nash (1992) gave their definition 
of “trade policy reform” as follows:
“It covers measures that move the trade regime toward a more neutral incentive 
framework for foreign trade, toward a more liberal trade regime, or toward both. Neutrality 
refers to incentives among and between exportables and importables, between sales to 
domestic and export markets, and between tradables and non-tradables. A more liberal trade
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reg im e refers to the  reduction  o f  controls and to the rep lacem ent o f  d irect interventions by 
price m echan ism .” (Thomas and Nash 1992)
In light of the above definitions, a general understanding of trade liberalisation which is 
used here involves three main aspects. They are the increase of trade regime transparency, 
the reductions of import barriers and the normalisation of export incentives. The latter two 
are the core of trade policy reform, while the first may be regarded as the precondition or 
environmental support to hade policy reforms. In this study, trade policy reform is broadly 
defined as reshaping the existing policy measures in order to create a favourable 
environment for trade expansion. Specifically, hade policy reform refers to the significant 
changes in policy measures towards a neutral or freer trade policy system. Obviously, trade 
policy reform is only a part of trade liberalisation.
Trade policy reform involves a large number of policy changes. Thomas et al. (1991) 
classified the main reform measures into three categories: export policy reform, import 
policy reform and the correction of hade regime bias. They found that great attention has 
been paid to the reduction of quantitative restrictions whilst moderate effort has been given 
to tariff adjustments (pp. 27-29). Dean et al. (1994) examined the following four aspects of 
hade policy reforms: import tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, export 
impediments and incentives, and the degree of exchange rate misalignment (p. 11). Other 
similar studies (e.g. Papageorgiou et al. 1991) also showed the same components of 
liberalisation (trade policy reform). Institutional reforms and reforms in some trade-related 
areas including administrative management, legal systems, foreign investment policy, and 
even the foreign exchange rate system are important parts of trade liberalisation but do not 
constitute the “pure” components of trade policy reform.
Although, in most cases, export policies need to be reformed, import liberalisation has 
become the focus of trade policy reform on all sides, whether members of the reform 
movement or not. There are two reasons behind such an emphasis. Import liberalisation is 
all the more important in order to bring about competition, to promote exports, and to help 
control inflation, since creating workable domestic competition will take time in developing 
small and medium-sized economies (Koves and Marer 1991). Another fact is that import 
barriers in developing countries are higher than in the developed world. For greater 
compatibility with the world economy, import liberalisation, as a cost for expanding 
external markets, becomes the core ingredient of trade policy refoim.
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1.2.2 Focusing on China’s Trade Policy Reform 
The Central Themes of China’s Trade Policy Reform
Before reform, China’s foreign trade featured “state trade” or “over-centralisation”. 
Foreign trade, functioning mainly as a channel through which China exported goods to pay 
for the import of equipment and other production materials, was considered simply a means 
of meeting the balance of materials required for domestic economic development. Due to 
the dominance of central planning, trade policy had 110 place in the regulation of trade 
flows. The planning authority assumed the responsibility for sorting out the items and 
quantities of goods that had to be imported. The total amount of trade, the prices of the 
import and export products, the variety and the specification of the trading goods, and even 
the exchange channel, were assigned by the state through the annual foreign trade plans. 
The foreign trade corporations (FTCs), under the state’s supervision, were responsible for 
implementing the state’s foreign trade plans.
China began its trade reform when it adopted an open-door policy at the end of the 
1970s. Starting with the devolution of trading power, which implied the reduction of direct 
centrally-planning controls, trade policies became increasingly powerful instruments for 
adjusting foreign trade activities. Twenty years on, China has experienced significant trade 
policy change, including introducing trade policy instruments, formalising export incentives 
and liberalising import restrictions.
China’s trade policy reform can be roughly divided into two major phases. The first 
phase was the late-1970s and 1980s, China concentrated on decentralisation (administrative 
devolution). With the progress of reform and the gradual understanding on market forces, 
some trade policies (mainly relative to export incentives) were reformed. But these reforms 
were mainly administrative adjustments rather than market reforms. The second phase is 
the period since 1991 dining which China has carried out its intensive trade policy reform 
based on market reform, and reform emphasis turned towards reducing import barriers. 
China has eventually incorporated all aspects of trade policy reform. The significance of the 
full-ranged trade policy reform is that China has moved into the right track for trade 
liberalisation and is moving closer to international trade practice.
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Different countries might claim various targets of trade policy reforms. Many reform 
packages have the same goals but with different levels of priority. A common feature for 
the reforming countries, regardless of their different initial conditions, is that they want to 
accelerate the development process. Trade policy reform is considered a crucial breaking 
point for further development in an increasingly interdependent world. For this final effect, 
trade policy reform is in most cases expected to (1) expand exports, (2) improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation, (3) enhance international competitiveness by improving 
technological capabilities, (4) help domestic economic stabilisation by increasing export 
revenue, and (5) establish a neutral or freer trade regime. Among these objectives, export 
expansion is the priority in most trade policy reform cases. With regard to the basic 
components of trade policy reform, China shares many similarities with other reforming 
countries. What distinguishes China from other reforming countries is the reform approach. 
That is, China’s initial economic conditions and ideological inheritance.
Concerning China’s situation before reform, a wide range of trade policy reforms were 
needed, simply because the starting point was a centrally planned trade regime. In 
particular, the lack of the market forces in foreign trade posed the biggest obstacle to 
meeting standard trade policies, in line with international practice. It is not clear to what 
extent China was wrong to have ignored the importance of a fully functioning market 
system until as late as the early 1990s, some 15 years after the launch of reform. This 
neglect was a reflection of the fact that China was not prepared to touch all aspects of trade 
policy in the early stages of reform.
Trade policy reform, or more widely trade and economic liberalisation, may be started 
from very different situations. Historically, there have been at least two different patterns at 
the beginning of liberalisation: some countries have launched their reforms in a state of 
crisis, and others have begun reform under favourable internal and external conditions 
(Langhammer 1991). Most countries began to liberalise their economies in difficult 
circumstances, with a severely distorted price mechanism, resulting from government 
intervention over a long period. In this case, trade policy reforms were usually undertaken 
as a part of macroeconomic stabilisation measures, in response to economic crises faced by 
these countries. Latin America and Africa had a number of countries in this category. Other 
countries that conducted their trade policy reforms in favourable conditions were more
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likely to move toward a more liberal trade regime. Most newly industrialised economies 
(NIEs) in trade policy reform were in this group. For these countries, their interests were in 
accelerating the pace of economic growth. Trade policy reform was regarded as a means to 
enhance productivity and competitiveness, enlarge external markets and integrate deeply 
with the world economy.
There is a third kind of country, those that started trade policy reforms neither in serious 
crisis nor in extremely favourable circumstances. China was in this category. Perkins (1991) 
noted that China’s 4-5% a year GNP growth in the two decades prior to reform does not 
seem slow. Unlike those countries classified into the above two categories, China’s trade 
policy reform centred on “catching-up” efforts. However, China’s trade policy reform still 
had to address the problem of economic stabilisation following the exposure of its 
previously isolated economy to world markets. All trade policy reform measures were 
carried out with an emphasis on both economic stabilisation and increasing openness. Note 
that this situation at the beginning of reform enabled China to choose a moderate approach 
to trade policy reform; rather than a rushed transformation to overall liberalisation.
The adoption of gradual reform has also been due to the requirements generated by the 
“socialist characteristics” of the Chinese economy. The public ownership system and the 
long-lasting planning management have established a tradition of government intervention 
in China. Although the central planning control has significantly declined and the size of 
public ownership system has been reduced in the course of economic reform, there is no 
strong evidence to suggest that China will totally abolish these systems. Instead, China has 
clearly stated that capitalism and privatisation are not the goals of China’s reform (Li 
Lanqing 1996, Li Zhengzhou 1996a). Given the existence of a sizeable public ownership system, 
government intervention is likely to play an important role in administering economic 
development in the country. In fact, China’s trade policy reform over the past two decades, 
especially the 1980s, has been heavily driven by government intervention.
Indeed, the role of government intervention has been a key aspect in trade policy choice 
and has remained a debated issue. In fact, the above mentioned evolution of economic 
thought about trade policy has very much concerned this issue. In theory, free trade should 
enable countries to obtain the maximum gains from trade to promote economic growth and
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increase national welfare. Trade policy, in this sense, should fully rely on the operation of 
the market mechanism, with no intervention in trade activities. In practice, the history of 
international trade has shown a basic (although phased) trend towards trade liberalisation, 
given the increasingly recognised positive linkages between trade and economic 
development. The widespread trade policy reform in developing countries since the 1980s 
reflects the importance of trade liberalisation in a country’s development.
However, a pure free trade or laissez-faire regime cannot be found in the reality. 
Government intervention has been an ingredient of trade policy in almost all countries, to 
varying degrees. The extent to which trade policies can be liberalised is subject to the 
features of the trade regime pursued by different countries. Interestingly, for example, there 
are two contrasting interpretations of the Asian NICs’ rapid growth in recent decades. The 
neo-classical view is that these economies have “got their prices right”. This means that the 
most important factor in the NICs’ growth is that these economies have relied upon the 
price mechanism to realise the efficiency of resource allocation (W oronoff 1992). The non- 
neo-classical explanation stresses the role of government in actively promoting export- 
oriented industrialisation (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Levy 1993). In reality, evidence of the 
market mechanism or trade liberalisation and of government intervention can be foimd in 
East Asian economies. The crucial point is that these two factors have been, in some ways, 
combined. Chinese economists and policy makers have laid great emphasis on the 
experience of East Asian economies, and in particular on the possibility of the coexistence 
of trade liberalisation and government intervention.
Consequently, the motives for trade policy reform in China have contained two 
prescriptively opposite themes. One is to liberalise trade to promote economic growth. 
Trade policy reform reflected the economic rationale of ensuring that sustained 
development in the country is consistent with its comparative advantage. Liberalised trade 
may enable the country to expand the economy, improve effectiveness and promote growth, 
through increasing utilisation of foreign resources. The other is to continue government 
intervention to maintain the public-ownership-based socialist economic and trade system. 
Not surprisingly, China sought (at least intended) an approach that served its dual 
requirements. China’s trade policy reform has actually become government oriented, due to 
the fact that the government intended to use market forces but not fully to yield to them.
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This begs the question: Is there another way towards trade liberalisation other than the 
neo-classical approach relying totally on the price mechanism? To provide evidence in 
order to answer this question, this study investigates the two following major issues. First, 
how has China reformed its trade policies with strong government intervention? Second, is 
China’s government-oriented trade policy reform an effective effort that can lead the 
country to a freer trade regime in accord with its own conditions?
The Significance of Theoretical Issues for China's Reform
As mentioned, free trade (or trade liberalisation), which is much appreciated by the 
mainstream contemporary economics (namely neo-classical economics), has been regarded 
as the target of China’s trade policy reform. Regardless of the gap between China’s 
liberalisation attempt and the principles of western mainstream economics, China is moving 
towards freer trade. Therefore, it is important to assess how much China has achieved, and 
will achieve, in liberalising its trade policies in accordance with the standard principles of 
free trade.
This attempt to apply free trade theory to research on China’s trade policy reform does 
not mean that free trade theory has been the dominant ideology guiding Chinese economists 
and trade policy makers. For some other reasons relating to their ideological issues and 
special development affairs, Chinese economists and policy makers have tried to find 
support for their requirements of protection, late liberalisation and government intervention 
in other non-orthodox theories. Reasons for China’s attitude toward western economic 
theories should be noted.
First, China’s economy is in a stage of transition from a centralised economy to a 
“socialist market economy”. Many industries under previously planned system were closed 
or protected. The adoption of the open-door policy was based on the desire to promote 
economic development by adjusting the growth mechanism, rather than directing the 
country toward a liberal economy. The concepts of “market economy” and “free trade 
system” as stated by Chinese government will be imbued with strong “Chinese 
characteristics”, It is unrealistic, at least up to the present, to expect that China’s trade 
policy reform will fully follow the instruction of free trade theory.
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Second, although free trade, which is thought optimal, seems to dominate the ideology 
of world trade policy, today’s international trading system is not a “pme” free trade system. 
Trade protection and government intervention, in various forms, have significant influences 
obstructing trade liberalisation. The fact that protection measures co-exist with free trade 
policies in almost all countries enables China to have certain reservations in its course of 
trade policy reform.
Third, traditional trade theories are dependent on some assumptions that remain some 
distance from reality. Based on this gap, both orthodox and non-orthodox economists have 
tried to explore and debate the unresolved issues. Apart from the development of neo­
classical international economics, there are also some other theories offering different 
explanations of trade policies. Moreover, applications of trade theories in an individual 
country also have to fit the special circumstance of the country. These theories will 
certainly be reflected in the thinking of Chinese economists and policy makers on trade 
policy reform.
As noted, this study places an emphasis 011 China’s experience of trade policy reform, 
rather than providing a perfect theoretical interpretation on the basis of a single theory. 
Instead, due to the various motives behind China’s trade policy reform, the theoretical 
framework for the analysis has to be open. However, again, free trade theory remains the 
main grounding for this study. Certain effort is paid to seeking a connecting point between 
various theories, for a better interpretation of China’s experience.
1.2.3 The Structure of the Thesis
In this thesis, the theme of China’s trade policy reform is dealt in the following way: 
The shift of trade strategy as an aggregate reflection of changes in trade policy is the 
starting point of this study. However, due to the fact that China’s trade policy reform has 
been adopted and carried on in a process of economic transition, an examination of trade- 
related institutional reforms must be given before starting the analysis of trade strategy 
shift. For the same reason, some discussion of the trade regime is logically included in this 
study, where applicable and appropriate. Following the analysis on general trade policy 
(trade strategy), the main body of research investigates how China has moved towards trade
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liberalisation, through detailed analysis of changes in hade policies. This is followed by an 
examination of the effects of China’s trade policy reform from both domestic and 
international perspectives. A conclusive evaluation of China’s trade policy reform is given 
at the end of this thesis.
The remaining chapters are arranged as follows: Chapter 2 examines institutional 
reform in the field of foreign trade which is regarded as a precondition of, and support to, 
trade policy reform. Chapter 3 reviews the foundation of trade policy choices —  foreign 
trade strategies —  in order to explain the general trend of China’s trade policies. Chapters 4 
and 5 provide a detailed examination of China’s trade policy changes and their impact on 
trade growth. Chapter 4 deals with the aspects of export policies while Chapter 5 concerns 
the changes in import policies. The following two chapters, Chapters 6 and 7, discuss the 
impact of China’s trade policy reform from domestic and international perspectives. 
Chapter 6 conducts a series of statistical and econometric analyses, concentrating on the 
relationship between trade policy reforms and China’s economic performance, while 
Chapter 7 discusses the international impact of China’s trade policy reform and the role of 
external factors in the reform process. Chapter 8 draws some conclusions relating to 
China’s experience and the direction of China’s future trade policy reform.
^  The ratio o f  foreign trade to GDP should be treated as a nominal degree o f  openness. The real significance o f this 
indicator needs to be further analysed in combination with the hade pattern. In the case o f  China, there was a large 
portion o f  foreign trade related to processing trade. Without appropriate adjustment, the ratio o f  foreign trade to GDP 
may cause an overestimation o f  the real degree o f  openness. For a detailed analysis o f  the real degree o f openness see 
Chapter 6.
China officially applied for its status in GATT in 1986. The GATT was replaced by the WTO from 1 January 1995. 
After then China’s application became to join the WTO. In this study, where relevant, China’s application may be 
expressed as relating either to GATT or to the WTO as appropriate. Otherwise the expression used w ill be GATT/WTO.
I3J The theory o f  comparative advantage was reformulated in terms o f  opportunity costs by Haberler (1929).
^  As written by Haberler (1936), "Since M ill gave his approval, the infant-industry argument has been accepted in 
principle by many Free Trade economists" (quoted by Corden (1973), reprinted in Corden 1997, p. 139). Evans (1989, 
1991) provided brief reviews on the subject that certain interventionist arguments have been sheltered in neo-classical 
theory.
[5] The five leading authors o f  the neo-liberalism are Balassa, Bauer, Krueger, Lai and Little, according to Colclough 
(1991), pp. 5-6.
[6] “Leaning-by-doing” is sometimes treated as an argument for protection (see for example Dornbush 1992). It may be 
true that protection w ill be called for if  the “learning-by-doing” activities are based on IS strategy and on the 
imperfections o f  capital market. In such a circumstance, firms are easily tending to seek “infant industry” status for 
protected development and likely to be reluctant to engage in the development o f  the productivity. However, it is not
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necessary to provide protection for all “learning-by-doing” activities. On contrast, openness in trade may shorten the 
period o f  “leaning-by-doing” and force firms to concentrate on its own research and development based on what they 
have leant.
In the Uruguay Round, the developed countries made average trade-weighted tariff cuts o f  40% on industrial products. 
For developed markets as a group, the tariff average is scheduled to be reduced from 6.3% to 3.8%. For developing 
economies, a reduction o f  ceiling rates for tariffs leading to a decline o f  30% in the trade-weighted average tariff.
[8] The periods for these stages are that, as classified by Corden (1974, 1997), the first stage lasted until the end o f  the 
19th century, followed the second stage active until the 1960s, and afterwards the third stage.
^  The “theory o f  the second best”(Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) demonstrates that if  one or more conditions for Pareto 
optimality cannot be achieved due to some distortion or constraints, the other conditions also will not be necessarily 
satisfied for a constrained (second-best) optimum. A constrained optimum can be roughly understood as the possible 
maximum to be achieved under the existing conditions in the reality.
It is impossible to obtain a perfect list o f  literature on the effects o f trade policies since the amount o f  work in this 
category is extremely huge. But it is worth to mention some important work. On general cost o f  protection, see the work 
o f  Corden and that o f  Johnson in various years. On effective protection, see Corden (1966, 1971, 1974, 1997), Balassa 
(1971), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973). On tariffs and quotas, see Balassa (1965), Bhagwati (1969), Bhagwati and 
Ramaswami (1963), Corden (1966, 1997). For a survey on partial or whole o f  the topic, see Baldwin (1984), Corden 
(1984), Krueger (1984, 1997), Havrylyshyn (1990), Bruton (1989), Bliss (1989), Greenaway (1988), Erzan et al. (1989), 
Anderson (1994), Anderson and Neary (1994). With regard to trade policy reform, see Thomas and Nash et al. (1991), 
Papageorgiou et al. (1991), Rodrik(1992, 1995), Dean e ta l .  (1994).
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Institutional Reform in Foreign Trade
The most important feature of China’s economic reform has been decentralisation. 
Decentralisation has had two major aspects. One was the deregulation of central 
government administration over economic activities. The other was the emergence of the 
market mechanism in the national economic system. In the field of foreign trade, 
decentralisation first led to institutional reforms and then resulted in many trade policy 
changes. This chapter concentrates on the institutional reforms in the foreign trade sector.
2.1 D e v o l u t io n  o f  T r a d in g  R ig h t s
2.1.1 Institutional Reorganisation
Prior to reform, China’s foreign hade was centrally controlled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade (MOFT) and conducted through some twelve state-owned foreign trade 
corporations (FTCs). Export producers and the consumers of imports lacked direct 
interaction with world markets. Consequently, export producers could not adapt their 
products to the needs of the world market and domestic producers could not introduce and 
use foreign advanced technology and equipment properly or efficiently. The potential 
development of foreign trade was heavily constrained and so was economic growth.
Administrative Adjustments
Because of its institutional setting, the stalling point for China’s hade policy reforms 
was different from those of other developing countries. The prerequisite of trade policy 
reform was to transform the centrally planned foreign trade system to a more liberalised 
one. As the first step towards liberalisation, the decentralisation of foreign trade 
management took place soon after The Third Plenum of the 11th Communist Party Central 
Committee held in late 1978, although at the beginning it was only a trial measure.^ A 
highly significant event was that, in July 1979, the Central Committee of the Party and the 
State Council jointly issued a document which allowed both Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces to start reforms ahead of other provinces through implementing “special policies 
and flexible measures”. The implementation period was five years from 1979 to 1984 and 
then extended for another five years from 1985 to 1989 (Gu Mu 1985). The main components
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of the special policies were to (1) implement the “Budgetary Contracting Systems” so that 
the provincial government should sign a contract with the central government to fix the 
amount of revenue remittance for a specified period and to take responsibility for local 
fiscal revenues and expenditures; (2) expand local authority over the management of 
foreign trade and other foreign economic activities; (3) grant authority to the local 
governments to deal flexibly in the areas of finance, materials, labour, wages and prices; 
and (4) establish special economic zones in these two provinces (Lin Ruo et al. 1992). Then, 
through the implementation of special policies and flexible measures, both provinces began 
to reform their trade systems.
Following the opening-up and reform of foreign trade in Guangdong and Fujian, also 
since 1979, the administrative devolution extended to some other coastal provinces and 
cities. By January 1981, three municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai), four 
provinces (Guangdong, Fujian, Liaoning and Hebei) and one autonomous region (Guangxi) 
were granted the rights to establish their own trading enterprises to operate foreign trade 
within their jurisdictions. Although these local FTCs were under the dual leadership of the 
local governments and the MOFT, the real significance was that the state trade monopoly 
was beginning to be dismantled.
At the central government level, institutional changes also signalled the progress of 
reform. In 1979, some administrative agents related to foreign trade including the Foreign 
Investment Control Committee (FICC), the Export and Import Management Committee 
(EIMC), the General Administration of Customs (GAC) and the General Administration of 
Foreign Exchange Control (GAFEC) were established. In 1982, a new Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) was established to replace the old MOFT and 
absorb several departments including the FICC, the EIMC, and the Ministry of Economic 
Relations with Foreign Countries (MFERFC). In 1983, to help with the decentralised 
management of foreign trade, the MOFERT dispatched special representatives to the four 
main ports of Guangzhou, Shanghai, Tianjin and Dalian. All these agents took an active 
role in co-ordinating and promoting the process of decentralisation.
The aim of decentralisation of foreign trade was to break up the existing state trading 
monopolies. However, decentralisation before 1984 was simply a devolution of
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administrative powers from central government to provinces and ministries. No significant 
measure had been taken to separate trade enterprises from their administrative authorities.
Transforming Foreign Trade Enterprises
On 15 September 1984, the State Council approved a MOFERT report proposing 
reforms in the foreign trade system. This led to a new phase of trade reform aiming at: (1) 
separating FTCs from their administrative departments, (2) developing an “agency system” 
in foreign trade operations, (3) simplifying the contents of foreign trade plans, and (4) 
combining industrial production, technological progress with foreign trade and linking up 
export and import activities {People’s Daily 20/9/1984). The core task was to transform FTCs 
into independent entities. Foreign trade administrative departments (MOFERT and the 
provincial committees) were to be responsible for making general policy, drafting trade 
plans, issuing export and import licences, and co-ordinating all related aspects. 
Correspondingly, all FTCs, as independent entities, would handle foreign trade as a part of 
their day-to-day functions and be responsible for their own profits and losses.
Unfortunately, due to inadequate reforms in relevant areas, especially in fiscal and 
financial sectors, the effect of separating FTCs from their administrative departments was 
unsuccessful. Most FTCs continued to operate under the supervision of their higher 
administrative departments. Direct government control remained the main tool of foreign 
trade management. It was for the same reason that little progress was made on developing 
the agency system and integrating production and technology development with foreign 
trade in this period.
With regard to the lack of incentives for FTCs to promote the growth of exports, in 
1988, the State Coimcil decided to apply the “contract responsibility system” to the foreign 
trade sector, after the successes of the system in agricultural, industrial and commercial 
sectors. The features of the responsibility system in the foreign trade sector included: (1) 
Most local branches of national FTCs were transferred to local governments, who decided 
on their tasks. (2) All relationships between government and FTCs, FTCs and production 
enterprises were ensured by signing contracts in which rights and responsibilities relating to 
foreign trade production, circulation and management were defined for each part. (3) The 
main contents of responsibility contracts were the amount of foreign exchange earnings, the 
remittance of foreign exchange being turned over to the central government, and the
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balance of profits and losses from trade activities. (4) All localities, departments and 
enterprises were entitled to freely use the foreign exchange they retained, according to state 
regulations. (5) The MOFERT committed itself to increase the use of market instruments, 
such as prices, exchange rate, taxes, tariffs, interest rate, export credit, etc., replacing 
mandatory administrative controls over foreign trade. Improvements in the duty drawback 
system and the trade agency system were also proposed.
The process of decentralisation was continued alongside the implementation of the 
contracting system. Most provincial and local branches of national FTCs were converted 
into separate FTCs under the supervision of provincial or local governments. In some ways, 
FTCs were granted greater rights to handle foreign trade themselves, as well as having 
much clearer responsibility for their own operations. In addition, three foreign trade 
industries (Light industry, Handicraft industry and Garment industry) were selected as 
experimental bases to test the system of FTC-responsibility for profits and losses.
The initiatives of the contract responsibility system were: (1) to provide impetus for 
enterprises and workers to increase production, (2) to stabilise and increase government 
fiscal revenue, and (3) to strengthen the enterprises’ ability to rationalise their behaviour by 
combining responsibility, rights and profits at enterprise level (Xim Dazhi 1990). However, 
the last two goals have not been completely achieved, although the system did arouse great 
enthusiasm in enterprises and workers to expand foreign trade.
In 1991, China started a new round of foreign trade enterprise reform. The main goal of 
this programme was to establish an operating mechanism in which FTCs were expected to 
be really responsible for their own profits and losses. The foreign trade and production 
enteiprises were to embark on the road of independent operation, self-responsibility for 
profits and losses, self-restraint and self-development. The reform approach in the 1990s 
has been shifted onto the right track for unified trade policies, equal competition, 
integrating industries with trade, and the agency system. Great effort has been made to 
establish a market-based foreign trade system, with emphasis on trade policy reform.
2.1.2 Regional Strategy of Openness
Implementation of a regional strategy of openness was also a feature of the devolution 
of trade administration. Differential policies were applied to different regions. This did not
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imply any bias to the specified areas, but was due to the desire for gradual reform. China’s 
experiments started from special economic zones (SEZs), moving then to coastal open 
cities before being extended from eastern areas to central provinces and western regions.
Special Economic Zones
The establishment of SEZs began the refonn in foreign trade and the opening-up of the 
national economy. It also signalled the introduction of regional strategies in trade refonn. In 
February 1979, an industrial processing zone appeared at Shekuo, Guangdong Province. 
The initiator, a Hong Kong-based corporation named China Merchants Steam Navigation 
Company which is owned by the Ministry of Transport, intended to use its experience of 
operation in the market economy, as well as experience of special economic zones in 
foreign countries, to develop an export processing zone. This idea was approved by the 
Central Government. Soon, this event led to a further strategic decision to establish four 
SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian provinces.
In July 1979, the State Council approved the proposal to establish four “special export 
production bases” (the name was changed to “special economic zone” in the following 
year) in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou of Guangdong Province and Xiamen of Fujian 
Province. In August 1980 the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress 
approved the “Regulations on the Special Economic Zones o f Guangdong Province” that 
formally announced the establishment of SEZs. Xiamen SEZ was established in Fujian 
Province in the same year. The area of these four SEZs was 338.37 square kilometres at the 
time of their establishment and then extended to 632.1 square kilometres. In April 1988, the 
National Congress approved the elevation of Hainan Island, which has 33,931 square 
kilometres and previously belonged to Guangdong Province, to provincial level and the 
fifth SEZ.
The establishment of the SEZs was to exploit the geographical advantage of these areas 
adjacent to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and the linkages with overseas Chinese to 
expand foreign trade and absorb foreign investment, through the implementation of special 
economic policies. In the early 1980s, the Chinese government set the goals for the 
establishment of SEZs: the SEZs would be developed as a “laboratory” of economic 
reform, a window for China’s open policy and a bridge for interaction between China and 
the world economy (Z en g  M u y e  et al. 1993 , p ,2 0 3 ) . The SEZs have carried out each refonn one
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step ahead of other areas, as well as enjoying preferential policies. Through the practice of 
refonn and opening-up to outside world, the Shenzhen SEZ for example has successfrilly 
functioned as such a “laboratory”, “window” and “bridge” (Fukasaku and Wall 1994). The 
SEZs’ successes have generated significant impact on China’s economic transition.
Open Cities and “Economic and Technology Development Zones”
The establishment of SEZs has actually been a significant measure in the opening-up 
process. However, the areas of SEZs represented only a limited portion of China’s territory. 
The implementation of the open policy needed to be expanded to a larger area. On 30 April 
1984, the Political Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee formally decided to open 14 
coastal cities^ and Hainan Island to foreign countries, as well as to continue the experiment 
of the SEZs. Adopting the experience of SEZs, these newly open cities were allowed to set 
up economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) in which some preferential 
policies of SEZs could be im plem ented.The special facilities granted to the open cities 
were (1) to provide preferential conditions for foreign investment, and (2) to expand the 
brief of the open cities to include economic and technological co-operation with 
foreigners J4] Open cities were expected to introduce and develop technology-intensive or 
new industries to make use of the human technological resources there. The difference 
between ETDZs and SEZs was that the ETDZs were to concentrate on reshaping the 
existing industries in those cities by introducing foreign technology and investment. At the 
end of 1984, the State Council approved the proposal for Tianjin ETDZ. Since 1985, most 
open cities have set up ETDZs, one after another.
Later, various forms of special economic zones were used to speed up the opening-up 
process. By 1997, there were 32 ETDZs, 52 high and new technological development zones 
(HNTDZs) and 14 free trade zones throughout the open areas (Qin Shi 1997, pp. 78-84). They 
have been given the same preferential policies as the open cities.
Coastal Area Development Strategy and the “Ladder-Style” Structure of Openness
The establishment of SEZs and the opening-up of coastal port cities reflected China’s 
view that the opening-up of the economy could be gradually earned out from some test 
areas to larger areas. This “pushing-up” policy was continued by expanding open areas and 
eventually foimed the “ladder-style” structure of openness in the second half of the 1980s.
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In January 1985, the Yangtze River Delta, Peal River Delta and Xiameng-Quanzhou- 
Zhangzhou Triangle Area were selected as parts of the “coastal economic open areas”. 
These areas were proposed to develop outward-looking economies following a “trade- 
industry-agriculture” sequence, in order to meet the needs of international markets. 
Important tasks were to expand exports and to increase export earnings. The special 
privileges granted to them were similar to those in the 14 open cities. In October 1987, 
Shandong Peninsula and Liaodong Peninsula were added to the list of open areas.
Dining the first half of 1988, the idea of “joining the international great circle” and the 
economic development strategy of the coastal regions were popular in China. More and 
more counties and cities were included in the proposed “coastal economic areas”. By the 
end of the 1980s, the coastal economic-development areas made up of SEZs, open cities 
and open areas covered 290 cities and counties, with an area of 420,000 square kilometres 
and a population of 220 million (Li Haijian 1994). In addition, in early 1990, the State 
Council approved the establishment of the Pudong district of Shanghai as another special 
economic development area. This decision aimed to restore the central city of Shanghai as 
an international economic centre in the Far East. Moreover, the process has never been 
limited to the eastern coastal areas. Between 1990 and 1992, a large number of inland cities 
and areas were opened up to the outside.
Having set up open areas in all the eastern coastal provinces, and then the inland areas, 
China has in fact formed its “ladder-style” frame of openness. The increase in open areas 
indicated that China’s move towards opening up the economy to the outside world has been 
strong and permanent. The target of the regional strategy was to build an export-oriented 
eastern area with rational industrial structures, advanced science and technology, and a 
prosperous economy. While developing the local economy, the eastern area was expected to 
bring up the inland areas through the transfer of introduced advanced foreign technology 
and the capital inflows, as well as through industrial linkages between these areas. In the 
past refonn period, the eastern area, especially the SEZs, provided assistance in the 
financial, technological, managerial and personnel training areas to the inland regions and 
promoted their economic development.
Besides others, an important element relating to the opening-up decisions was the 
availability of trade rights. All these open cities and areas were granted power to operate
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trade under the preferential policies they were given. In this way, decentralisation in foreign 
trade was accelerated.
2.1.3 The Real Significance of Administrative Devolution
Forming the Base for Freer Trade
How important was the administrative devolution in the process of China’s foreign 
trade refonn? Three points should be taken into account. First, the decentralisation of 
administrative authority was a significant step to breakthrough the previously centrally- 
planned economy. It divided the rigid, unified and centralised economic regime into many 
active economic entities at provincial and local levels, and formed the basis for the 
“regional open strategy”. In this context, the institutional adjustments became the 
precondition of China’s opening-up process. This policy made it possible to open the 
economy to other countries in some experimental sites and then extend openness to other 
areas. Overall, the national economy has become more open than it was.
Second, besides the transfer of administrative power to provinces and localities, trading 
rights, in particular those rights involving trade practice, have been partially passed on to 
the enterprises. Although the granting of hading rights in all cases was subject to 
administrative authority’s selective approval and supervision, the significant effect was that 
a number of FTCs could engage in foreign trade as relatively independent entities. This was 
also an important condition for facilitating market refonns, given that an increasing number 
of new economic entities, as major participants of market economy, have been created.
Third, the implementation of the contract responsibility system in foreign trade was, 
from a historical viewpoint, a continuation of the delegation of authority and of benefit 
sharing to the lower levels. It was also a prelude to the further refonns of trade enterprises. 
The most important effect was that, at various levels, responsibilities, rights and profits 
relating to foreign trade activities were gradually interlinked. It showed that China’s foreign 
trade refonn was shifting to an emphasis on enterprise efficiency. Many new practices, such 
as competition mechanisms, bidding and the autonomous rights for employing directors and 
staff members, were applied to ensure the successful fulfilment of contracts. It also gave 
greater initiatives to localities, departments, and FTCs to improve their internal systems, to 
increase economic efficiency and to expand their exports.
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The Limits of the Contract Responsibility System
Another question is to what extent did the trading rights devolution contribute to 
China’s trade reform? The devolution was targeted at distributing trading rights at two 
levels: local trade management and enterprise operation. The former was achieved through 
administrative devolution, as discussed above. The latter was the content of enterprise 
reform. The implementation of the contract responsibility system represented the early 
effort to turn FTCs into independent operating entities. But the constraint seemed to he that 
the contract responsibility system was based on administrative forces instead of on the 
market mechanism. Many non-market factors were actually involved in the process of 
contract making. Therefore, the implementation of the contract responsibility system could 
not turn the FTCs into independent entities acting in markets.
First, the contracts were made on the precondition that differences in export targets, 
export costs and foreign exchange retention between regions, departments and enterprises 
were recognised. These differences became a source of unequal competition. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the system, accompanied by the decentralisation of management 
authority, strengthened and legalised the administrative intervention from local 
governments and departments in foreign trade.
Second, the targets of responsibility contracts emphasised export earnings by fixing the 
volume of exports, the creation of export earnings and the remittance of foreign exchange 
from FTCs. Given that the export conunodity structure could not be changed in the short­
term, many FTCs, therefore, fixed their gaze on a few exportable items, such as textiles and 
clothing products, which were usually controlled through licences and quotas. FTCs, and 
local governments also, made great efforts to strive for more quotas from the MOFERT or 
just ignored the quotas controls to export at higher levels. The development of a new export 
product was thought a thankless task. This resulted in an effect encouraging quantitative 
expansion of exports rather than improving export structure and competitiveness.
Third, while FTCs were assumed to be independent accounting imits, they found 
themselves in an unusual position. On the one hand, they had to face incomplete domestic 
market conditions due to the slow progress of refonns in the areas of prices, taxes, finance, 
and fiscal regime. On the other hand, FTCs were required to undertake the risk of 
international market changes. FTCs had to adapt the changing world market and unchanged
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domestic enterprises simultaneously and to transfer fluctuating international prices into 
fixed domestic prices. The role of FTCs as a “buffer” between international markets and 
domestic enterprises increased the complexity and difficulty involved in being responsible 
for their profits and losses, unless the contract targets were fixed at much lower levels.
The experience of practising the contract responsibility system in foreign trade was not 
totally successful. The key reason was that the administrative devolution could not build an 
effective mechanism as in the market economy to regulate FTC behaviour. Although many 
reform measures in taxation, finance, planning and foreign exchange were adopted, the 
effort to establish a market economy was weak until 1992 when the market economy was 
considered the refonn target and incentive trade policy reforms were carried out.
Biased Decentralisation
When analysed in more detail, the limits of administrative devolution become apparent. 
One question concerns the interaction between the regional strategy and the devolution of 
hading rights. It seemed that the devolution of trading rights was just an accompaniment to 
regional strategy. The extent to which trading rights were granted to localities or enterprises 
was treated as individual case. Once the central government decided to open up an area to 
the outside, this area would be granted greater authority to engage in foreign trade. But the 
implementation of the regional strategy, with the differential open policies for different 
regions, has raised some problems.
First of all, the degree of openness varied in the eastern, central and western areas. Of 
the total 424 open areas approved by the State Council in their various forms (e.g. free trade 
zones, SEZs, ETDZs, open cities, etc.), by the mid-1990s, 360 were located in the east, 
while only 36 were in the central areas and 26 in the west. Regarding foreign trade, the 
eastern areas accounted for 87% of the total exports and 91% of the imports to the country, 
while the proportions in the central area were 9% and 7%, and only 4% and 3% in the west 
(Guo Keshai and Li Haijian 1995). Eastern areas had a significant advantage in becoming open 
to the outside world earlier. But more than a decade of preferential policies in the east has, 
relatively, worsened the development in western areas. The difference between the eastern 
and the western areas has increased during the refonn period.
32
Second, the regional openness strategy brought about a situation where different areas 
within the country were given unequal conditions of production, unequal investment 
policies, and unequal control over foreign trade. The man-made unequal competition caused 
an economic blockade and market separation between regions. It was always the case that 
the FTCs in more-open eastern areas would like to obtain export resources (exportables) 
horn less-open inland areas, in order to enjoy the benefit of cheap prices fixed by the 
government. On the other hand, inland less-open areas were keen to develop their own 
regulations and preferential measures to compete with other areas for attracting foreign 
companies or promoting exports from local FTCs. In some inland areas, preferential 
treatment was claimed to be even higher than in the coastal areas. In addition, provincial 
and local authorities were increasingly concerned with local interests, due to their 
responsibilities for local development under the “budgetary contracting system”. To protect 
their benefits, local governments strengthened administrative intervention in economic 
activities. This situation increased the difficulties of improving the effects of foreign trade 
and retarded the transformation of FTCs into independent operating entities.
Finally, the focus of the preferential policies encouraging export expansion of labour- 
intensive light and textile industries in the eastern region, together with an import 
substitution policy protecting heavy and chemical industries which are mainly located in 
inland areas, slowed the structural upgrade of exports. In 1991, for example, light industries 
accounted only for 48.9% of China’s total industrial output but exports of light industrial 
products were as high as 73.0% of total manufactured exports (Wang Xinkui 1994a). Until 
1995, most of China’s manufacture exports remained low value-added products {People’s 
Daily, overseas edition, 13/1/1996).
2.2 D e v e l o p in g  a n  In d ir e c t  M a n a g e m e n t  Sy st e m  f o r  F o r e ig n  T r a d e
2.2.1 The Decline of Central Planning
Another important aspect of decentralisation was the changing role of foreign trade 
planning. Before refonn, all foreign trade agreements were mandated by the central 
planning system. Once the trade plans had been made out by the central government, all 
FTCs had to be responsible for the fulfilment of the plans but not for the profits and losses 
from trade.
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The procedure for foreign trade planning included the following steps: First, the MOFT 
and the State Planning Commission jointly made plans for exports and imports according to 
the demand of national economic development in physical terms. Second, the approved 
trade plans were transmitted to the specified state FTCs who were responsible for fulfilling 
the plans, contacting the relevant foreign enterprises and signing the import or export 
contracts. Third, the state FTCs purchased the agreed products according to state-fixed 
prices and then exported them, or imported the planned import items and then distributed 
them to the final users at state-fixed domestic prices. In such a procedure, foreign trade 
plans had to cover a huge number of import and export commodities in quantity, physical 
specifications and prices, as well as the specified executive channels (FTCs). The system 
employed a large amount of human and material resources. However, the biggest problem 
was that the trade plans might not fit the real needs of national development. The foreign 
trade plan system actually generated a confusion of administrative power and enterprise 
function, and caused a separation between production and commercial spheres.
Since the end of the 1970s, the reform of the foreign trade planning system has been an 
important touchstone, because it has reflected to some extent the progress of trade 
liberalisation. Refonn of trade planning has gone through a difficult process. Until 1984, 
China maintained an almost completely controlled planning system for foreign trade, while 
central planning had been increasingly reduced in the agricultural and industrial sectors. A 
government statement is evidence of such an unchanged foreign trade system:
“The P eo p le ’s R epublic o f  C hina is a country in  w hich  the p lanned  econom y is in 
practice. Im ports and  exports are operated according to p lans determ ined  by  the state. The 
ratio  o f  foreign trade to GNP is very  sm all. The products p roduced  in  C hina are m ainly to 
m eet the needs o f  the dom estic m arket and few  o f  them  are designed  to be exported. Export 
is for im port and im port is dependent on the needs o f  dom estic econom ic developm ent. ... 
E xport p roducts are purchased  at dom estic prices and exported  to  the w orld m arket at 
in ternational prices. Im port com m odities are purchased at the in ternational prices and 
distributed to consum ers a t dom estic prices. There are no  direct linkages betw een dom estic 
prices and the in ternational prices o f  the im port and export com m odities.” (People’s Daily 
1/12/1983)
Accompanying the deepening understanding of market mechanisms, has been the 
decline in the role of central planning. Around mid-1980s, the foreign trade planning 
system was reformed but still remained the core of China’s foreign trade regime. The main 
change was the division of foreign trade plans into two categories, namely mandatory plans
34
(Zhi Ling Xing Ji Hua) and guidance plans (Zhi Dao Xing Ji Hud). The former were state 
orders with a legally binding nature and specified in physical terms, while the latter were a 
non-compulsory requirement with indirect government adjustment through various 
economic levers. Guidance trade plans were mainly applied to exports. Unlike mandatory 
export plans, a guidance export plan fixed the value of exports without their composition or 
export channel. Correspondingly, there was no guarantee for export producers in obtaining 
inputs from state materials distribution system at fixed prices. Following the introduction of 
guidance export plans, in 1985, the MOFERT stopped drafting and issuing mandatory plans 
for the purchase and distribution of export products.
The refonn of the foreign planning system gave greater freedom to local government 
and even FTCs. The scope of state foreign trade planning was continuously reduced. As a 
result, by 1988, the planned share of exports had fallen to 45% and that of imports to 40%. 
(Xiao Zhuoji et al. 1992, p. 168). After 1994, all mandatory foreign trade plans were completely 
abolished. The government only produces a guidance plan for the total value of exports and 
imports, the foreign exchange quotas from export earnings and import expenditure.
2.2.2 The Emergence of Market Mechanism
As the scope of central planning was gradually reduced, market forces were given much 
more importance in economic operation. This crucial but gradual progress mirrored the 
cognitive process of the relationship between the “planned economy” and the “market 
economy” throughout the reform period. At the beginning, Chinese economists and policy­
makers avoided using the term “market” in their work and policy decisions because 
“market”, or “market economy”, was thought to be the equivalent of capitalism. However, 
analysis of the disadvantages of the traditional planned economic system suggested that the 
key issue of decentralisation was just how to deal with the conflict between the planned 
economy and the market. To identify the different interests at the various levels of local 
government, enterprises and even individuals, it was necessary to introduce some indicators 
in terms of market economy to improve macro-economic control. Since over-centralisation 
caused inefficiency in the economy, it was thought the only solution was to reduce the 
scope of planning and to expand that of market forces. Therefore, both in practice and in 
theory, the economic refonn models were presented in order from a “planned economy with 
the assistance of market adjustment” (1982) to “planned commodity economy” (1984), then
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to one in which “the state regulates the market and the market guides the enterprises” 
(1987) and finally the “socialist market economy” (1992).
To make a market system work, the essential elements are: (1) free flows of 
intermediate and final goods, (2) a price mechanism based on demand and supply forces, 
(3) rational enterprise behaviour in accord with the rules of the market, (4) competition 
among enterprises, and (5) macro-economic stability (Perkins 1991). Of course, all these 
elements should be collected together. Once such an economy has been established, the 
price mechanism would play a mandatory role in production, circulation and income 
distribution. So enterprises could act as independent entities mainly responding to the 
changes of price signals.
Looking at the evolution of the reform target, a clear trend in China’s reform was to 
increase the role of market forces. Through sustained refonn, a multi-fold market system 
has basically been established as the base of the “socialist market economy”. More than 
90% of industrial enterprises are engaging in some form of contracting operation. This has 
meant that enterprises have been forced to enter market competition. The government is no 
longer to “operate” enterprises directly. According to statistics, before 1979, the value of 
industrial production fixed by the state mandatory plan accounted for 95% of the total value 
of industrial production. Dining 1979-1992, this proportion has been reduced by more than 
85% to less than 10%. The type of raw materials distributed for production by the state has 
been reduced from 256 to 19, and the kinds of Category One commodity purchased through 
the state unified plan have also been decreased from 65 to 20. Of the commodities 
purchased or distributed by the state, about 70-80% were subject to the adjustment of the 
market mechanism (prices), hence only about 20-30% of industrial products were 
controlled through the state plans (Cao Yuanzheng 1994).
In addition, by the mid-1990s, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accounted for less than 
50% in industrial sectors while the non-state sector including town and village economies 
(TVEs) grew rapidly. The growth of TVEs was basically dependent on the market system, 
given that all inputs and products are purchased and sold through markets. By 1994, the 
share of TVEs output in total national industrial output was 42.04%. In this aspect, together 
with the marketisation of state-owned enterprises’ economic activities, the market 
mechanism has played a major role in the Chinese economy. Moreover, 85% above of
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product prices were determined by market force of demand and supply (Yang Qixian 1994; 
Goodliart and Xu 1996). Government control of the macro-economy has been gradually shifted 
to indirect measures. Facing the severely overheated economy in 1993, for example, China 
for the first time used financial measures as major tools of macro-economic control. In the 
1993 adjustment, China twice increased the interest rates on savings and loans in May and 
July of that year, reintroduced “inflation proof savings” for three-year and above fixed-term 
deposits, and allowed free selling and buying of foreign exchange in foreign exchange swap 
centres. These measures, combined with other necessary administrative measures, have 
been proven effective in adjusting macro-economic conditions (State Statistical Bureau 1994).
In foreign trade, market forces also increased their importance. Prices of exportables are 
mainly subject to the level of domestic markets. Competition in purchasing goods for 
export sometimes causes the prices to go up, due to limited supply. State-pricing and the 
dual price systems have been minimised. After 1994, export purchasing and distribution 
plans were eliminated. Among all export commodities, the number subject to direct state 
control decreased from 900 in 1980 to 20 in 1995. Commodities subject to export quotas 
and licences was 143 in 1995 (MOFTEC 1994; Xu Yu and Ma Lijun 1996). On the import side, in 
1995, import quotas were only applied to 16 general commodity groups (133 commodities) 
and 15 machinery and electric product groups (168 commodities), compared with the 
situation before 1980 when all imports were mandated by the state plans (Lin Guijun 1996).
To realise the 1990s’ refonn goals, contrary to the emphasis on administrative 
devolution in the 1980s, several important measures (trade policies, including the 
elimination of subsidies, the unification of exchange rates, tariff and non-tariff barrier 
reductions, which will be discussed in the remaining chapters) were taken to rebuild the 
foreign trade regime based on market mechanisms. Much attention was paid to the 
development of market forces and relevant refonns —  such as the exchange rate system and 
tariff structure —  were introduced to match the refonns in foreign trade.
2.2.3 The Persistence of Government Intervention
Although great progress was seen in the effort to establish a market system, it is fair to 
say that state-owned enterprises, either in the foreign trade sector or in other fields, could 
not act completely in accordance with the market principles even if they intended to do so.
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The reason was simply that enterprises were still bonded to the administrative management 
system. There is a view held by many Chinese leaders and economists that the market is not 
a panacea for economic and trade reform. Market competition might mislead resource 
allocation and enterprise behaviour (Wang Shaoxi 1994). Therefore, government guidance and 
intervention are thought to be necessary to ensure the direction of refonn.
Throughout the 1980s, China’s trade refonn was earned out under the precondition that 
government control should hold a dominant position, whilst the market mechanism would 
be considered a supplementary tool. Up to now, although the market economy has been the 
refonn target, this principle has not really been abolished yet. A feature of China’s trade 
system refonn over the past years has seemed to be that the fonns of management might be 
changed but the core of government control could not be phased out. But on the other hand, 
given that direct government control has been proven inefficient and incompatible with the 
market economy, China has put in a lot of work to establish a new indirect macro-control 
system over foreign trade. The refonn measures were, as mentioned, the elimination of 
mandatory trade plans, the introduction of guidance trade plans, and the use of various 
economic and law instrument including tariffs, the exchange rate, and prices.
In analysing the persistence of government intervention (or control) over trade, two 
contributory factors and resulting problems are worth noting. First, in theory, the weakness 
of the market economy has been excessively stressed. From the viewpoint of traditional 
Marxism that provides the guiding idea of the socialist economy, capitalist market 
competition may lead to the absence of government intervention. Although a market 
economy (and competition) could be the model for a developing socialist economy, it will 
be effective only if it is combined with government planned guidance. “Under the socialist 
market economic system, it is necessary and possible for the state to strengthen its macro 
management” (Liu Rixin 1994). Some western economic theories developed in recent 
decades, such as “market failure theory”, “managed trade” and “strategic trade policy” 
theory, have also provided support for government intervention. Some Chinese economists 
have used these theories to call for appropriate government intervention to improve trade 
structure, to ensure the increase of trade benefits for the nation, and to guarantee that trade 
liberalisation takes place under government control (Xue Rongjiu 1995; Hai Weng 1995; Zhang 
Shuguang et al. 1996).
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Further, there was a confusion in understanding the concept of “market failure’’. In 
western economics, “market failure” refers to the situation in a perfect market economy that 
departs from competitive equilibrium and Pareto-efficient outcomes. Put simply, market 
failure means that in some areas the principles of the market mechanism become 
ineffective. It is a fact that market failures exist in almost all market economies. However, 
these market failures may occur in limited fields such as pure public goods, goods with 
positive externalities or spillover benefits, natural monopolies and imperfect information 
(World Bank 1996, pp. 110-111). Government interventions designed to remedy these failures, 
therefore, should have a sectoral limitation. Considering the requirements of managed trade 
and strategic trade policy, government control or guidance should also be targeted at 
selected industries. In China, the situation is more complex. The ineffectiveness of the 
market in the Chinese economy rests in imperfections in the underlying market systems. 
Only a few of these may be counted as real “market failures”. It is not necessary and 
reasonable for China to maintain the current “all-directions” government intervention. 
Moreover, regarding the areas with dispensable government guidance, China also needs to 
reduce its excessive administrative control although in economics there is still a lack of 
conclusive standard defining the appropriate government intervention.
Second, in practice, several decades of running a centrally planned economy generated 
an “inertia”, so that both senior authorities and basic managers were used to the 
administrative command approach. Faced with the transition of the economy from plan to 
market, they seemed unable to adapt to the changing situations. Government intervention 
seemed not only to reflect the desire of the government to control the economy but also a 
motivation to control enterprise operation. On the other hand, the successful experience of 
government intervention in some countries, particularly Japan and Korea in their early 
period of development, strengthened the belief of Chinese people that government 
intervention could play an important role in economic and trade development.
Combining the above two factors, and in addition, the fact that foreign trade has long 
been considered a special sector with links to all aspects of the economy, China seemed not 
to be very keen to reduce government control over foreign trade. This attitude has at least 
generated the following problems. The first is the misunderstanding of the relationship 
between “destroy” and “establishment”. To establish a market economy, the first thing is to 
remove all barriers incompatible with the market system including excessive administrative
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intervention. This is not to say that government intervention could not co-exist with the 
market economy but to recall that the operation of market mechanisms needs some essential 
preconditions, as mentioned earlier.
The second problem is the misunderstanding of the “East Asian experience”. 
Government intervention used by Japan and Korea was to complemente markets rather than 
to replace them (Stiglitz 1996). Regardless of the differences and debate among economists, 
the fact that both government intervention and market mechanisms have contributed to 
economic growth is undeniable. What demands our attention here is the pattern in which 
these two factors co-exist. Unlike the case of China, there were relatively complete market 
economies in these countries. Appropriately balanced government interventions promoted 
and used the market economic system to improve efficiency. There are two totally different 
ways to combine market forces and government intervention. In Japan and Korea, the 
experience was to have a market system first and only then was intervention used. In China, 
strong government intervention already existed, but a complete market system has not yet 
been built up. There is not a lack of government intervention in China.
The third problem is that government intervention also generates failures —  
government failures. Even for a government intending to maintain a market system, some 
non-market factors such as political objectives, bureaucratic structure, imperfect 
information could lead to some government intervention against the market principles. 
Further, when there are genuine “market failures” to be corrected, it is also possible that 
government intervention may be poorly implemented.
Undoubtedly, there has been positive progress in transforming China’s economy and 
foreign trade by increasing the role for market forces. However, to develop a well- 
functioning market economy and to balance the forces of the market economy and 
government intervention, China certainly has a long way to go.
2.3 A s s e s s in g  t h e  D e c e n t r a l isa t io n  in  C h in a ’s T r a d e  R e f o r m
The decentralisation of trading rights was a notable first step in China’s trade refonn. 
The immediate and direct effects were that: First, the over-centralised state trading regime 
has been ended. An increasing number of trade entities has been created. Second, the scope
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of central trade plans has been gradually reduced. Local governments and enterprises have 
been granted greater power to engage in foreign economic exchanges. Third, for adjusting 
and balancing benefits between regions and enterprises, market instruments have been 
increasingly employed in the government’s macro-management over foreign trade. All 
these changes contributed to the ongoing construction of market mechanisms in the field of 
foreign trade.
In assessing the effect of institutional reform, however, a crucial point concerns the role 
of FTCs. After reform, the role of FTCs has been much improved. This can be seen from 
the growth of relatively independent FTCs as new entities in foreign trade and their 
increasing involvement in the market economy. But, equally, it is worth noting that a 
number of problems still exist. First, the property rights of FTCs and the relevant 
responsibilities remain unclear. Most FTCs are state-owned and remain government 
subordinates. The separation of enterprises from government, a problem examined more 
than 10 years ago, remains to be solved. Second, FTCs’ business activities are mainly 
driven by government administrative forces and are only responsible for profits but not for 
losses. The function of the market principles has been heavily distorted. Third, enterprises’ 
inner management system remains backward. Most FTCs are characterised by small-size, 
dispersed-operation and a single-product line. Many enterprises lack necessary incentives 
and rules to ensure efficient operation.
Several factors have contributed to the stagnated transition of FTCs. First, foreign trade 
has remained a “priority” sector under the government’s close regulation. The only change 
is that direct government control by the State has been shifted to indirect administrative co­
ordination. Provincial and local governments, rather than the State, take the responsibility 
for regulating the foreign trade within their territories. While lacking a complete market 
mechanism for indirect controls, the foreign trade sector has remained in public or state 
ownership to ensure the effectiveness of government intervention. Government controls 
over foreign trade was thought to be a way to maintain equilibrium in the balance of 
payments. Even as the contract responsibility system with its mandatory plans was 
nominally abolished, the fixed targets of exports, the amount of foreign exchange earnings 
and the quotas of foreign exchange to be turned over to the central government were still 
compulsory.
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Second, the domestic market systems and the indirect macro-control system for foreign 
trade have not been completely established. Some necessary reforms in relevant areas 
including tariffs, foreign exchange, licensing, tax and financial systems remain to be further 
earned out to create a favourable environment for FTC reform. In such a circumstance, it is 
impossible for the State to adjust its foreign trade by using economic means such as credits, 
interest rates, tariffs and exchange rates. In contrast, the existing direct and indirect 
government subsidies for exports and “soft” restraints on enterprise accounting encourage 
the FTCs to rely on the government for financial support.
Third, most FTCs lack a production basis. Their main business is to purchase products 
from production enterprises and to export them. The separation of'production and exports 
means that FTCs are unable to undertake risks in international markets. It is difficult for this 
kind of enterprise to become responsible for the profits and losses of their business.
China intended to make use of competitive mechanisms by creating new entities 
through devolving trading rights to localities and enterprises but failed to create an equal 
environment of competition due to the “half-way” effects of institutional reform in foreign 
trade. By decentralisation, trading rights have been partially devolved from the central 
government but have not been sufficiently passed onto enterprise level; Market forces have 
been introduced into the economy but have not yet been fully functioning so as to regulate 
trade behaviour. More importantly, the decentralisation seemed an attempt to devolve 
administrative powers to local governments rather than to create truly independent FTCs. 
This also reflected the fact that China has put more weight on the side of government 
control rather than developing a fully functioning market mechanism. Although many FTCs 
were granted greater rights to deal with trade activities, local or departmental administrative 
units, which replaced the role of the central government, were still supervising most foreign 
trade affairs. To this end, the key reason was the lack of a well-functioning market system. 
In other words, it has not been seen a sufficient reduction of government control over 
foreign trade.
Following the above analysis, the assessment can be made that China’s institutional 
reform in foreign trade has so far only been a partial reform which has resulted in the long- 
lasting incomplete transition of the foreign trade system. Although the market mechanisms 
have been introduced into the economy, government control remains one of the most
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important features of China’s foreign trade. Both the partially reformed government control 
system and the partially constructed market mechanisms are unable to perform properly.
This assessment implies that trade policy reform has not been fully supported by 
creating a favourable institutional environment. China’s foreign trade institution now is a 
mixed system in which market forces and government administrative controls co-exist 
rather than being integrated. Or, at least, these two systems have not been matched with 
each other appropriately. The persistence of government control over foreign trade, together 
with the incomplete market reform, has retarded the pace of liberalisation and restricted the 
significance of China’s trade policy reform.
tl] On 15 July 1979, an article in the People's Daily  presented the argument that: “Current foreign trade regime should be 
reformed. ... The reform o f  foreign trade regime must be carried out positively and cautiously. It is right first to conduct 
tests o f  reform at selected points and then to spread it throughout the nation gradually”.
t2' In January and February 1984, Deng Xiaoping, with some other Chinese leaders, inspected Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Xiamen SEZs and appreciated the achievements the SEZs have made. After his southern tour, Deng suggested adding 
some places to the open area list and to try another form in implementing special econom ic policies.
The newly opened 14 coastal cities are Dalian, Qinghuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, 
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai.
[3] As Deng Xiaoping suggested, the newly added open areas w on’t be called SEZs but they can obtain some special 
policies similar to those in SEZs. See Zeng Jianhui (1984).
^  For details see Ji Chongwei (1984).
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3 Shifting Trade Strategy
China adopted an import substitution strategy throughout the period from the 
establishment of the new republic until the commencement of the open-door policy, or even 
later. However, along with the opening-up of the economy, China also doubled her efforts 
to promote exports. The trade strategy, which reflects trade policy changes, has been shifted 
toward a mixed one. This chapter investigates the changes in China’s general trade policy 
—  trade strategy. The first section of this chapter comments on the changing position of 
import substitution in China’s shift of trade strategy while the effects of import substitution 
in China are examined in the second section. Finally, the last section evaluates China’s 
trade strategy in the reform period.
3.1 Im p o r t  S u b s t it u t io n  S t r a t e g y  in  C h in a
3.1.1 The Adoption of Import Substitution Strategy
At the beginning, China’s adoption of import substitution strategy reflected the special 
economic conditions in China and contemporary thinking on economic development at the 
time. In the early years of the post-war period, it was widely believed that development in 
developing countries needed to stress modernisation in industrial sectors, capital formation 
and planned management. It was thought that the developing countries could not develop 
their economies on the basis of the market mechanism, because the structure and the 
functions of market in developing countries were incomplete. State intervention and 
planned management became the only reliable force to accelerate capital formation and 
improve resource allocation for rapid industrialisation (see Krueger 1992, p.7, p. 40; 1993, p. 43; 
1995, p. 7). Import substitution was considered an inescapable stage for industrialisation in 
low-income countries due to the lack of knowledge of foreign markets, the stringent quality 
requirements of international markets and the paucity of indigenous skills (Agosin 1993). In 
practice, most developing countries were pursuing policies of import substitution in the 
1950s and 1960s.
The aims of the IS strategy were to enhance the domestic productivity to replace 
imports, to protect domestic infant industries and then to promote rapid industrialisation.
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Under the IS strategy, capital goods were imported to build factories, and very often 
imports of intermediate goods and raw materials were employed in the production process. 
It is important to mind the relationship between trade protection and substitution activities 
in a traditional understanding of IS strategy, although an argument may be raised that 
import substitution is not necessarily across-the-board protection. It was fact that 
protectionist trade policies, such as high tariffs, tight quotas and an overvalued exchange 
rate, were usually used in IS strategy to promote domestic industrialisation by allocating 
resources away from export-goods production and toward production for the domestic 
market. High tariffs and tight quotas protected domestic industries from foreign 
competition. An overvalued exchange rate lowered the domestic price of imported capital 
goods for use in the domestic industrialisation process.
In the case of China, given the environment at that time, the development approach was 
also understood as industrialisation based on self-reliance, import substitution or state 
protection. Three factors contributed to the choice of an import substitution strategy. First, 
China adopted the “Soviet-style” economic model which was formed in Soviet Union under 
special conditions, due partially to the lack of experience in developing a socialist economy 
and partially to ideological identity. The feature of such a model was a closed-type 
development. Second, the severe economic blockade from foreign countries forced China to 
develop an economy depending 011 domestic resources and self-reliance. Finally, China 
faced a pressing task to industrialise its economy in order to improve the general standard 
of living. Given the low level of economic development at that time, it was easy to place 
the domestic market in the centre of development strategy. Like many developing countries, 
China chose an import substitution strategy as its way to industrialisation.
Under an IS regime, trade and other incentives are usually biased in favour of 
production for the domestic market and against production for exports. For a long time, 
China’s trade policies featured such bias. However, it was also the case that the increase of 
exports as a source of external payment was treated as an important policy target in China. 
Therefore, a policy dilemma exist: Export sectors were biased by an overvalued exchange 
rate on the one hand but export volume was targeted by administrative forces to be 
increased on the other. To compensate for the discrimination towards exports, China carried 
out a number of policies in the 1980s to strengthen export incentives. Imports were also
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restrained by government controls. The general trade policy became one of encouraging 
exports while imports were strictly restrained {Jiang Chu Xian Jin),
Consequently, large amounts of government subsidies were provided for the expansion 
of exports. Many exports were in fact sold on a net loss basis. FTCs were not, however, 
responsible for the profits and losses of their export activities. While exports were forced to 
increase, imports were tightly controlled by the government through high tariffs, strict 
exchange controls and complex administrative procedures. All imports were assigned by 
the central government to support national economic development, since the economy was 
a unified and centrally-planned regime. The import strategy of the country was aimed at 
industrial development instead of direct improvement of the domestic consumer’s market. 
That was why China’s commodity composition of imports laid particular stress on producer 
goods (Import structure is to be analysed in subsection 3.2.2). The policy doctrine that 
“export is for import and import is dependent on the needs of domestic economic 
development” {People’s Daily 1/12/1983) mandated China’s foreign trade throughout the pre­
reform period and even in the decades since reform.
3.1.2 Reconsidering Foreign Trade Strategy: Chinese Economists Debate
Following the adoption of the reform and open-door policies, debate on China’s foreign 
trade strategy was carried on amongst Chinese economists. Not surprisingly, different 
views on trade policy were reflected amongst Chinese economists.
Arguments
(1) Shifting to Export Orientation A  radical argument suggests that China’s foreign 
trade strategy should be shifted from IS to export orientation (EO),[1] given that many of the 
tasks of import substitution have basically been completed in China. According to this 
argument, the use of the IS strategy in China was aimed at the domestic market and in 
favour of imports (imports of producer’s goods were given a privileged position). It would 
cause the increase of imports and the decrease of exports. The consequence might be the 
shortage of foreign exchange and even a severe debt. On the other hand, the export 
orientation strategy could lead China’s closed-type economy on to an open and outward- 
looking development track. The international market would be not only a supplement to the 
domestic economy but also a favourable environment for the country’s development. All 
enterprises would have to improve product quality, production technology and operational
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efficiency in order to compete with foreign producers in international markets as well as in 
an open domestic market. Exports would increase, and the situation of exchange shortage 
can be fundamentally released. Therefore, the export orientation strategy is an efficient way 
to solve the problem of exchange shortage that has been regarded as the bottleneck on the 
development of China’s economy (Huang Fangyi 1985,1986).
(2) Remaining Import Substitution The opposite opinion considers IS to be a long-term 
strategy for China’s catching up with the industrialised countries. Several arguments are 
employed to support this strategic choice. First, a large country such as China has a huge 
domestic market which provides the precondition for implementing an IS strategy. 
Economic development should base upon the domestic economic circle, as most large 
countries in the world have done. Second, although China has implemented IS strategy for a 
long time, the task of import substitution is still hard. For example, between 1984 and 1985, 
imports of 20 largest manufactured goods accounted for about 50% of China’s total 
manufactured goods imports. Third, China’s major export sectors are labour-intensive 
industries and only operated for foreign exchange creation. No export industry can act as 
efficient leading sector to bring along the industrialisation in China, Finally, the lack of 
liberalisation in trade and capital flows, and the incomplete market system, are difficulties 
that prevent the implementation of an export orientation strategy (Liu Changli 1987).
Some Chinese economists have agreed that China should adopt a balanced foreign trade 
strategy which does not discriminate in favour of either IS or EP. However, given that 
China has a big economy with the characteristics of strong domestic demand and a low 
level of development, an EP strategy could not be an efficient way to promote the national 
economy. It also lacks the necessary base in physical terms to adopt such a strategy. 
Therefore, China’s foreign hade strategy in the near future should have a preference for IS 
to complete the protected development of intermediate and capital products industries. IS 
strategy is the main way to develop the economies of less-developed countries (Tang Haiyan 
1994; Liu Liqun 1994). This view actually treated a balanced hade strategy as a long-term 
target while IS was assumed to remain the priority of current trade policies.
(3) Pursuing a Mixed Overall Strategy Some Chinese economists think China should 
adopt a mixed trade strategy combining IS with EP. There are three ways of thinking about 
the implementation of a mixed foreign trade strategy. The first one is the “geographical
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combination” of the two strategies. This argument believes that it is impossible to 
implement either EP or IS strategy throughout the country because of the different regional 
conditions. The nation’s aggregate strategy for development is to use both IS and EP 
simultaneously, on the basis of “mainly self-reliance with the assistance of foreign aid”. 
This strategy is workable to develop outward-looking economies in China’s coastal areas to 
promote the economic growth of the whole country (Wang Jizhu 1988).
The second way is the “sectoral combination” of the two strategies. This is to apply IS 
strategy to some “infant” or new industries while an EP strategy is implemented in the 
relatively mature industries. The traditional and mature industries should be encouraged to 
expand exports according to their comparative advantage. The increasing foreign exchange 
earnings, in turn, may powerfully support the development of the import substitution 
industries. The import-competing industries are expected to utilise introduced advanced 
technology to improve production structure and performance (Reng Jijun 1991). Some 
emphasise that the combination of the two strategies could establish a smooth economic 
circle linking the domestic and international economies. When the capital-intensive 
industries are modernised through import substitution, they will be turned into an export 
sector. Finally, the national economy may become outward-oriented (Cao Yuanzheng 1988).
The third way is the “aggregate integration” of the two strategies. Economists who hold 
this view think that neither IS nor EP could be the solely suitable strategy for China’s 
foreign trade development. Some pointed out that one of the measures for improving the 
mixed trade strategy is to encourage import substitution sectors to develop an outward- 
oriented ingredient, while the export-oriented sectors should import foreign advanced 
technology to improve their competitiveness. This implies a need to integrate the two 
strategies within each sector of the economy (Zhang Yangui and Xian Guomin 1987). The mixed 
strategy using these two ingredients also should not be limited by assigning regional or 
industrial ranges. It is better to integrate IS and EP in eveiy region or industry, together 
with a necessary adjustment from time to time (Huang Jingbo 1989).
Right Choice for China; Coexisted or Integrated trade Strategy?
What could be the right trade strategy for China’s ongoing reform economy? The above 
mentioned arguments need to be evaluated. In the author’s opinion, China’s trade strategy
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should be a mixed strategy integrating IS in selected sectors with the ingredients of an 
overall EP. Three aspects need to be further discussed as follows.
First, it is right that neither IS nor EP alone could be the right trade strategy for China. 
Arguments for a single strategy of IS or EP have in fact over-simplified the complexity of 
China’s economic structure and the variety of tasks in developing different industries. 
Further, concerning the experience of these strategies, neo-classical economists have proven 
that the IS strategy is inefficient as a way to development and the EP strategy is a much 
better choice for the developing world. The experience of the IS strategy in China has also 
been problematic. The question now is whether the EP strategy alone is suitable for a large 
developing country like China. So far, the successful stories of EP strategy have all been 
relative to small economies. In a large country, a huge domestic demand could permit 
economies of scale even in the absence of export markets (Yoshitomi 1996). Of cause this 
should not be a reason for rejecting the opening-up of an economy. But it implies that trade 
strategies in countries with different sizes of the economy could be varied. China is a 
developing country with typical feature of “dual structure” a coexistence of traditional 
labour-intensive industries and relatively advanced capital- and technology-intensive 
industries. China’s comparative advantage lies in its low labour cost. Using an EP strategy 
to maximise the benefits of such an outward-oriented strategy is therefore appropriated for 
the traditional industries. But the shock of stronger foreign competition under the EP 
strategy might result in an unfavourable environment for the development of the industries 
which have not yet become internationally competitive. Even if some protection measures 
were allowed for those “infant” industries, as pennitted by neo-classical economics, the EP 
strategy could not be dominant in China, since so many industries are “less-developed”.
Second, mixed strategy is common in most developing countries. More important, a 
mixed trade strategy could fit China’s special economic conditions. The emergency of the 
EP strategy has most significance in providing an alternative way to development, but it is 
by no means a replacement for the IS strategy. The superiority of the EP strategy does not 
preclude the use of IS strategy in selected industries (Bhagwati 1988a). In fact, combinations 
of the IS and EP strategies can be found in most developing countries, due to the fact that 
they are largely complementary (Dijk 1990). For developing countries where conditions are 
suitable, it may be ideal to change the trade strategy from IS to EP as the successful Asian 
economies have done, using the EP strategy to accelerate economic development. The
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conditions for such a strategy transition, among others, include a right moment for policy 
changes, the availability of export markets, the presence of leading export sector(s) and the 
possibility of better performance under the new strategy. An alternative would be a mixed 
strategy in which elements of IS and EP strategies co-exist. In the case of China, apart from 
its special economic structure for which the EP alone is not a practicable strategy, the 
absence of a leading export sector(s) and a market mechanism linking the various sectors 
may produce uncertain results for an EP strategy. On the other hand, given the long-lasting 
and less efficient practice of the IS strategy in China, it is important to develop the 
ingredients of the EP strategy in response to the opening-up of the economy. In this sense, 
China’s trade strategy is likely to be a mixed one.
Third, it is not enough to put the two strategies together to form a simple strategy 
mixture. Instead, it is necessary to integrate the ingredients of the IS strategy with those of 
the EP. If both IS and EP strategies exist independently rather than being integrated, not 
only might they benefit less from each other but also may their positive policy effects be 
offset. For example, import restrictions under an IS strategy will also distort the neutral 
structure of incentives pursued by the EP strategy.
It is important, when integrating these two strategies, to combine the market 
mechanisms and government interventions appropriately, so as to ensure effective co­
ordination between the targets and policies pursued by each strategy. Nevertheless, the 
crucial side is the role of government intervention. Market information can signal the extent 
that a strategy has been achieved and the need for policy change but cannot automatically 
switch the trade strategy from one to another. By contrast, government activity seems more 
aggressive than market forces. Not only can government intervention advocate a trade 
strategy change, but also may it be important to make a strategy work successfully. This 
was the case in regal'd with the practice of the EP strategy in most East Asian economies 
(Bhagwati 1988a). The further question here is whether government intervention can also act 
appropriately in controlling the use of IS strategy. Theoretically, such a possibility is not 
unattainable. On the assumption that government can be self-constrained, neo-classical 
economics allows government to play a role in resource allocation and, to some extent, in 
supporting “infant industry”. In practice, some East Asian economies, such as Korea and 
Taiwan, have skilfully used government forces to control the process of import substitution 
and then changed their strategies to the EP. The failure of trade strategy change in the
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majority of developing countries reflects a failure to judge and control the process of import 
substitution, not a total failure of the IS strategy itself. No one has persuasively 
demonstrated that the IS strategy should necessarily be excluded from the strategies for the 
developing world!
Based on the above discussion, the integration of the two strategies requires a 
changeable policy system in which all policies must be compatible, or, at least possible 
policy trade-offs are kept to a minimum. In particular, in the case of China for example, the 
following principles should be considered essential for an integrated overall trade strategy. 
First of all, the IS strategy is to be used only in some strictly selected sectors, essentially the 
technology-intensive industries, and the sectors selected for import substitution should be 
changeable according to the dynamics of the economy; Second, the period of 
implementation of the IS strategy should be as short as possible to avoid the negative 
effects of long-lasting protection; Third, the degree of protection for IS sectors should be 
decreased as these sectors begin to grow. Fourth, the EP strategy would be initially used as 
the first step in moving toward neutrality, balancing the incentives for both IS and EP 
sectors. With the limited protections for IS sectors and stronger incentives for EP sectors, 
the overall trade strategy might reach a point of neutrality. Finally, by taking parallel 
reductions of excessive export incentives and import protections the trade regime could 
become liberalised.
3.1.3 Trade Strategy Changes in China
As mentioned above, the emphasis on “self-reliance” has led to a long-lasting practice 
of import substitution in China. The adoption of the open policy at the end of the 1970s was 
not an attempt to phase out this strategy but divided it into two stages (Huang Jingbo 1989). 
The differences in import substitution in these two stages were as follows: First, the 
economic conditions for the implementation of import substitution varied in the different 
periods. There was a highly closed regime before 1978 but an increasingly open economic 
system emerged thereafter. Second, import substitution under a relatively open economy 
led to a reduction of administrative intervention and an increasing use of market levers in 
directing the process of economic development. Import substitution before 1978 was 
basically dependent on non-economic forces in the forms of central command plans, 
administrative organisation and political demand. Since reform, market forces have been 
allowed to play an important role in the process of import substitution. Domestic demand
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has become a decisive factor in developing industrial structure. It is evident that the 
Chinese government has stopped making import-substitution plans (lists), so as to reduce 
direct administrative intervention in foreign trade. Third, while the various benefits from 
opening-up the economy have been enjoyed, import substitution has no longer been 
considered the only way toward industrialisation. In contrast, the launch of the reform and 
open-door policy began the process of changing China’s economy from self-reliance to an 
open economy. Strategies for export-oriented growth and market competition with 
appropriate government intervention have attracted much attention from central and local 
government leaders and business circles. China’s trade strategy has in fact turned into a 
mixed package combining the ingredients of import substitution and export promotion.
However, the shift in trade strategy was not a straight move from IS to EP. The initial 
attempt of the reform was to modify the planned economic system to improve efficiency, 
without fundamental changes in the management regime. The reforms of the foreign trade 
sector in the early stages concentrated on the adjustment of management authority between 
central and local governments and 011 the moderate adjustment of some export and import 
policies. Several export incentive instruments including the foreign exchange retention 
system, export subsidies and devaluation become important balancing factors against the 
anti-export bias while the import substitution strategy remained as general policy for 
foreign trade until the late 1980s.
The most important turn in China’s trade strategy has occurred in the 1990s. Besides the 
elimination of export subsidies and the exchange retention system, import barriers such as 
tariff rates and non-tariff barriers have been substantially reduced. This shows that China is 
moving to freer trade through reducing the incentives for both exports and imports.
3.2 E f f e c t s  o f  Im p o r t  Su b s t it u t io n
3.2.1 The Literature
As a way to development, IS strategy was common in the developing world in the post­
war period. But the effect of this strategy was mixed. There are two points to be raised 
concerning these mixed results. The first is that the IS strategy may bring about both benefit 
and damage, depending on the specific situation in each country. Krueger (1978) pointed out 
that both import substitution and export promotion increase capacity utilisation but such an 
effect under EP strategy is greater than that of IS strategy (pp. 181-182). Whilst it could not
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be ignored that the IS strategy led to fast growth, at least for a short period in the beginning, 
the implementation of this strategy also resulted in distortions that reduced efficiency and 
productivity growth (Syrquin 1994). The second is the variety of experience in different 
countries. Many countries followed an industrialisation process entirely dependent on IS 
strategy and, therefore, suffered from the damage caused by the protectionist policies 
associated with this strategy. In the post-war period, however, a few countries (mainly the 
Asian economies) were successful in import substitution and promptly turned to an outward 
orientation. They have enjoyed the benefit of the IS strategy. This suggests that the 
implementation of the IS strategy is not one without any merit, despite the commonly 
accepted view that it is an inappropriate strategy for long-term development in the 
developing world, especially when compared to the export promotion strategy.
At least two achievements of the IS strategy can be mentioned, accepting the possible 
costs of protection. (1) The IS strategy can achieve some substitutions. In some countries, 
import shares in total supply declined after a period of import substitution (for example, see 
Little et al. 1970, p. 60, for the cases of Pakistan, Philippines, Brazil, India and Mexico), This 
significantly relaxed the pressure on foreign exchange. Relatively, exports for foreign 
exchange earning could be slowed down in order to concentrate on production for the 
domestic markets, or to the end, on industrialisation. (2) An import substitution strategy can 
stimulate industrialisation of the domestic economy in the initial stage of development, A 
set of industries may be created as a basis for further development, as well as the foundation 
for strategy shift to outward-orientation in some countries. Chenery (1980) pointed out that 
IS was an important and necessary feature of the early stage of industrialisation in the NICs. 
In the way that IS strategy implies protective policies, there is another argument worth to be 
mentioned here. Senghaas (1985) argued that much of the early European experience 
involved selectively controlled trade and protective policies for promoting infant industries.
Starting by the study of Little et al. (1970), and especially after the Bhagwati-Krueger 
studies (Bhagwati 1978; Krueger 1978), there was a growing body of literature demonstrating 
the limitations of the IS strategy and the advantages of the EP strategy.[2] Some major 
shortcomings of the IS strategy described in the literature include: (1) High level of 
effective protection induced overvaluation of the domestic currency, price distortion and 
bias against exports, resulting in resource misallocation divorced from the principle of 
comparative advantage; (2) Domestic production highly dependent on imports of equipment
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and raw materials which, in turn, left the problem of foreign exchange shortage unresolved. 
(3) The exclusion of foreign competition discouraged innovation, cost-cutting and the 
enhancement of technological capacities, resulting in inefficient production or low-capacity 
utilisation; (4) Excessive administrative intervention over trade led to an even higher cost of 
protection.
These consequences were relative to the key policy features of the IS strategy high 
tariff rates, strict import quotas and the over-valued exchange rate(s), and the institutional 
settings associated with these policies. The imposition of tariffs and import quotas reduced 
the demand for foreign exchange. But this induced an appreciation of the domestic currency 
which increased the export costs and made imports cheaper. While import barriers remained 
high for consumer goods but relatively low for intermediate goods, resources would be 
directed to import-competing sectors. Being inward-looking, the IS strategy was initially 
intended to reduce external trade because the ideological belief of self-reliance undermined 
the role of foreign trade in development. However, import substitution could be a long 
process, in the sense that newly expanded industries lacked an appropriate technological 
basis to rationalise the production. When import substitution industries grew up, related 
imports of capital goods would increase as well (Krueger 1995, pp. 8-11). For the payment for 
imports, exports would be pushed to expand on a larger scale.
Moreover, the anti-export and anti-competition policies of the IS strategy protected the 
import-competing industries to be operated at low productivity, due to the absence of 
competition in the domestic and foreign markets which forced enterprises to improve their 
operation. As result, after its “once-over” stimulation at the early stage if any, the IS 
strategy could not induce a sustained growth of the economy.
3.2.2 Effects of China’s Import Substitution
China’s experience of import substitution followed the above description. Meanwhile, 
the adoption of the export promotion strategy in the 1980s also generated significant effects 
on trade policy reform which distinguished China from many other countries. This section 
discusses the effects of the IS strategy in China, considering IS policies as existing 
environment. The concrete measures of trade policy reform are examined in the following 
chapters.
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Industrialisation and Import Substitution
Continuous introduction of foreign equipment and technologies (from former Soviet 
Union in the 1950s, and from various sources since the 1970s) enhanced China’s industrial 
capacity. A unified, nation-wide and multi-layer industrial system was built up. Regarding 
economic growth, China also enjoyed a fast growth rate in most years. In 1953-1978, 
China’s average annual growth rate of GNP was 6.1%. From 1979 to 1997, China 
registered an average annual rate of GDP growth of 9.9%. The average annual growth rate 
of gross industrial output value in 1980-1996 was 15.8%, while this rate was 11.3% in the 
period of 1953-1980. This rapid economic and industrial growth could not be excluded 
from the achievements of the country’s industrialisation process although this process was 
heavily dependent on very high rate of inputs, implying a relatively low efficiency of 
resource allocation.
In the drive for substituting imports with the introduction of foreign technology and 
equipment into the industries to increase their capacity, some products have achieved their 
desired goal. TV sets and synthetic fibres are examples of success. Table 3.1 shows the 
effects of import substitution in various industrial products. Of the eight comparable 
products in this table, in the year of 1985 when imports surged with the relaxation of import 
controls, the ratios of import to total supply of six products increased. Only TV sets and 
synthetic fibres supplies have reduced their dependencies on imports. During 1985-1995, 
compared with the level of 1985, five out of the eight products increased the proportion of 
substitution. However, in the whole period from 1980 to 1995, the ratio of imports to total 
supply kept going up in metal-cutting machines and pesticides, together with that rolled 
steel and chemical fertilisers recorded larger rate of dependence on imports.
Table 3,1 Share of Imports in Total Supplies (SITS) * (%)
SITS Percentage change
1980 1985 1995 1980-1985 1985-1995 1980-1995
Rolled steel 12.0 35.2 14.8 23.2 -20.4 2.8
Motor vehicles 19.5 44.7 9.8 25.2 -34,9 -9.7
Metal-cutting machines 1.9 7.2 25.4 5.3 18.2 23.5
Synthetic fibres 44.3 38.9 28.2 -5.4 -10.7 -16.1
Paper & paperboard n.a. 9.2 n.a. - - -
Polyethylene in primary forms n.a. 53.2 n.a. - - -
Pesticides 2.4 7.1 25.4 4.7 18.3 23.0
Chemical fertilisers 30.6 36.5 42.8 5.9 6.3 12.2
Soda ash 16.1 34.5 1.2 18.4 -33.3 -14.9
TV sets 49.6 23.4 3.2 -26.2 -20.2 -46.4
* SITS = VOI / (VOI + VOD), where VOI =  volume o f  imports; VOD =  volum e o f  domestic output. 
Source; State Statistical Bureau (1992); State Statistical Bureau (1996b);
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Structure o f Imports
China’s industrialisation followed the typical route to import substitution. That is, a 
country increases domestic production by the means of introducing foreign capital goods 
(equipment and raw materials) to strengthen its capacity of output and to replace those it 
has previously had to import. China’s commodity composition of foreign trade reflected 
such a spirit of import substitution strategy.
In China, before the reform, over 90% of total imports in the 1950s were production 
facilities. In the remaining years until the late 1970s this proportion remained above 75%, 
except the first half of 1960s when China suffered from supply shortage resulting from 
natural calamities (Table 3.2-a). Most imports were raw materials, agricultural products, 
and machinery and equipment.
Table 3.2-a China’s Import Structure in Pre-reform Period, Selected Years (%)
1950 1953 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980
Im ports of production facilities 
Imports of consum er goods
83.5
16.6
92.1
7.9
93.8
6.2
95.4
4.6
66.5
33.5
82.7
17.3
85.4
14.6
81.4
18.6
78.9
21.1
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1981), p. 358.
Table 3.2-b China’s Import Structure, 1980-1996 (%)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
Prim ary goods 34.8 12.5 18.5 18.5 18.3
M anufactured goods 65.2 87.5 81.5 81.5 81.7
M achinery & transport equipm ent 25.6 38.4 31.6 39.9 39.4
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996b, 1997b).
The preference of production facility imports over others continued in the 1980s and 
1990s. One important target of China’s open-door policy is to improve its industrial 
capacity by introducing foreign advanced equipment and technology. Most imports of 
equipment and raw materials have enjoyed preferential treatment of tariff reduction or 
exemption. In 1995, for example, about 80% of machinery and electrical product imports 
were given preferential treatment of tariff reduction or exemption. In the structure of 
imports, equipment and raw materials remained the main type of import.[3] Because China 
changed its statistical method, adopting the SITC in 1980 and then HS since 1992, the 
accurate data classified as in Table 3.2-a are no longer published. However, it is possible to 
obtain a rough estimate based on official data. The estimated results show that the share of
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equipment and raw materials in total imports since the mid-1980s has remained within the 
range of 70-85%,[4] very close to the level before reform. Given the fact that trade barriers 
for imports of consumer goods remained high, although several significant reductions did 
take place in the 1990s, China’s such a structure of imports demonstrated the features of an 
import substitution strategy in the reform period.
“Compulsory Export”
For a long time, the view that the central task of foreign trade was to increase foreign- 
exchange earnings through exports has been the doctrine which strongly influenced the 
makings of trade policy in China (Shi Shijmi 1995, 1996). The initiative of this doctrine 
probably related to the fact that export earnings were the main resource to pay for imports. 
Because of the low level of the economic development, many industries were regarded as 
“infant industries” to be developed under import substitution protection. Demand of import 
was extremely high. This led to, as analysed, an import structure biased in favour of 
production facilities. It was reported that, during the period of 1979-89, more than 80% of 
foreign exchange for the imports of necessary raw materials, equipment and technology 
came from export earnings (China’s Foreign Trade, Nos. 10-11,1989, pp. 3-4). This ratio could be 
necessarily higher in the pre-reform period because the other resources for financing 
imports, such as the gains from overseas investment and the exchange earning through 
service exports, were very small. Export expansion, therefore, became the priority in the 
development of China’s foreign trade.
The special position of exports in the Chinese economy produced a “compulsory 
export” model of foreign trade. The features of “compulsory export” were as follows: 
Initially the requirement of planned economic growth determines the scale of imports. 
Then, the scale of exports is accordingly decided by the scale of imports (Wang Dongjing
1994). Because China has long been pursuing a rapid development programme, the 
expansion of economic size generated increasing demand for imports. In turn, this trend of 
import growth forced the further expansion of exports. However, the size of exports could 
not exceed the possibility determined by the development level of the economy. China 
faced the question of foreign exchange shortage like many other developing countries. 
Insufficient capacity of payment could not afford for the growing imports. Therefore, 
government policies had to restrict imports on the one hand, and to expand exports through 
creating export incentives for FTCs on the other.
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The “compulsory export” policy pushed China’s exports to grow. Exports increased at 
an average annual rate of 16.68% between 1979 and 1997. However, the growth of exports 
was not a response to an increase of export prices although export price index increased, for 
example, from 73.3 in 1978 to 120.9 in 1993.[5J Lardy (1994) rightly pointed out the 
deterioration in terms of trade was due to rising prices paid for imports (Lardy 1994, p. 40). 
During 1978-1993, as shown in Table 3.3, the import price index increased by about 52 
percentage points while export price index only had a 48 percentage points increase. The 
terms of trade declined from 115.4 in 1980 (121.4 in 1982) to 101.1 in 1993. Because of the 
rapid expansion of the economy, import demand was always strong and the actual imports 
grew fast. Increasing imports, in turn, forced exports to be further expanded regardless of 
the deteriorating trend in terms of trade. ^
Table 3.3 Terms of Trade, 1973-95 (1987=100)
1973 1975 1978 1980 1985 1987 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Export price index 59.2 61.2 73.3 102.5 87.9 100.0 120.9 122.0 123.1 120.9 n.a. n.a.
Im port price index 48.8 56.6 67.8 88.8 80.4 100.0 114.5 116.5 121.7 119.6 n.a. n.a.
Term s o f trade 121.3 108.1 108.1 115.4 109.3 100.0 105.6 104.7 101.2 101.1 105.0 105.0
Source: World Bank (1995b, pp.210-211; 1996; 1997b).
Of course, changes in terms of trade, either increasing or decreasing, are normal 
phenomenon in world trade. But in most case the decline in terms of trade could, and 
should, not stimulate export expansion unless the foreign exchange earnings are absolute 
needed. However, China’s export expansion accompanying the decline in terms of trade 
was just aiming at the increase of foreign exchange earnings. The use of the “compulsory 
export” policy in this case was not therefore surprising.
Rapid export expansion enabled China to alleviate the foreign exchange shortage. 
Despite a great amount of foreign exchange, used to feed the increasing demand of imports, 
China’s foreign exchange reserves still increased from US$0,167 billion in 1978 to 
US$139.9 billion in 1997 (LI Peng 1998). Whether China needs to have such a large foreign 
exchange reserves is not the theme of this study. However, if the increase of export earning 
was just for the government’s holding of foreign exchange reserves, the excessive export 
expansion became insignificant and harmful for the development of foreign trade. Export 
expansion is worth encouraging because export earning can be a source for improving the
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domestic production or national welfare. Holding too much foreign exchange shows 
nothing but a fact of resource wastage.
In fact, some more problems can be found behind the fast growth of exports. The 
“compulsory export” policy led to a situation in which enterprises and sectors focused on 
the increase of export volume (quantity) while ignoring the improvement of effectiveness. 
The quantitative expansion of exports was largely attributed to the following reasons: First, 
there was a strong demand for imports since China has been seeking to enhance the level of 
industrialisation. Increasing requirements of foreign exchange to pay for the imports of 
production equipment and materials put a heavy pressure on exports to be expanded. Due to 
the low competitiveness of Chinese products in the world market, a very important means 
of increasing foreign exchange earnings was to increase the volume of exports regardless of 
the price decline.
Second, it seemed that China’s comparative advantage was in labour-intensive exports 
for which there was a relatively large market in developed countries. This situation 
encouraged the fast growth of China’s labour-intensive exports. China has abundant labour 
resources but a relatively low level of natural resources per head in the world (Xiao Zhuoji et 
al. 1992, pp. 36-37).[?] Logically, what China needed was to change the export structure by 
reducing the proportion of resource-intensive products and increasing the share of 
manufactures with higher capital and technological ingredients. However, the excessive 
emphasis on foreign exchange earnings, naturally, led to the enhancement of industrial and 
export structure being ignored. Although the exports of some manufactured products have 
rapidly increased since the second half of the 1980s, the low value-added nature of these 
exported commodities has not fundamentally changed.
Third, some institutional imperfections also strengthened the trend of quantitative 
expansion. Most FTCs could not fully, and independently, determine their own business. 
FTCs had to follow government supervision rather than reacting to market signals. Under 
the regime of the contract responsibility system during 1988-91, for example, the amount of 
foreign exchange earnings was one of the main indicators for evaluating the operation of 
FTCs. As a result, FTCs had to achieve the target of making exchange earnings by 
expanding exports regardless of efficiency. In addition, the targets for FTCs to increase the 
volume of exports also induced blind competition among enterprises, areas and even
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provinces. One result of blind competition was the decline of export prices. Once export 
prices had declined, more exports were needed to make up the same exchange earnings.
Finally, the most important factor stimulating the simple quantitative expansion of 
exports was the implementation of hade policy, A powerful instrument used before 1994 
was the foreign exchange retention system. The proportion of foreign exchange which 
could be retained by an enterprise depended on its export performance, as well as its status 
and location. If an enterprise overfilled the assigned export target, the extra earning of 
foreign exchange could be shared by the enterprise on a higher ratio. In some areas, the 
retention shares for assigned export earnings were such that 80% went to central 
government and 20% to the enterprise itself, but the ratios for overfilled earnings were 20% 
and 80% respectively (Cai Jinniu 1995). The more exports, the larger the amount of foreign 
exchange that could be retained. Another policy instrument was the duty drawback system 
implemented since 1985. The aim of this policy was to balance tax burdens between 
exports and imports and to strengthen the competitiveness of export products. The 
implementation of this duty drawback policy seemed helpful in promoting China’s exports 
since the tax rebate became an important source of funds that enabled enteiprises to reduce 
export prices. In addition, the frequent devaluation of the Renminbi since the mid-1980s 
also provided stimulation for export growth. The devaluation of Renminbi meant that 
exports could be further expanded through price decreases. The exchange rate changed from 
2.8 Renminbi per dollar* in 1984 to 8.7 Renminbi per dollar in 1994. Although some (e.g. Pei 
Ping 1994) argued that the devaluation of Renminbi had little effect in promoting export 
growth, the exchange rate reform could not be regarded as meaningless for exports. At a 
minimum, it has contributed to maintaining the high growth of exports. In 1994, China’s 
export growth rate was 31.9%, much higher than a 15% average annual growth rate in the 
previous reform, years since the late 1970s. This supernormal growth rate seemed, in a large 
part, due to the unification of the exchange rate system and the accompanying drastic 
devaluation of Renminbi in 1994 (Zhong Pengrong 1996). However, in the sense that the 
exchange rate mechanism in China still lacked a solid foundation in the market economy, 
devaluation and exchange rate adjustments did not fully function as stimulators for export 
expansion. Therefore, the function of exchange rate system in promoting exports in the past 
reform years should not be overestimated. Trade flows will not change with fluctuations of
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the exchange rate if exporters and importers cannot respond to the change of price signals 
caused by devaluation or revaluation.
Efficiency
The term of economic efficiency can be understood in two specific aspects — allocative 
efficiency and technical efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to a situation in which 
resources (factors of production) are allocated to those sectors where the maximum output 
will be produced. Technical efficiency refers to a situation in which the best technology is 
employed, which means factors of production are optimally combined, to produce output at 
lower cost or of higher quality.
Under an import substitution regime, China conducted a series of development policies 
aiming at centralising economic power, emphasising heavy industries and pursuing a high 
speed of growth. Among these policies, a high accumulation rate stimulated huge 
government investment in support of the import substitution of heavy industries. Li 
Jingwen (1993) in his empirical study pointed out that China’s rapid growth in 1952-1979 
was a low-efficiency growth supported by high input rate, at the cost of low improvement 
to people’s living standards. At the same time, efficiency in terms of output per unit of 
capital was also low because of poor management and the lack of incentives. In the pre­
reform period, the ratio of investment to national income was above 1.9:1, meaning that for 
every unit of national income increase in terms of Yuan it needed to increase capital inputs 
by 1.9 Yuan (Song Guangmao 1996).
Since reform, this situation has not fundamentally changed, it may even have worsened. 
The profit-capital ratio in state-owned industries has declined and the total loss of state- 
owned enterprises has expanded (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Efficiency of State-Owned Industrial Enterprises (%; billion of Yuan)
Year Pre-tax profits /  total 
capital
Profits /  assets Proportion of loss-innking 
enterprises in all enterprises
Total loss o f loss-making 
enterprises
1978 4.21
1980 24.94 16.00 3.43
1985 23.80 13.20 9.6 3.24
1990 12.40 2.60 27.6 34.88
1995 8.01 1.85 33.5 63.96
1996 6.54 0.99 37.7 79.07
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996b, 1997a; 1997b); Mao Tianqi (1997a, 1997b).
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As can be seen, the total loss of state-owned industrial enterprises has increased sharply 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The competitiveness of state-owned enterprises became 
relatively weak, especially in contrast to the emergence of the rural and township 
economies. State-owned enterprise reform stagnated, owing to the poorly-defined property 
rights, an incomplete market system and excessive administrative intervention. Their 
operational characteristics, formed under the earlier import substitution regime, such as 
depending on government investment, seeking protection and expecting preferential 
policies, have not yet been changed. Regarding government policies, market-type reforms 
have not been earned out until recent years. High tariffs, a high exchange rate and strict 
import controls maintained an environment fitting import substitution as it was. When trade 
policy reforms started in the 1990s, state-owned enterprises found their situation was so 
severe that they could not avoid heavy losses.
With regal'd to China’s import substitution, there are some points to be noted: First, it is 
difficult to assess whether the import substitution policy in China has been successful or if 
it has failed. Both benefits and costs have been brought out by implementing this strategy. 
Second, China’s import substitution lacks the foundation of a complete market system. 
When import controls were released, for example in 1984 and 1993, imports almost 
immediately singed. This reflects the fact that import demand was restrained other than 
being met by domestic substitutes. Finally, China’s import substitution was still at a stage 
concentrating on the substitution of ordinary products. Many products with higher 
technological ingredients, such as complete sets of equipment, medical instruments and 
appliances, and communication equipment, were highly dependent on imports. In this 
sense, China’s import substitution was far from complete.
3.3 E v a l u a t in g  C h in a ’s E x p e r ie n c e  o f  T r a d e  St r a t e g y  C h a n g e s
3.3.1 Classifying China’s Trade Strategy
Conventionally trade strategies have been divided into IS and EP. However, the 
possibility of their coexistence has opened a large space in which the mixture of the IS and 
EP strategies may be varied. Liang et al. (1991) developed a new classification of trade 
strategy by adding two concepts to the conventional method. Besides IS and EP, there are 
two strategies to be considered. One is “protected export promotion” (PEP) referring to 
“promoting import substitution for the sake of developing new exports”. Another is “de
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facto import promotion” (DIP) which “minimises exports and maximises imports, 
intentionally or unintentionally, in order to provide the needed resources and incentives for 
domestic investment and consumption”. According to their analysis, some of the East Asian 
economies such as Korea and Taiwan are found to have pursued a PEP strategy rather than 
a pure EP strategy. By contrast, the incentive structure of DIP characterises an insatiable 
“import hunger” and systemic bias against exports.
It is interesting to note that there are two quite different assessments over China’s trade 
strategy in two World Bank studies, both have obviously adopted the above classification of 
trade strategy. In an earlier study, China’s foreign trade regime was thought of as a DIP 
regime, although China’s intention was to pursue the PEP strategy as its Asian neighbours 
did before (World Bank 1994a, pp. 80-81). More recently, in the World Development Report 
1996, China’s trade policies were described as those which “have combined substantial, 
although partial, liberalisation with active export promotion” (World Bank 1996, p. 29). In 
other words, China’s trade strategy is established as a kind of PEP. Why have these two 
studies had so different conclusions?
The reason seems largely due to the significant change of China’s trade policies at the 
time. Over the past 20 years both export and import policies were frequently adjusted. In 
particular, around the period of 1992-1996, the time those two World Bank studies were 
published, China conducted its intensive trade policy reforms in the clear direction of trade 
liberalisation. Given the pace of change of China’s trade policy, it is difficult to identify the 
real trend in trade strategy.
Looking back, however, China’s newly adopted trade strategy could not be regarded as 
either a pure DIP or PEP. As mentioned above, the rapid growth of the East Asian 
economies were an important element in determining China’s reform and open-door policy. 
Many new trade policy measures were carried out with an intention of pursuing the effect of 
PEP. It was evident that in the 1980s, when most import banders were not liberalised, a 
series of export promotion measures including the enhancement of purchasing prices for 
export goods, the set-up of exchange retention rates, the decentralisation of export rights, 
and devaluation of the domestic currency were the main episodes of China’s trade reform. 
In addition, imports were tightly controlled except those needed for export production.
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China’s exports increased rapidly in the 1980s. Such a strategy is similar to that of some 
Asian economies in the 1970s, where it was attested an effective strategy. However, 
China’s trade policy reform is in a veiy different situation from that of her Asian 
neighbours in the 1960s and the early 1970s when the linkages between export promotion 
and import protection or liberalisation seemed not to be as tight as it has been since the late 
1970s. Since the 1980s, especially since the Uruguay Round, every country has become 
more sensitive to their counterparts’ trade policies. Given that China has been making great 
effort to re-join the GATT and enter the WTO, the pressure of trade liberalisation forced 
China to accelerate the pace of trade policy reform. This has meant that China, unlike some 
East Asian economies, has had to cany out liberalisation reforms in exports and imports 
simultaneously. Therefore, although the PEP strategy describes the strategy in China during 
the 1980s, since the 1990s, China in fact has not be able to maintain a pure PEP strategy 
and take the advantage of “promoting export without import liberalisation” like some of her 
East Asian counterparts.
Can China’s trade strategy be thought of a typical DIP strategy? It is true that China’s 
import demand was strong. The actual imports increased rapidly, with an annual growth 
rate of 14.49% during 1979-1997. In the first half of the 1990s, the annual growth rate of 
imports (19.9%) was even higher than that of exports (19.1%). However, this is by no 
means proof that imports were encouraged. Three reasons can be considered supportive to 
such a conclusion.
First, China’s rapid growth of imports was based on the support of high growth rate of 
exports. During 1980-1989, China had a total trade deficit of US$44,986 billion, due for a 
large part to “import hunger” released in this period. From 1990 to 1996, a total trade 
surplus of US$46,616 billion was enjoyed while import restrictions were much reduced. 
This phenomenon, together with China’s huge foreign exchange reservation, showed that 
imports have not been the priority of the trade strategy.
Second, using imports as a means to production resources is a feature shared by both the 
DIP and IS strategies. But treating imports as a source for domestic consumption 
distinguishes the DIP Rom the IS strategy. From the earlier analysis of China’s import 
structure, it can be seen that the import of consumer goods has not been encouraged
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although the improvement in living standards might suggest that such an increase in 
demand for imported consumer goods has occurred.
Third, most importantly, it must be considered whether the incentives provided to 
importers exceeded those to exporters. A widely used method for classifying trade 
strategies is to calculate the effective exchange rates (EERs) to show the trade regime 
“bias”. The effective exchange rate on exports (EERX) or on imports (EERm) is defined as 
the units of domestic currency actually paid or received for a unit of foreign exchange. In 
1994, China’s “average domestic cost of foreign exchange” (can be considered as 
approximate EERX) was 8.65 while EERm was 8.99.[S] According to Bhagwati’s definitions 
(1988a), China’s overall trade strategy in 1994 could be classified as an EP (neutral) strategy 
since the ratio EERm/EERx = 1.0393, fitting the requirement of neutrality where EERX ~ 
EERm. In addition, based on the author’s constructed EERs, the trade bias ratios were also 
close to unity from the mid-1980s (see Appendix Table 1). This suggests that, although 
China’s overall trade strategy in the 1980s could be thought as an attempt of PEP to correct 
the anti-export bias of the IS strategy, the incentive structure in China has now moved to a 
neutral situation with less bias. Imports, in this case, have not been encouraged.
Interestingly, based on the author’s constructed EERs, China’s trade bias ratios in most 
years of the reform period were not severely deviant from neutrality. However, that is not to 
say that China adopted free trade policies in the early years of reform. On the contrary, 
China’s trade policies before the 1990s were far from free trade. The existence of the IS 
strategy in the 1980s, with an over-valued exchange rate, high tariffs and strict import 
quotas, resulted in certain anti-export bias. On the other hand, the continuous effort to 
create export incentives in the same period showed China’s attempt to aggressively 
participate in the world market and, strategically, to off-set the effect of anti-export bias of 
the IS strategy. In balance, trade policy was turning to a mixture of IS and EP, or 
specifically, a combination of the DIP and PEP. The trade bias ratio in the 1980s reached a 
level of neutrality with strong export promotion and high import protection. In the 1990s, 
both import restrictions and export incentives have been significantly reduced. The 
neutrality of the trade regime was achieved with less preference towards either exports or 
imports. This plausible change in trade policy demonstrated that China’s trade strategy has
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shifted from an aggressive participation in international markets to an indiscriminate 
integration with the world economy.
3.3.2 Evaluating China’s Trade Strategy
Based on the above analysis, it is possible to conclude that China’s trade strategy was 
derived first from the IS strategy before moving to the Ultra-EP (or EO) strategy and then, 
through intensive trade policy reforms, to a mixed strategy —  EP strategy in tenns of 
neutrality. The shift of trade strategy has been a foundation for further liberalisation of trade 
policies. However, China’s trade strategy shift has not been without problems.
First, China’s trade policy reform was not a straight move to liberalisation. The 
possibility that of combining export promotion with import protection has enabled China to 
carry out its gradual, partial trade reform. The beginning of trade reform can be thought of 
as the initial attempt to allow exports to play a more important role in directing economic 
and foreign trade development. Since then and throughout the 1980s, a main line of trade 
reform has been the promotion of export growth through the strengthening export 
incentives. Although sustained export growth in the 1980s encouraged China to let more 
and more areas open-up, trade reform was slow and partial. The only significant trade 
policy reform in the 1980s was the limited devolution of trading rights. Import substitution 
policies were maintained almost unchanged. Less progress had been made in reducing trade 
protection. The intensive trade policy reforms in the 1990s seem a significant effort to 
implement a balanced trade strategy. However, China still lacks the solid foundations to 
ensure she reaps the benefits of these trade policy reforms. Some crucial obstacles still 
remain. One is that a well-functioning market economy has not yet been established. 
Another is that government administrative controls continue to play an important role in 
China’s foreign trade. In this context, the effects of trade policy reforms may be offset by 
the incompleteness of trade regime reform.
Second, the two ingredients of trade strategy, import substitution and export promotion, 
coexisted rather than co-acted. Although export promotion supported import substitution to 
some extent, dynamic linkages between export promotion and import substitution have not 
yet been built up. Thus improvement have been seen both in effective substitution of some 
products and in the fact that manufactures increased to over 80% of total exports. However,
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almost all of these successes occurred in the areas relating to low-technology and labour- 
intensive products. The goal that combines export promotion and import substitution to 
upgrading the industrial structure has not been achieved successfully.
Third, China lacks a complete set of trade policies to harmonise export promotion and 
import substitution. Enterprises cannot get sufficient market signals to determine their 
market goals. Even in the 1990s, when some intensive trade policy reforms have been 
conducted, it is unlikely that enterprises could respond well to the trade policy changes. In 
addition, China has claimed it plans to establish a free hade system. An essential 
requirement is to remove all barriers to trade and establish a neutral incentive mechanism 
without any discrimination toward exports or imports. This means a further and more 
difficult reform of hade policies is still required in China.
In this chapter, China’s trade strategy has been examined, as indicating the general 
direction of trade policy in the country. The significant contribution made in this analysis is 
the explanation of the way in which China’s trade strategy has been rightly shifted from 
aggressive participation in international markets to an indiscriminate integration with the 
world economy. It is the author’s own view that China has been moving in the direction of 
a mixed, balanced and neutral trade shategy. While the IS policies remained in the 1980s, 
the creation of export incentives offset the anti-export bias of the IS strategy and enabled 
China to attain a neutral trade regime or balanced hade policy system, featuring a 
combination of DIP and PEP. By reducing export incentives and import restrictions in the 
1990s, China’s trade strategy reached a new level of neutrality with less preference towards 
either exports or imports.
[1] Strictly, a moderate distinction should be made between export orientation (EO) and export promotion (EP). EO refers 
to a strategy which is in favour o f  exports and expects an export-led (EL) growth, very close to the term Ultra-EP, while 
EP is understood a neutral strategy as used in the existing literature. However, in a simplified way, all these concepts can 
be treated as the opposite o f  import substitution (IS) strategy. Given the fact that many Chinese economists have not 
made strict distinction between EP and EO or EL or Ultra-EP, it is difficult to classify whether their views are EO or EP. 
It should be aware that the term EP used in this chapter, where concerns Chinese econom ists’ views, may contain the 
ingredients o f  EO or EL or Ultra-EP.
The literature on relative issues is broad. Among them, the major studies can be seen, for example, in Krueger (1981; 
1983; 1993), Bhagwati (1986; 1988), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979), World Bank (1987), and Papageorgiou et al. 
(1991). For a survey, see Pack (1988), Bruton (1989), and Edwards (1992),
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[3] Meng Xian gang, director o f  the Department o f  Foreign Trade and Economy in the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, pointed out recently as follows: "Our imports are mainly capital goods, including some key equipment for 
the domestic economic development and resource products that are scarce in the country". (M eng Xiangang 1997)
E4] The import value o f  equipment and raw materials is the sum o f  SITC 2 (non-edible raw materials), 3 (mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials), 4  (animal and vegetable oils, fats and wax), 5 (chemical and related products), 6 (light 
and textile industrial products, rubber products, mineral metallurgical products), and 7 (machinery and transport 
equipment) subtracting some items which imported as consumer goods. The subtracted items include: medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products, perfumed materials, cosmetics, leather products, travel articles, etc. in SITC 5; knitted or 
crocheted garments and clothing accessories, footwear, headwear, processed feather, artificial flowers, natural or 
cultivated pearls, precious stones and metal, jewellery, etc. in SITC 6; recorders, videorecorders and accessories, etc. in 
SITC 7. The results o f  estimate are as follows:
Shares o f  Equipment and Raw Materials in Total Imports (1985-1996)________________ (% )
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Shares in total imports 76.8 66.9 68.3 71.7 80.0 89.1 84.7 86.6
Source: Author's estimate, based on the data from State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1995, 1996b, 1997b).
151 Some Chinese scholars argued that China has in fact suffered from such a “immiserising export”. In their opinion, 
“compulsory export” contains a risk o f causing an “immiserising growth” o f  exports. “Immiserising export”, which refers 
to export growth that depends on the increase o f  exports in physical volume instead o f  in value (price), will be the result 
o f  the export-bias, Wang Xinkui (1994) gave a concise description o f this, based on Chinese export performance in the 
1980s.
In fact, change in terms o f  trade is a normal phenomenon in world trade. Even China’s exports were expanded with a 
decline in terms o f  trade, it is unnecessary to be considered the case o f  “immiserising growth”. To a maximum, China’s 
quantitative expansion o f  exports might suffer from an effect o f  low efficiency rather than being an “immiserising 
growth”.
c<5] Besides the data shown in Table 3.3, the deterioration in terms o f trade has been noted in some other Chinese sources 
(for example, Wang Zixian 1993; Han Yi 1995). The following table shows the changes in China’s terms o f  trade in the 
1980s;
Terms o f  Trade (1980-90)____________ (X980 =  100)
1980 1987 1988 1989 1990
Terms o f  trade 100.0 105.4 90.7 82.4 96.6
Source: Almanac o f  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1991.
E?] China is one o f  the six large countries (the former Soviet Union, the USA, China, Canada, Australia and South Africa) 
with richest natural resources in the world. However, with a large population, China’s natural resources per head are 
below the average level o f  the world. The following table based on the data o f  the late 1980s shows some aspects o f  
China’s natural resource per head, compared with some other countries and the average level o f  the world.
A Comparison o f  China ’.v Natural Resources Per Head with Some Other Countries
World China USA Canada Australia France UK India M exico
Cultivated land (acres) 0.27 0.09 0.76 1.77 2.84 0.33 0.12 0.21 0.28
Forest area (acres) 0.80 0.11 1.08 13.64 6.41 0.26 0.04 0.09 0.53
Forest cover rate (%) 31.10 12.00 28.90 38.40 13.90 26.70 9.60 22.60 23.10
Forest growing stock (cu. m.) 60.60 9.40 81.80 886.30 63.50 28.60 2.80 4.70 37.70
Prairie (acres) 0.63 0.20 0.98 1.23 26.38 0.21 0.20 0.02 0.90
Source: Xiao Shuoji et al. (1992), p. 37.
Given that Chinese population has kept growing since the 1990s and it is difficult to increase unrenewable natural 
resources, the level o f  natural resource per head in China is likely to be lower than before.
It is very difficult to calculate China’s EERX and EERm based on published official statistics, due to the lack o f  
complete information about tariffs and non-tariff measures on exports and imports. The lack o f internationally 
comparable prices also becom es difficulty to make an indirect estimation. In fact, China has annually produced its EERX 
data, in Chinese term “average domestic cost o f  foreign exchange” (P ing Jitn Chu Kou Huan Hui Cheng Ben) which has a 
same definition as EERX, but never published. Here, China’s EERX and EERra for 1994 are obtained in the following 
ways:
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EERX uses a figure o f  “average domestic cost o f  foreign exchange”, from Huang Xianhai (1996). Similar figure can be 
seen in Yi Gang (1995) who used the term EER;
EERm is calculated as EERm = e (1 + t + n), where e is official exchange rate while t is average tariff rate and n is 
tariff-equivalent o f  non-tariff measures. Data for t and n are from Zhang Shugang et al. (1997).
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Formalising Export Policies
Exporting has captured a special position in the Chinese economy. Over time, Chinese 
leaders and economists have repeatedly stressed that export expansion was the most 
important aspect for the development of China’s foreign trade. To promote export growth, 
China adopted various measures to provide strong export incentives during the reform 
period. However, alongside its economic opening, China also faced the task of reforming its 
export policies to fully engage with the world economy. In particular, China’s export 
policies are required to be formalised in accord with international trade practice in which 
the market mechanism and neutrality are considered to be the foundations of export 
promoting measures. This chapter intends to examine export policy formalisation in China.
4.1 Subsidies and Prices
4.1.1 Subsidies Related to Trade
Subsidy is defined as a payment or other benefits provided by the government to 
producers/exporters to support their production or exports. There are two kinds of subsidies 
classified as export subsidy and domestic subsidy. Export subsidy occurs when a direct 
payment or other benefits from government is paid to exporters or producers on the goods 
which are exported. A domestic subsidy is paid to producers on all that is produced 
regardless of whether the output is for export or the domestic market. An export subsidy 
clearly affects the prices of export goods while a domestic subsidy has a “less” direct or 
indirect effects on the trade distortions. In China’s statistics, the tenn “subsidies” in fact 
covers export subsidies (before 1991), import subsidies (before 1994) and domestic 
subsidies.
Table 4.1 Government Subsidies, 1985-1996 (billions of Yuan)
1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Price subsidies 26.18 38.08 37.38 32.16 29.93 31.45 36.49 45.39
Subsidies to loss-m aking SOEs 50.70 57.89 51.02 44.50 41.13 36.62 32.78 33.74
Total 76.88 95.97 88.40 76.66 71.06 68.07 69.27 79.13
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996a, 1996b, 1997b); State Planning Committee et al. (1997).
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Table 4.1 gives figures for China’s government subsidies for selected years. The data in 
Table 4.1 requires some explanation. First, almost all Chinese FTCs are state-owned and 
are therefore SOEs. Second, China has not officially published figures on export (and 
import) subsidies in detail. Subsidies to FTCs, either for supporting export expansion or 
offsetting their losses, are usually included in the total amount of subsidies to SOEs. Third, 
or at least it was the case before 1991, all FTCs could claim and gain compensation from 
the government for their losses, whether or not such losses were due to their operational 
inefficiency or to “external” conditions like the distorted price systems and exchange rates. 
Therefore, it was believed that all FTCs’ losses were offset by government subsidies. 
Fourth, after the elimination of export and import subsidies, subsidies to FTCs took the 
forms of domestic subsidy.
In international trade practice, export subsidies are regarded as an “unfair” measure and 
restricted by international agreement. Before the Uruguay Round, GATT rules distinguish 
subsidies between export and “other” subsidies and between subsidies on primary and non­
primary products. “Other” subsidies and export subsidies on primary products are permitted 
unless they are demonstrated to have adverse effects on the trade or production of trading 
partners. Export subsidies on manufactured goods are prohibited for developed countries, 
but are permitted for developing countries, provided they do not cause serious prejudice to 
the trade or production of trading partners. In the Uruguay Round, all subsidies are further 
classified into three categories —  prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies and 
nonactionable subsidies. Export subsidy is included in the prohibited subsidies category 
while (actionable) domestic subsidies need to be shown to be without trade-distorting 
effects. Although developing countries are given a period of time to phase out export 
subsidies, an increase of export subsidies will never be accepted. However, in practice, it is 
difficult to judge whether the export subsidies of a country hurt its trading partners’ 
production. Trade friction sometimes derives from the different views of the relative 
countries on export subsidies.
Export subsidisation was once the most important way for supporting Chinese exports. 
The target of export subsidy was to enable exporter to fill the gap of export costs (or the 
domestic prices) over export prices. Because of the lack of systematic data, it is difficult to 
show the accurate scale of subsidy on exports and imports separately. But some incomplete
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information can still provide a rough picture of China’s subsidy on foreign trade between 
1985 and 1991, the period when export subsidy policy was active. Exports did not require 
domestic currency subsidies in 1985 but import subsidies exceeded 5 billion Yuan. In 1986 
losses on exports alone exceeded 7 billion Yuan while losses on imports were placed at 12 
billion Yuan (see Lardy 1992, p. 102). In 1987, export subsidies accounted for 4% of the total 
value of exports (Fan Baoqing 1994). That means the export subsidy in that year reached 5.88 
billion Yuan (about US$1.58 billion). When the foreign trade contract responsibility system 
was introduced in 1988, the government subsidy for foreign trade was frozen at the 1987 
level. Considering export and import subsidies together, in 1987 and the following three 
years (1988-90), government subsidy for foreign trade was about 20 billion Yuan per year 
(Yao Lin 1991, also see Table 4.3 for reference).[l] In 1991, export subsidies were eliminated. 
Import subsidies were only applied to eight imported products including grain, sugar, 
fertiliser, steels and pesticide (Qiang Yongchang and Tao Yong 1993). Import subsidies were 
phased out in 1994.
4.1.2 Analysing the Effects of Subsidies 
Export Subsidies
Export subsidies allow exporters to sell their products in a foreign market at a lower 
price than in the domestic market. Sometimes the price of the subsidised export goods may 
be well below the costs of production. These effects of prices caused by export subsidies 
could affect both the exporting country and the importing country. For the importing 
country, export subsidies in the exporting country means a cheaper source of supply and an 
opportunity to enjoy an increase of net welfare. But the domestic import-competing 
industries may be harmed by importing goods subsidised by the exporting country. This has 
become the main reason for anti-dumping measures. For an exporting country, the effects of 
export subsidies are also double-edged, given the reduction of welfare on the one hand and 
expansion of exports and increased export earnings on the other. The use of export subsidy 
policy in China generated various problems.
The first problem related to the interaction between export subsidies and prices. 
Conventional analysis of export subsidies usually indicates that such subsidies help 
maintain the low prices of exported products but induce an increase in domestic prices. The 
rise of domestic prices in turn requires a further increase in the export subsidy because the
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export cost will go up as well. In China’s experience, such an interaction started with the 
rise of domestic prices. Since the beginning of reform, China’s price controls were 
increasingly eased. Market mechanism and administrative measures both resulted in price 
levels for most commodities being raised.
Table 4.2 Price Indices, Selected Years
1978 1980 1985 1988 1990 1995 1996
General CPI (1985=100) - - 100.0 135.8 165.2 302.8 327.9
CPI urban area (1978=100) 100.0 109.5 134.2 188.5 222.0 429.6 467.4
General PPI o f farm products (1978=100) 100.0 130.8 166.8 244.5 273.9 527.9 550.1
General EFPI of industrial products (preceding yea i-100) - 100.5 108.7 115.0 104.1 114.9 102.9
Note: CPI: consumer price index; PPI: purchasing price index; EFPI: ex-factory price index. 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996a, 1996b, 1997b); State Planning Committee et al. (1997).
Table 4.2 shows that the fast increase of various price indices since the 1980s (prices of 
agricultural products increased much higher and earlier than others). As a result, in 1985- 
1990, the purchasing prices of exported goods and the “average domestic cost of foreign 
exchange” increased 93.6% and 83.33% respectively (Huang Yaohua and Wang Zhengxiao 1991). 
Further, because of China’s “compulsory exports” practice, purchasing the exportables at 
high prices strengthened the trend of price increase. Some FTCs began to bid increasing 
prices for exportables which they could sell for foreign exchange, exporting these goods at 
loss-making competitive prices, cutting out Other FTCs (Liu Mingxing et al. 1982; Shen Liren 
1988; Kleinberg 1990, p. 144; Wang Zixian 1993; Shi Shijun 1995).
The second problem concerned the increasing burden for the government of 
compensating FTC losses through the use of subsidies. The need for subsidies was due to 
the low efficiency of the Chinese economy and the severely distorted price system. Due to 
the rise of the domestic prices which resulted in an increase of the “average domestic cost 
of foreign exchange”, FTCs’ exporting and importing losses continuously increased in the 
1980s. According to a World Bank report (World Bank 1994a), Chinese FTCs losses on some 
international transactions were inevitable, due to domestic price distortions and the 
existence of mandatory export and import plans.
As seen in Table 4.3, in 1986-1990 when export subsidisation was an active policy 
instrument, more than a half of fiscal subsidies for SOEs (58.53%) went to the FTCs. The 
situation since 1991 seemed improved, given that the subsidies to foreign trade accounted 
for a lower proportion of total subsidies provided to SOEs, due partially to the elimination
73
of export subsidies from 1 January 1991. Nonetheless, the budgeted subsidies for foreign 
trade in 1986-1991 totalled 153.71 billion Yuan, accounting for 5.82% of the real total 
value of imports and exports (2,642.82 billion Yuan) in this period. The above figures do 
not provide a complete picture. Between 1988 and 1990, besides the FTC losses which 
covered by subsidies from the central government budgets (about 82.93 billion Yuan), there 
was also an extra loss of 15 billion Yuan (Huang Yaohua and Wang Zhengxiao 1991), As already 
mentioned, all losses of FTCs were finally paid for by the government.
Table 4.3 Losses of FTCs and Government Subsidies to SOEs (billions of Yuan)
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Subsidies to FTCs
Subsidies to loss-m aking SOEs
FT C s’ share in subsidies to SOEs (%)
24.96
32.48
76.85
28.21
37.64
74.95
26.85
44.65
60.13
26.89
59.89
44.90
22.36
57.89
38.62
11.85
51.02
23.23
3.77
44.50
8.47
2.13
41.13
5.18
Source: World Bank (1994a, p. 26) for data o f subsidies to FTCs 1986-1988. The Editorial Board o f  Almanac o f  
C hin a’s Economy (1993, 1994) for data o f  subsidies to FTCs 1989-1993, “Subsidies to loss-making SOEs” 
are taken from State Statistical Bureau (1997b), p. 239.
Third, the export expansion effect of export subsidies not only helped overcome 
inadequate demand in the domestic market, but also brought about the development of other 
sectors. Using subsidies to promote exports may change domestic consumption expenditure 
into investment on the one hand, and increase foreign exchange earnings on the other. So 
the effect of subsidies in stimulating national economic growth can be larger than the losses 
caused by the worsened terms of trade. Traditionally, China’s exports largely relied on the 
low prices of export goods. The use of subsidies in China during the second half of the 
1980s was also an attempt to take advantage of low price to expand exports. By subsidising 
exports, some industries, such as the mechanical and electrical equipment industry, textile 
and garment industry and other light industries, grew rapidly in the 1980s and became 
major exporting industries. The export value of the mechanical and electrical equipment 
industry, for example, grew from US$1.41 billion in 1980 to US$48,21 billion in 1996, 
accounting for 31.9% of China’s total exports. The average annual growth rates in the 
periods of 1981-1985, 1986-1990 and 1991-1996 were 2.77%, 42.01% and 25.90% 
respectively. The mechanical and electrical equipment industry was one of the industries 
benefiting from strong protection in China. Apart from other protection measures, export 
subsidies certainly played a very important role in promoting the exports of this industry, 
given that most products of this industry were exported in a loss-making situation (Guo 
Fuhua 1992). Since the elimination of export subsidies in 1991, China has used other
74
measures including tax exemptions and export financing to continue providing support to 
the mechanical and electrical equipment industry.
Domestic Subsidies
When export subsidies were eliminated, domestic subsidies remained an important 
source for compensating FTC’s exporting losses. Domestic subsidies may take various 
forms including tax reduction or exemption, preferential credit, the availability of public 
infrastructure (or other) goods at lower prices (price subsidies) and subsidies to loss-making 
enterprises. The initial intention of domestic subsidies is not for trade expansion but such 
subsidies do affect exports and imports. It is difficult, however, to identify the extent in 
which foreign trade has benefited from domestic subsidies.
What is clear, however, is that China’s exports were supported by preferential treatment 
of production and exporting activities. The following rough estimate, taking the year 1995 
as example, may provide an impression of China’s domestic subsidies relative to the 
foreign trade. In 1995, government subsidies were 69.27 billion Yuan (see Table 4.1). On 
the assumption that all sectors benefited equally from government subsidies, the amount of 
the subsidies to foreign trade would be 5.55 billion Yuan (US$0.66 billion). Import tariff 
exemption for processing trade was worth US$20.95 billion (processing imports of 
US$58,37 billion times nominal tariff rate 35.9%). Other imports (general imports) might 
also enjoy tariff exemption or reduction but it is impossible to ensure the proportion relative 
to exports and therefore this part is ignored in this estimation. A conservative estimate 
could be that in 1995 there was at least US$21.4 billion of domestic subsidies relative to 
China’s foreign trade, accounting for about 7.6% of the total trade in the year (US$280.85 
billion).
From the above analysis, some points can be made. First, the use of subsidies has 
helped some industries to develop. To some extent, subsidies became one of the factors 
supporting China’s high growth rate of exports, given that most of China’s major exporting 
industries have been heavily subsidised. Second, subsidies on trade have in fact maintained 
the separation of domestic prices from those of the world markets, and aggravated price 
distortions which resulted in increasing FTC’s losses. Third, through subsidising exports 
directly or indirectly, the government has lost a large amount of fiscal revenue and 
increased its fiscal expenditure. All revenue losses and fiscal expenditure lowered the real
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significance of China’s rapid growth of exports. Fourth, although export subsidies have 
been eliminated, domestic subsidies are still playing an active role in supporting export 
growth. Finally, because all losses could be offset by subsidisation, FTCs lacked the 
necessary incentives to improve their operational efficiency.
Indeed, once subsidisation was extensively used and became a source for fostering 
inefficiency of enterprises, such subsidisation policy becomes harmful for promoting 
economic growth. In China, experience showed that the priority of subsidy policy was 
targeting foreign exchange earnings instead of encouraging technological innovation to 
enter foreign markets. Therefore, many enterprises depended on subsidies to engage in 
export operations. They lacked incentives or pressure to improve efficiency, since subsidies 
enabled them to compensate for any losses from exports. Moreover, China is a developing 
country and has been transforming itself towards a market economy. Subsidies are 
problematic in the context of market mechanisms because they may become a source of 
market distortion. By contrast, reducing subsidies will force enterprises to become 
responsible for their profits and losses instead of depending on government financial 
assistance. From this viewpoint, the elimination of export subsidies in 1991 was certainly 
an important measure in the formalisation of China’s export policies.
4,2 E x c h a n g e  R a t e  a n d  F o r e ig n -E x c h a n g e  R e t e n t io n
Foreign exchange policy affects many aspects of an economy, not just only the foreign 
trade. It is not a “pure” trade policy. However, foreign exchange policy is one of the most 
important factors influencing foreign trade because every foreign trade activity must face 
questions relating to the accessibility of foreign exchange, the convertibility of domestic 
currency and changes in exchange rates.
In developing countries following an IS regime, a common problem is “foreign 
exchange shortage”, due to the obstacles facing exports. Exchange control measures are 
usually introduced as a response (Krueger 1981b). Like most developing countries, China has 
had a period of chronic foreign exchange shortage. This situation made the Chinese 
authorities adopt a policy solution in which both increasing foreign exchange earnings has 
been much encouraged and restricting the access to foreign exchange has been much 
emphasised. Such a policy was reflected in the introduction and subsequent elimination of 
the foreign-exchange retention system and in the changes to the exchange rate system.
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Foreign exchange policy has been one of the most important instruments used to control 
foreign trade.
4.2.1 Using Foreign Exchange Policies to Promote Exports 
The Foreign-Exchange Retention System
In 1979, as noted earlier, a foreign exchange retention (FER) system was introduced to 
provide incentives to exporters. Exporters were allowed to retain a certain proportion of 
foreign exchange from their export earnings. The rights and rates of exchange retention 
were largely determined by the factors such as the nature of the export product, the export 
growth pattern and the performance of the exporter.
This system stalled with a complex formula and was adjusted several times. In the 
beginning, the rates of retention were relatively simple. The retention shares were 20% and 
40% respectively for the exported goods produced by the enterprises under central 
government supervision and for those under local government supervision. The retained 
share was divided equally between enterprise and its supervising authority. For export 
proceeds of export-processing enterprises and compensation trade, the share was 15% of net 
earnings, and for fees from simple processing and assembly of foreign components it was 
30% (Cheng Hang-Sheng 1993). After 1982, the retention rates became more complex. More 
and more export goods were included in the retention system and the retention rates were 
varied between 5% and 25% from product to product, from sector to sector and from 
province to province.
A unified 25% retention rate was applied to most provinces in 1985, with preferential 
rates for certain favoured regions (Guandong —  30% at general level and 100% for SEZs, 
Fujian and some remote provinces) and some industries (for example, the mechanical and 
electrical industry). Several years later, during the period of implementing the foreign trade 
contract responsibility system (1988-91), the retention rates were regulated along two lines. 
Within the assigned target of exchange earnings, 80% was handed over to the central 
government and 20% was retained by contracted enterprise. For excess earnings, 20% were 
handed over to the central government and 80% were retained by the contracted enterprise. 
For selected industries in reform trials (Light industry, Handicraft industry and Garment 
industry) the retention rate was 100%.
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In 1991, the FER system was shifted from regionally different retention rates to a 
structure of retention rates based on the categories of export products. A unified 80% 
retention rate applied to all export earnings, within this proportion 30% had to be sold to the 
state bank. This structure of retention rates basically remained in force until 1993, although 
some small adjustments were made to increase incentives to exports in some regions and 
industries. In 1994, the FER system was phased out.
Exchange Rate System
When China adopted an import substitution strategy to develop the national economy, 
the exchange rate policy was a fixed exchange rate system based on an overvalued 
exchange rate. The overvaluation of Renminbi became a serious obstacle to export 
promotion. The introduction of the exchange retention system did not solve the problem of 
balance between export costs and export earnings. Measures were therefore taken to 
strengthen export incentives. These measures were the use of multiple exchange rates and 
devaluation.
In 1981, China adopted a dual-exchange-rate system. The dual-exchange-rate system 
initially took the form of an “internal settlement rate” alongside the official rate, using 
different exchange rates for different categories of exports. The earnings from some 
government targeted exports could be converted into domestic currency at a preferential 
“internal settlement rate” that was usually higher than the official rate. The internal 
settlement rate was set at 2.8 Yuan to the Dollar while the official rate was 1.53 Yuan to the 
Dollar (Zhou xiaochun 1990). The immediate result of this system was that enterprises were 
given differential financial treatments, given that some were encouraged while others were 
in fact discriminated against; creating unfair competition.
In 1985, the “internal settlement rate” system was abolished. However the dual- 
exchange-rate was not phased out. It took another form in which a “swap rate” coexisted 
with the official rate. As early as 1980, a tentative step of exchange system reform, through 
the establishment of “foreign exchange adjustment centres”, was taken to release the tight 
control over access to foreign exchange. This measure provided a significant alternative to 
the foreign-exchange control authorities as a channel for obtaining foreign exchange on the 
one hand, and enabling foreign exchange to flow between enterprises on the other.
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After the elimination of the “internal settlement rate” system in 1985, the importance of 
the exchange swap (adjustment) system increased. The effect of the exchange swap system 
was to provide a preferential rate for converting export earnings to domestic currency for 
exporters, because the swap rates, like the internal settlement rate, were always higher than 
official exchange rates. The difference between swap rate and the internal settlement rate 
was that the swap rate applied to exporters instead of to products. By 1988, foreign 
exchange swap centres were operating in all provinces and the swap rate was allowed to 
float. In addition, an increasing number of enterprises, including foreign-funded enterprises, 
were permitted access to swap centres and the proportion of foreign-exchange allowed to be 
swapped increased. The function of the foreign-exchange swap system became more 
important. The total volume of exchange transactions was US$4.2 billion in 1987, US$6.3 
billion in 1988, US$8.5 billion in 1989, US$20.4 billion in 1991 and US$25.1 billion in 
1992 (Cheng Hang-Sheng 1993; Fan Baoqing 1994). At the end of 1993, more than 80% of export 
and import trade was using the swap/adjustment rate. The official exchange rate of 5.8 Yuan 
to the Dollar at that time almost could not be obtained in practice for trade transactions 
(Wang Zixian 1994; Yang Xiaobin 1994).
The exchange policy reform also witnessed the devaluation of the Chinese domestic 
currency. The reason for the existence of the dual exchange rate system rested on the 
unrealistic setting of the official exchange rate, with an severe overvaluation of the 
domestic currency. Thus, the real problem seemed to be the unrealistic exchange rate of the 
Renminbi. Under the dual-exchange-rate system, the “internal settlement” or “swap” rate in 
practice was to provide incentive to exporters. However, it obviously derived from common 
international practices. Unifying the dual-rate system and marketising the exchange rate 
formation mechanism became crucial elements of Chinese trade reforms. In the 1980s and 
the early 1990s, China adopted a slow-pace devaluation policy to cut down the difference 
between official exchange rate and real market rates (swap rate and black market rate). In 
1994, China unified the dual-rate system and established a unitary managed floating 
exchange rate system based on the market mechanism. Thereafter, the system allowing 
enterprises to retain a portion of foreign exchange was abolished, and replaced by a system 
of settlement and sales of foreign exchange.
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4.2.2 Impacts of Foreign Exchange Reform 
What is to Be Retained?
The introduction of the FER system was an administrative measure to strengthen 
incentives for export expansion. It functioned in the following ways: First, allowing a 
proportion of export earnings to be retained by exporting enterprises improved accessibility 
to foreign exchange. In a country like China which was under a planned regime, foreign 
exchange control restrained enterprise’s access to foreign equipment and technology and 
other profitable import activities. The implementation of the FER system in fact reflected a 
limited relaxation of the strict foreign exchange control. The retention rate(s) indicated the 
extent to which the control on foreign exchange was eased. The accessibility to foreign 
exchange for individual enterprises, through the FER system, increased the enterprise’s 
capacity to engage in some other import or activities to make use of foreign advanced 
production facilities which may results in a higher profitability.
Second, under a dual exchange rate system, the retained foreign exchange may be an 
additional source increasing the total revenue of the exporting enterprises. While the 
retained exporting earnings could be converted into domestic currency at the “swap rate”, 
which was usually higher than the official rate, the exporting enterprise’s total domestic 
currency income was enhanced. The higher the retention rate, the larger the export income 
in domestic currency would be. This partial devaluation, an actual depreciation only for 
exports in the settlement phase, created incentives solely for exporting enterprises to offset 
the anti-export bias under an IS regime. A further effect of this partial devaluation was that 
it avoided the overall shocks of price changes which usually result from a real devaluation 
and helped maintaining China’s general trade policy of encouraging exports while imports 
were strictly restrained.
On the whole, the FER system was initially a remedy for the restrictions of the foreign 
exchange control system. What was retained was not only the earning of foreign exchange 
but also the right for enterprises to achieve higher revenue and to arrange further 
development with less government control. Such benefits enabled the FER system to 
become another major incentive for export expansion in the 1980s until its elimination in 
1994. Moreover, the elimination of the FER system did not mean such an incentive was 
reduced. Instead, export promotion policy was reinforced because enterprises no longer had 
an obligation to hand over exchange earnings to the state. In view of that, autonomy in the
80
use of foreign exchange expanded, and enterprises were given a stronger stimulus to 
increase exchange earnings.
Getting the Exchange Rate Realistic
Figure 4.1 shows the trends in official exchange rates and real effective exchange rates 
(REER) of the Renminbi. It can be seen that the Renminbi depreciated dramatically from the 
1980s on. In particular, since the mid-1980s, the heavy inflation pressure is reflected in a 
continuous decrease of the REER and its divergence from the nominal exchange rates. But 
the large real depreciation seemed to be an effort to correct the overvaluation of the 
Renminbi.
Figure 4.1 Official Exchange Rates and REERs 
(Index 1978=100)
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Note: In this figure, REER was calculated as REER = official exchange rate * ( US consumer price 
index /  China’s consumer price index).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, various issues; State Statistical Bureau,
China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
The reform of the exchange rate system brought out some immediate and potential 
impacts on the development of Chinese foreign trade. First, the value of Renminbi has been 
largely devalued since the 1980s. The nominal exchange rate (the US Dollar to the 
Renminbi) increased from 1.4984 Yuan in 1980 to 8.6187 Yuan in 1994, implying a 
depreciation of 475.19%. The REER index (1978=100) also increased from 102.7 in 1980 
to 269.1 in 1994, indicating a real depreciation of 162.03%. Adopting such a large 
depreciation without severe social and economic chaos should be considered a successful 
transformation of China’s exchange rate system.
Second, the change in the real exchange rate had significant effects on China’s exports 
and imports. In 1994 when China unified its foreign exchange rate system, the nominal
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exchange rate was set up at US$ 1=8.7 Yuan. The unified exchange rate supports the trend 
towards export promotion while not adding any discrimination against imports. The 
possible decrease of imports would be due to the end of the de facto position encouraged 
under the IS regime, not a result of exchange-rate-biased policy. According to a study by 
the Research Department of China Aggregate Development Research Academy (R D C A D R A
1995), regression results show that when the real exchange rate is increased by 1 Yuan, 
exports may increase by US$18 billion and imports may decrease by US$6.53 billion.
Third, the balance of trade depended on the real exchange rate, especially the annual 
rate of change of the real exchange rate. When the degree of change is smaller than the 
previous year, the balance of trade may worsen. That means the accelerated devaluation of 
Renminbi became an instrument for maintaining the balance of trade (RDCADRA 1995). The 
unified exchange rate can help to avoid sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate caused by 
speculation and profiteering.
Finally, and more importantly, the marketisation of exchange rate formation changed 
the situation of unrealistic overestimation of the Renminbi. It provided a foundation for 
correcting the distortion of trade policy. The unification of the dual exchange rate was a 
precondition for integrating China’s economy into the international economy. The measures 
complementing the unification of dual rates, such as the elimination of the exchange 
retention system, will facilitate the rationalisation of the relationships between enterprises 
and their authorities. The unification of the exchange rates was aimed at long-term 
development. It is important to realise that the unification of exchange rates was the only 
way in which the exchange rate system of the Renminbi could be made compatible with the 
internationally standardised floating exchange rate system.
4.3 D u t y  D r a w b a c k  S y s te m
4.3.1 Duty Drawback and Export Promotion
To encourage export expansion, in April 1985, China adopted a duty drawback system 
in which the indirect tax levied on exported goods was refunded to the exporters. The duty 
drawback system was initiated in accordance with international practice. More importantly, 
it strengthened the competitiveness of exported goods through tax refunds, which enabled 
exported goods to enter international markets without domestic indirect taxes.
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The Implementation of the Duty Drawback System
In 1985, when the tax rebate policy started, the national amount of duty drawback was 
only 1.98 billion Yuan. The main export promotion measures at that time seemed the use of 
export subsidies and tax exemption. However, with the extensive implication of the duty 
drawback system and the rapid growth of exports, the total amount of duty drawback 
exceeded 10 billion Yuan by the end of the 1980s and reached 20 billion Yuan in the early 
1990s (Zhu Wenhui 1996a). The elimination of export subsidies since 1991 reinforced the role 
of the duty drawback system in the export promotion mechanism. The duty drawback 
system became an increasingly important source to offset export losses and to increase 
export earnings through reducing export costs. By 1994 when China adopted a policy 
ensuring a zero-rate of tax for exported goods, the amount of duty drawback reached 44.78 
billion Yuan, 48.5% higher than that of the previous year. In 1996, the duty drawback 
increased to 82.6 billion Yuan {China Business Times 20/2/1997).
Table 4.4 Export Tax Rebates (billions of Yuan)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Am ount o f rebates 1.98 4.20 7.40 12.0 18.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 30.2 44.5 55.0 82.6
Source: Lardy (1992), p. 50; China Economic News (No. 36, 18/9/1995); Zhou Fuxiang and Qi Yuanjun (1996); 
Yang Fan (1996); China Business Times 20/2/1997.
The implementation of the duty drawback system was one step in the process towards 
normalising the export incentive mechanism. This system has played an increasingly 
important role in promoting exports. In 1994, in particular, the reform of the exchange rate 
system limited the possibility that trade companies could obtain profits from imports and 
benefit from the sale of export earnings at the swap rate. Possible substitute measures for 
export promotion seemed relying on devaluation and tax rebates. However, the effect of 
devaluation in 1994 was thought not strong enough to push the increase of exports (Pei Ping 
1994; Zhu Wenhui 1996a). The export duty drawback therefore became the main source 
pushing the export growth. The growth rate of exports in 1994 reached 30%.
Duty Drawback Rates
Before 1994, China used a taxation system with the consolidated industrial and 
commercial taxes in the centre. These taxes were usually levied each time when products 
were transferred in the production circulation. The prices of final goods had a tax
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component that varied significantly depending on the number of stages in the production 
process. The calculation of duty drawback was extremely complex. It took a significant 
amount of time to investigate the indirect tax component in the prices of exported goods. 
The rebate rates varied from commodity to commodity. The average rate of rebate was 
11.2% (Wang Yi 1996; Yang Fan 1996b). The method of duty drawback was to make a national 
duty drawback plan according to enterprises’ export plans. Then the central fiscal 
department paid the planned tax refunds to the exporters after confirming their real.exports. 
The central government would not absorb the cost of duty drawback for over-plan exports 
(Wang Suqing 1992). Since 1994, however, a new taxation system with value-added tax, 
consumption tax, business tax and personal income tax has been introduced to rationalise 
the tax structure. The rebate rates before the 1995 adjustment were divided into two levels, 
13% and 17%, 17% being the average nominal rate of indirect tax burden. By converting 
these two rates into the tax component of price, the average rate of rebate was 14.2% (Wang 
Yi 1996). However, due to some preferential and exemption measures launched soon after 
the implementation of the new tax system, the actual tax burden on exported goods was 
about 10%, 4.2 percentage points lower than the rebate rate (14.2%). This meant some 
exporters might get 4.2% of total exports as “extra income” by claiming export duty 
rebates.
The decline of the real tax burden and the increase of rebate expenditure forced the 
government to adjust the rebate rates twice. The first time was in July 1995. The State 
Council decided the rebate rate for agricultural products and coal should be 3%, while the 
rebate rate for manufactured goods produced using agricultural raw materials and some 
other products subject to 13% value-added tax would be reduced to 10% and the rebate rate 
of the products with 17% of value-added tax would be reduced to 14%. The aggregate rate 
of rebate actually declined by 3 percentage points. The second adjustment was in January 
1996. The rebate rates were then reduced from 10% and 14% to 6% and 9% respectively 
(Zhu Wenhui 1996a). By these two adjustments, the average rate of rebate decreased by about 
50%. The immediate effect was that the central fiscal expenditure was reduced. On the base 
of the 1994 level, the reduced expense on export rebate would be at least 20-22 billion Yuan 
per year. Although the duty drawbacks have been reduced, exports kept growing in 1995. 
Total exports in 1995 were US$148.77 billion, up 22.9 percent (.People’s Daily, overseas edition, 
13/01/96). However, much of this took place in the first six months in anticipation of the 
reduced duty drawback rates. According to Chinese customs statistics, export growth rates
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compared with the same period of the previous year increased from 33.0% in the second 
half of 1994 to 44.0% in the first half of 1995 but dropped to 8.7% in the second half of 
1995 and to -8.2% in the first half of 1996.
4.3.2 Issues Concerning the Duty Drawback System
It is important to draw a distinction between export subsidy and duty drawback. Export 
subsidy is a price-distorting support to exports aimed at an expansion of export markets 
with the advantage of low prices. Because of its feature of “unfair competition”, export 
subsidy is prohibited by the GATT/WTO rules. Duty drawback can be considered a price- 
correcting measure in international transactions by avoiding repeated taxation on traded 
goods.
The duty drawback system may generate different effects. First, consumers in the 
importing country do not need to pay indirect taxes levied in the exporting country in 
addition to those taxes levied in the importing country. It ensures the best protection of 
consumer interest with regard to consumption of imported goods. Second, a zero-rate of tax 
on export goods, by which the differences of taxation systems in different countries can be 
excluded, may lead to fair competition in the world market. For the exporting country, the 
duty drawback system helps to reduce the anti-export bias given that neither export sector 
nor import-competing industries will be discriminated against. Third, by taking off 
domestic indirect taxes from the export goods, exporters can lower the export prices and 
restore the real comparative advantage which helps to rationalise the trade structure of the 
exporting country. Considering the above reasons, the duty drawback system is generally a 
neutral instrument compatible with trade liberalisation. In the GATT and WTO rules, it is 
clearly stated that duty drawback should not be considered as a kind of subsidy.
Using the duty drawback system appropriately is never an easy task, especially when it 
is newly introduced into an economy. In China’s experience, there were some problems in 
the implementation of the duty drawback system. One problem was that the surge in duty 
drawback refunds brought the government a large fiscal burden. The growth rate of the 
claimed rebates was even higher than that of export growth in some years. This meant the 
expansion of exports did not increase as much as expected revenue, and reduced the 
existing level of the revenue. In addition, due to the difference between the norminal rate of 
tax and the much lower rate of actual tax burden which was resulted from the excessive use
85
of preferential policies, the extra amount of export duty drawback paid by the government 
reached as large as 16.8 billion Yuan in 1994, approximately one third of the total duty 
drawback in the year (An Tifu and Liang Peng 1996).
A further problem was that many tax-cheating cases occurred, due to the incomplete 
managerial system. According to statistics, the amount of duty drawback from cheating 
accounted for about one fifth of the total amount of rebates in 1994 (Zhu Wenhui 1996a).
The third and the most notable problem concerned the rate of rebate —  the duty 
drawback policy itself. In particular, the second reduction of duty drawback rate in 1996 
produced a greater pressure on export enterprises. In 1996, China’s exports experienced the 
lowest growth rate since the 1980s. The reduction of duty drawback rate was quoted as a 
main cause of the export slide-down. First, the reduction of duty drawback rate increased 
export costs. In world markets, export prices are decided through competition. It is 
impossible in most cases to increase an export price unilaterally to compensate for the extra 
burden caused by the reduction of duty drawback rate. Equally FTCs also could not force 
down the prices when they were purchasing export commodities from production 
enterprises because of the prices of raw materials also went up sharply in recent years. The 
effective way forward was to reduce trade costs and improve export structure, but this 
process would take time. Second, considering the fact that the duty drawback rates (9% and 
6%) were lower than the nominal indirect tax rate (17%) or the actual tax burden of 
exported goods (10%), some enterprises could not export on a tax neutral basis. Indeed, 
China intended to apply zero-rate of tax to export products. But the two reductions of duty 
drawback rates seemed against this intention. Third, delays in the payment of duty 
drawback tied up enterprises’ circulating capital. In some cases, by the first half of 1996, 
the accumulation of unpaid duty drawback for an individual FTC was up to 1 billion Yuan. 
At the national level, by the end of 1996, the total accumulated unpaid duty drawback was 
about 50-60 billion Yuan (FanZhigang 1997). According to some estimates, the interest losses 
causing by the unpaid duty drawback for all FTCs reached 5.5 billion Yuan (Ling Ye and Zhu 
Naixiao 1996; Zhu Lilian 1996).
It was believed that the reduction of duty drawback rate would produce a positive effect 
in improving the export structure. Trading enterprises would be forced to balance the costs
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and profits through developing high value-added export products. Those small size 
enterprises with weak competitive power would be eliminated through competition and the 
structure of exports should be improved. However, reducing the rate of duty drawback has 
been used as a means by which the central government transferred its fiscal difficulty to 
trade enterprises. This unfavourable condition for exporters may once again distort resource 
allocation, shifting inputs to non-export sectors and generating pressure on external 
payments. China’s duty drawback system, in this sense, has not really been a neutral 
mechanism providing fair incentives for export enterprises. The fall in the export growth 
rate from 22.9% in 1995 to 1.5% in 1996 sounded the alarm.
4.4 O t h e r  E x p o r t  In c e n t iv e s
4.4.1 E xp ort F in a n c in g
Three kinds of export financing needed for exporters are pre-shipment credit, post­
shipment credit and investment credit. Besides general forms of export finance for direct 
exporters such as seller’s and buyer’s credits directly obtained from banks, using domestic 
letters of credit is an effective measure to provide financial support for indirect exporters 
(export producers). Export producers (indirect exporters) may obtain credit from banks 
when they can produce a domestic letter of credit they have received from direct exporters 
or FTCs (World Bank 1987, Box 2.6).
The Size of Export Financing
Until 1994 when the China Import-Export Bank was set up, China had no specialised 
institution providing export financing support for exporters. However, export loans have 
long been a preferential policy instrument in China’s financial policy. Exporters could 
obtain loans, if necessary, from other banks. Financial support for exporters in China were 
mainly investment in export production and working capital for FTCs. For example, the 
Bank of China has long been executing a preferential policy towards the foreign trade 
sector. Over 80% of the loans in domestic currency were given to foreign trade, industrial- 
trade, foreign-funded and export production enterprises. By 1994, the accumulated amount 
of loans provided by the Bank of China for foreign trade enterprises was 444.6 billion 
Yuan. Of this, export production loans reached 6.3 billion Yuan (Yang Huiqiu 1995).
A World Bank report (1994a) gave some further details about export financing in China, 
indicating that trade credit grew rapidly between 1985 and 1991. As the report points out,
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the ratio of export credit to total exports was veiy high. In 1988/1989, 90% percent of new 
trade loans were used to finance exports. Export loans in that year would have amounted to 
an estimated 150% of the actual volume of exports (World Bank 1994a, p. 127).
Apart from general loans for establishing and developing export production, the Bank 
of China, and then other national banks, also provided foreign exchange loans in forms of 
export seller’s credit since 1978 and buyer’s credit after 1992. In 1994, China Import- 
Export Bank was set up as a new policy bank to manage export financing. The aim was to 
use financial means to support China’s exports, particularly the exports of machinery and 
electric products and complete set of equipment. By the end of 1996, the China Import- 
Export Bank had approved US$54 million of export seller’s credit to support machinery 
and electric product exports of a contracted amount of US$7.26 billion (Lei Zuhua 1997).
The Motives and Effects of Export Financing
Two reasons may explain such a preference for financing exports. First, export 
expansion was traditionally a favoured sector for government encouragement. Exporting 
was regarded as the key to industrialisation and economic growth. Exportable production 
became one of the areas supported by government industrial policies (State Council 1989, 
1994). Export earning was an important indicator for examining an enterprise’s 
achievements (Zheng Chaoyu and Wei Wei 1994; Wang Xinkui 1994). This induced some 
preferential policies in favour of exports.
Second, financial institutions favoured export loans, partly because of the relatively 
small risk associated with most of these loans which were applied to existing orders and 
partly because of the administrative interventions from central or local governments. 
Evidence of this favouritism was seen in the greater efficiency in approving loan 
applications from export enterprises. Before the mid-1980s, most loans were controlled by 
state mandatory plans. After the reforms began in 1984/1985, banks were granted rights, to 
some extent, to decide the allocation of loans, although the final right of judgement 
remained with government (Singh 1992, pp. 63-64).
The rapid increase in foreign trade credit reflected the importance of export financing in 
the trade growth. This situation was due firstly to the efforts of FTCs to develop new bases 
for exports for which a large amount of medium- or long-term investment was needed, and
secondly in some cases to the low productivity in production and trade enterprises. The real 
reason may be that most FTCs and export production enterprises had not been changed to 
real independent entities responsible for their profits and losses. There was also a lack of a 
hard budget constraint for enterprises which might have forced them to enhance the 
efficiency of resource utilisation. This circumstance was even severe when many 
manufacturing enterprises had no direct trading rights and could not directly access the 
earmarked trade credits provided by the central or local governments.
Moreover, loans for exports could be obtained under preferential conditions including 
low interest rate. One example was that of the Bank of China providing export commodity 
purchasing loans and export credit for machinery and electrical manufactures under 
preferential interest rates for foreign trade enterprises (Yang Huiqiu 1995). Generally, the 
preferential interest rate for export loans was usually two percentage points lower than the 
market rate (The Project Research Team of UIBE 1994). In addition, it was also easier for export 
projects to obtain loans from banks. However, in the WTO rules, providing export loans 
under preferential conditions is regarded as a kind of export subsidy and therefore 
prohibited. To conform with international trade practice, in 1995, China phased out the 
policy offering preferential conditions for export loans.
4.4.2 Industrial Policies
Industrial policies, as distinctive from trade policies, are defined as government efforts 
to alter industrial structure to promote productivity-based growth (World Bank 1993, p. 304). 
Industrial policies are commonly used in developing countries to encourage certain sectors. 
The argument for using industrial policy is that, in a weak market or a market with market 
failures, the rationalisation of industry requires government intervention to allocate 
resources between sectors, protect “infant” industries, and promote the country’s products. 
In the countries adopting industrial policies, trade policies usually feature specific 
preferential treatment for the government’s “picked winners”.
The use of industrial policies, typically providing subsidies to the chosen firms or 
industries, may help establish certain industries as the leading sectors of the economy for 
growth. Hughes (1995) notes that, unlike Hong Kong and Singapore where free trade was 
the core trend of policy direction, Taiwan and Korea had employed strong protectionist 
policies to support their protected industries in the 1960s and 1970s. However, such
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policies may easily generate demand for government intervention and trade protection. 
Furthermore, incentives for exports and resulting distorted price system are likely to affect 
resource reallocation.
Before reform China had no specific industrial policies, since nearly all industries were 
in protected development. Certain industrial policies emerged as an alternative to reducing 
the previous excessive overall protection, in the course of China’s gradual strategy of 
reforming and opening-up the economy. In practice, since the 1980s, China has tried to 
produce some industrial policy support for the preferred sectors such as textiles, electronic, 
machinery, iron and steel, and automobile industries.
The effects of industrial policies in the 1980s have varied and have not been tied closely 
to trade policies. China had used supportive policies to encourage the development of the 
textile industry and these policies have been seen to be successful in the first half of the 
1980s (Lu Zheng 1993). But the overall implementation of industrial policy has been 
ineffective. The reasons for this are as follows. First, the industrial policies did not fit the 
requirements of a developing market economy. The basis of industrial policy was still the 
planned economy which emphasises the aggregate balance of the economy, instead of 
comparative advantage. Second, there was a lack of workable measures to support the 
implementation of industrial policy. The main instrument was still administrative control. 
The market mechanism has not fully acted as the main power in the distribution of 
resources. Third, there was failure to systematically combine trade policy with industrial 
policy. China’s preferential trade policy was initiated with an emphasis on regional 
opemiess, instead of on a sectoral strategy. Local governments provided vaiious preferential 
trade policies, some of them exceeding that on the national level, for the enterprises within 
their territories. Many low efficiency enterprises obtained stimulus from these preferential 
policies and developed rapidly. For example, in the case of iron and steel industry, large 
and mid-scale enterprises should have been encouraged according to industrial policy. 
However, most large-scale iron and steel enterprises were tightly controlled. At the same 
time, some small local enterprises, including some of those which have been supposed to be 
restrained by industrial policy, have developed rapidly due to regional protectionism and 
preferential policy measures provided by local governments (Xiong Zhijun 1993).
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Being aware of the weakness of the previous industrial policy, the State Council of 
China announced a new “Outline o f the National Industrial Policy in the 1990s” in March 
1994, five years after the first industrial policy package (March 1989). In this new guidance 
document, enterprises which manufacture products with comparative advantage, high 
added-value and competitiveness are encouraged to export. The state will support the 
imports of new technology and relevant equipment and the imports for some infant 
industries. Concerning the measures for implication, the Outline stresses that industrial 
policy must be matched by relevant economic policies, in particular public finance, 
taxation, prices, finance, foreign trade and investment policies. It seems that the linkage 
between industrial policy and trade policy has now been considered. But the effect will take 
some years to be felt.
The reinforcements of industrial and trade policies were two-layered. Industrial policies 
may, but not always, become a source of protection. Biased industrial policies and export 
incentives may cause trade policy distortions while promoting the growth of exports. The 
correction of the distortions has also led to demands for more and more complicated 
industrial policies. The growth of international competitiveness along with a rapid increase 
of exports can provide the basis for trade policy liberalisation after the initial stage of 
outward-looking development. The issue now facing China is how its adoption of industrial 
policies might not be seen as a type of trade protection against trade liberalisation.
4.4.3 Encouraging Exports from Foreign-Funded Enterprises
Encouraging the development of foreign-funded enterprises in order to expand exports 
has been an important export promotion policy in China. For the purposes of attracting 
foreign investment, China also substantially devolved the management power to provincial 
and local governments, particularly to the eastern coastal provinces, to simplify the 
investment approval procedures. Coastal provinces were given greater power to approve 
new investment projects. This induced the increase of foreign investment in eastern coastal 
regions.
China has recorded rapid progress in attracting foreign investment since the adoption of 
its reform and open policies. During 1978-1997, the total actual used foreign capital 
amounted to US$253.25 billion. Industrial projects (including processing projects) account 
for more than 70% of the total foreign funded projects. The increasing foreign investment
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has been an important source of China’s export expansion. The share of exports from 
foreign-funded enterprises in China’s total exports increased from 1.08% in 1985 to 12.58% 
in 1990 and 40.72% in 1996.
Table 4.5 Share of Foreign-Funded Enterprises’ Export in China’s Total Exports
Year Export 
(US$ bn)
Share o f total 
exports (%)
Import
(USS bn)
Share o f total 
imports (%)
E xport and 
im port (USS bn)
Share o f total exports 
and imports (%)
1981 0.032 0.15 0.111 0.50 0.143 0.33
1985 0.297 1.08 2.064 4.89 2.361 3.39
1990 7.814 12.58 12.306 23.07 20.120 17.43
1991 12.047 16.75 16.908 26.50 28.955 21.33
1992 17.357 20.42 26.376 32.73 43.734 26.42
1993 25.237 27.50 41.833 40.24 67.070 34.27
1994 34.713 28.69 52.934 45.79 87.647 37.04
1995 46.875 31.51 62.942 47.70 109.818 39.10
1996 61.506 40.72 75.604 54.45 137.110 47.30
Source: Long Guoqiang (1994); State Statistical Bureau (1996b, 1997b).
While the rapid growth of foreign investment and associated exports were noted, some 
comments are needed to demonstrate the underlying function of trade policy. First, in the 
early years of the reform period, foreign investment and associated exports were not as 
important as they have been later. The surge of foreign investment and associated exports 
has occurred since the late 1980s, just after a series of decentralisation programmes. Along 
with the opening-up process, investment and trade policies relative to foreign-funded 
projects were much relaxed. Regarding the foreign-funded projects, in 1985 for example, 
Guangdong and Fujian had rights to approve technology-introducing projects with total 
investment under US$10 million. After 1988, all Sino-foreign joint-venture projects of total 
investment less than US$30 million in coastal provinces and cities could be approved by 
the local governments if the foreign exchange payment could be self-balanced and product 
exports were not involvement in export quotas. In Hainan and Pudong, the kinds of projects 
which could be approved by local governments were even larger than in other provinces 
(Cheng Linzlm et al. 1995, pp. 41-42).
Second, foreign-funded enterprises have enjoyed some other preferential conditions in 
China. Before 1994, for example, state-owned trading enterprises had to complete state- 
assigned export earning plans. State-owned enterprises had to sell 20% of export earnings 
within planned export targets to state-assigned banks at the official exchange rate. But 
foreign-funded enterprises could retain all exchange earnings and these balances could be 
sold (swapped) at the swap rate which was about 3 Yuan higher than the official rate. This
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meant that while state-owned enterprises made one dollar, they would receive 0.60 Yuan 
less than FFEs after converting foreign exchange to Renminbi (The Project Research Team of 
UIBE 1994). The dual-rate foreign exchange system ended in 1994 and there is now no 
mandatory plan to force domestic enterprises to hand over exchange earnings to the 
government. Even so, foreign-funded enterprises may still enjoy greater freedom than state- 
owned enterprises, since the latter are still responsible for making exchange earnings for the 
country and the state still has some controls on the distribution of exchange earnings.
Besides the above, foreign-funded enterprises could enjoy some other benefits from 
preferential policies including tax exemption, tariff-free imports and simplified approval 
procedures. All these endowed foreign-funded enterprises with superior conditions over 
domestically-funded enterprises. In other words, the rapid growth of foreign-funded 
enterprise exports has benefited greatly from the country’s preferential policies. In this 
sense, preferential policies for attracting foreign investment became part of China’s export 
promotion policies.
4.5 E x p o r t  C o n t r o l s  a n d  T a x es
While many policies were adopted to promote exports, the Chinese authorities also 
employed an array of controls to manage their exports. The main measures of export control 
include, besides the export planning discussed in Chapter 2, export licensing and export 
taxes.
4.5.1 Export Quota and Licensing System
China instituted an import and export licensing system in 1980 as a part of foreign trade 
reform. The initial goals of the licensing system were to strengthen the administration of 
import and export trade under the national plan, protect the economy, stabilise markets at 
home and abroad, and give better economic results. By 1983, a list showed that there were 
about 38 kinds of export products requiring export licenses (Shen Jueren 1983). The number 
of commodities requiring export licences increased to 152 by 1986.^ Among them, 19 
were issued by MOFERT, 38 by the Representative Offices of MOFERT, and 95 by 
provincial Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Committees {China's Foreign Trade, No. 5, 
1986). In 1989, the number of export commodities subject to licensing increased to 173
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(Lardy 1992, p. 44). The trend was clear that, in the 1980s, as the scope of export plans 
became smaller, the range of export commodities subject to licensing became wider.
The use of export licensing has decreased in the 1990s. In 1992, export licensing was 
applied to 676 Harmonised System commodity groups, accounting for over 15% of China’s 
exports (World Bank 1994a, p.68). After several adjustments, and the combination of quotas 
with export licences, there were, by 1993, four categories of export commodities falling 
into the range of quota/licensing administration, according to The Tentative Measures o f  
Export Commodity Management (1993). These four categories included 138 commodities, 
accounting for 40.7% of China’s total exports (Table 4.6).[3]
Table 4.6 Commodities Subject to Export Quota Licensing (1993)
C ategory Number % of total 
exports
Exam ples o f  commodities Type o f export control
I 38 23 Rice, soybeans, coal, crude oil, cotton Planned export quotas
II 54 5.9 Firecrackers furfural, honey, canned asparagus Voluntary export quotas
III 22 1.8 Bristles, bearings, general chemicals, computers, 
heavy water, easy-made noxious chemicals
General export licences
IV 24 30 Textile products, dried sweet potato, canned 
mushrooms
Negative export quotas
Source: Wang Shouwen (1994).
The first categoiy covered those commodities related to the national economy and 
people’s livelihood, mainly natural resources and traditional export commodities. For the 
export of these commodities, “planned export quotas” were applied. The second category 
covered 54 commodities which are leading export items but are subject to “voluntary export 
restraints” by China’s hading partners. For this categoiy of exports, “voluntary export 
quotas” were implemented. The third group covered some famous, fine and special export 
commodities which could easily suffer from export distortion. For these commodities, 22 in 
number and 1.8% of total exports, “general export licences” were required. The last kind is 
the commodities that were restrained by quotas of foreign countries. There were 19 textile 
products and 5 other products in this categoiy. For these products, “negative export quotas” 
were used to arrange the exports.
In 1995, the number of export commodities subject to quota and licensing was 143.[41 
The method of issuing export quotas/licences, according to a document of MOTFEC, was 
as follows: Of the 143 varieties of export commodities requiring licences at the time, only 
21 were given export licences by the MOTFEC, 59 commodities were licensed by
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representatives dispatched by MOTFEC to various localities, and the remaining 63 
commodities were given licences by local commissions (M O T F E C  1 9 9 4 ) .
Since 1994, an export quota tender system has been introduced to improve the quota 
licensing system. In March 1994, for the first time, quotas for 13 export commodities, 
including crude wood, light (and heavy) magnesium, and gauze, were distributed through 
the new tender system. 705 of 872 distributed bidding contracts have been collected; 225 
bidders won quota contracts (Reporter o f Intertrade 1994). The export quota tender mechanism 
increased the degree of fairness and transparency in distributing quotas. It improved the 
effects of export quotas. In the mean time, exports have been achieved at higher prices. The 
blind price competition between enterprises has been reduced, since the enterprises have to 
add the cost of the quota to total export costs. In addition, in order to obtain necessary 
export quotas, enterprises are compelled either to develop new, high-tech and high value- 
added products to strengthen their competitiveness or to develop the production of non­
quota products. However, the quota tender mechanism is far from complete.
Some have indicated its weakness whilst the main achievements of the system have 
been appreciated. Wang Shouwen (1 9 9 4 )  pointed out that the export quota tender 
mechanism is still unfair, as the prices on award of bids are influenced by the bids offered 
by bidders. Different winning bidders may obtain the same amount of quotas by paying 
different prices that they originally offered in their bidding, if they won their quotas on the 
award of bids. In other words, different winners of the same product may be bound to 
different price levels. Experience has shown that the differences in prices varied by several 
hundred percent. Furthermore, it is also a problem that the tender system increases costs to 
the bidders, given there are some complex procedures to go through and some fees to pay. 
Wang Shouwen therefore calls for a special export tariff system to replace the tender 
mechanism of some export commodities. Liu Changyu (1 9 9 5 )  criticised two aspects of the 
negative impacts. One is that the tender mechanism induced some enterprises to make over- 
high bids to obtain quotas since the availability of export quotas was effectively a 
precondition for enterprises to earn foreign exchange and, probably, profits. This may be 
harmful for some export products in the future because the high prices will lower the 
competitive power of export commodities. The other is that the change of winners may be 
unfavourable for maintaining the existing export channels.
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These problems were in the implementation measures rather than the tender mechanism 
itself. Distributing quotas through a tender system is better than through an administrative 
approach. To smooth the conflicts, one effective solution would be to improve the tender 
mechanism, as well as to encourage enterprises to adapt to the unavoidable change. 
MOFTEC announced some new measure in 1995 to improve the open tender system, 
through the simplification of the procedures and the combination with other approaches of 
tender including agreement tender and directional tender (Mao Guangzhong 1995). The 
implementation of the export quota tender mechanism signalled the shift of export quota 
distribution and management from administrative manipulation to a market mechanism 
adjustment. It is a significant step in the adaptation of China’s foreign trade regime to 
international norms.
4.5.2 Export Tax
Export tax was a relatively new policy used by China to control its exports. Previously, 
export control in China was mainly dependent on administrative forces such as export plans 
and/or export prohibition. The use of export taxes reflected China’s intention to adjust the 
volume of some export commodities and improve the terms of trade by using market 
mechanisms. Usually these kinds of exports were those not concerning the national 
economy and livelihood of people. They also were those which have captured a sufficiently 
large market share and had a high export demand elasticity in the world market, such as raw 
silk, lead, raw lacquer, etc..
Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, China expanded the use of export taxes as a 
supplement to the export licensing system. The product categories subject to export taxes 
had risen from 19 in 1987 to 54 in 1994 but was reduced to 49 in 1996 (World Bank 1994a, p. 
69; People’s Daily, overseas edition, 28/12/1996). In December 1996, China announced that it 
would phase out export taxes on 14 export commodities on 1 January 1997. Only 15 
commodities continued with the existing export taxes. Of these 15 taxable export 
commodities, temporary annual export tax rates were, once again, imposed on 4 
commodities including ores and concentrates of lead, zinc and tin, and zinc without forging 
and pressing (People’s Daily, overseas edition, 28/12/1996).
The historical functions of tariffs, either on exports or on imports, were to raise 
government revenue and to protect domestic economic development. In the contemporary
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world, the importance of trade-tax revenue has declined while the protective effects of trade 
tax has sometimes been desired in practice (Cordeii 1997, pp. 45-60). However, the result of 
using export taxes may not always be in favour of the country relying on them for the 
improvement of terms of trade. In contrast, it may hinder the exports of related 
commodities. China needs to reduce its trade restraints both in imports and exports.
4.6 E v a l u a t i n g  C h i n a ’ s  E x p o r t  P o l i c y  R e f o r m s
On the whole, China has made great effort to harmonise its export policies in 
accordance with international trade practice. Based on the above analysis, some 
characteristics of China’s export policy reform can be drawn out:
First, a basic trend in China’s export policy reform has been the move from strong 
export promotion to neutral incentives. This has been China’s trade strategy over the reform 
period. China’s overemphasis on export promotion derived from its long-lasting IS strategy 
which heavily biased against exports. To compensate the incentive distortion, China 
adopted a series of promotion measures to stimulate the growth of exports in order to 
increase foreign exchange earnings to facilitate the IS industrialisation. When China 
realised that the IS strategy was not the best way for development, trade strategy was 
changed again to a mixed strategy integrating the contents of the IS and EP strategies. IS 
industrialisation was no longer a dominant determinant of trade policies. China’s export 
policies were then moved in the direction of neutrality with less discrimination towards 
both exports and imports, by reducing and eliminating the excessive export incentives.
Second, China’s export policies have been turned from dependence on administrative 
forces to reliance on market mechanisms. In the early years of reform, administrative 
measures were the main forces pushing exports to grow. The FER scheme was something 
like a government granted “bonus” to exporters. Export subsidies were an administrative 
support for exporters. Through reform, especially the institutional reforms in the 1980s, 
trade policies have increasingly been based on the market mechanism. The change of the 
FER system from regional basis to product basis (1991), the relaxation of restrictions on the 
access to swap exchange rate (1988 and sustaining year's), the elimination of export 
subsidies (1991), the reductions of export quotas and licensing (various years), the 
unification of exchange rates and the elimination of the FER system (1994), the increasing 
importance of the duty drawback system (since 1991) and the phasing-out of the
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preferential policies toward foreign-funded enterprises (1996) all showed that 
administrative export incentives interventions have been gradually reduced.
Third, China’s export policy reform has been a phased process composed of two major 
stages. In the 1980s, China gradually opened up its economy to the rest of the world while 
the economy was still heavily focused on an IS strategy. Export policy reform therefore 
concentrated on the increase in export incentives. Many export policies were aimed at 
compensating for the trade distortion effects of the IS strategy. All these measures played 
important roles in promoting exports and became major factors contributing to China’s 
rapid growth of exports. However, each export incentive was active in a different period. 
Notably, the dual-rate exchange and the FER systems were the main source of export 
incentives and remained active until the mid-1990s. Although it was introduced into the 
export sector in 1985, the duty drawback system seemed less important in the 1980s due to 
the lack of a corresponding reform in the domestic taxation system. The export subsidy 
policy existed for only a few years but domestic subsidies, as in many other countries, has 
continued to be a part of export incentive policy.
In the 1990s, China’s export policy reform entered into the second phase. In fact, when 
China applied to return to the GATT in 1986, Chinese leaders and economists began to 
consider the formalisation of the export policies in accordance with international practice. 
In the late 1980s, the central government reduced the role of subsidies through the 
implementation of the contract responsibility system in which the levels of export subsidies 
were fixed for enterprises. Enteiprises were therefore discouraged from relying on 
government subsidies. In the 1990s, many measures have been carried out to regularise 
China’s export policies. The elimination of export subsidies was the first step. Then the 
range of export controls like quotas and licensing were substantially reduced. Since 1994, 
more measures were introduced to increase the neutrality of export policy. These included 
the elimination of the exchange retention system (1994), the unification of the dual 
exchange rates (1994), the implementation of the new value-added tax system (1994), the 
phase-out of the preferential interest rate for export loans (1995), the end of preferential 
policies for foreign-funded enteiprises (1996). All these measures aimed at formalising 
export incentives and providing a fair competition environment for both domestic and 
foreign-funded enterprises.
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On the other hand, it is worth noting that the evolution of China’s export policy has 
been arduous and tortuous. Two lessons can be drawn from China’s experience. First, the 
gradual and changeable policy measures increased the cost of reform. An example is the 
two adjustments of duty drawback rates within half a year. There was not enough time left 
to allow the rates to slide down. These major reductions of duty drawback rates created an 
entirely different situation for exports in the second half of 1995 and the first half of 1996. 
To enjoy a higher duty drawback rate, enteiprises made great efforts to increase exports in 
the first half of 1995, and once again before the end of 1995. In the first half of 1996, 
according to customs statistics, export declined sharply to US$64.6 billion, 8.2% lower than 
the same period of 1995 {Global Electronic Daily 15/7/1996). On an annual basis, exports 
increased only by 3.3% in 1996, much lower than the growth rate of 22.9% in 1995.
Second, the lag in domestic reforms have generated difficulties for export policy 
reform. The fate of the duty drawback system in the past reform period is a typical example 
demonstrating the importance of the support of domestic reforms for trade policy 
adjustment. Although the intention of implementing the duty drawback system was 
announced and earned out in 1985, the effect of this system was veiy small in its first 
decade of implementation. The reason for this was China’s lack of a comprehensive 
taxation system to back such a reform measure. In this regard, a World Bank report (1987) 
suggested that China needed to replace the consolidated industrial and commercial taxation 
system by a value-added taxation system that is the foundation of a duty drawback system 
(World Bank 1987, 1.31, 4.23). This situation lasted until 1994 when a new value-added 
taxation system was set up. This reflected the restraints to export policy reform due to 
domestic economic condition on the one hand and indicated the lack of overall blueprint for 
trade reform on the other. Moreover, the real reason may be the intention of some Chinese 
authorities to maintain the existing government control over trade policy reform, to go on 
enjoying the fast expanded growth of the economy and exports rather than taking the risk of 
trade policy changes. In fact, many delays of economic and trade reforms were attributed to 
such a conservative consideration.
Before the intensive trade policy reform in 1991, export promotion policies in China 
featured heavy subsidies, pricing controls, tax exemptions and some other administrative 
measures. Many of them have now been considered incompatible with international trade 
practice. Begun in the 1990s, China’s trade policy has been shifting from strong export
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promotion to moderate and neutral measures balancing exports and imports. Although 
further reforms are still required, after twenty years of effort, China’s export policies have 
been fundamentally changed into a set of market economy-based instruments.
Due to different sources, the amount o f  subsidies cited fell in the range between 20 and 30 billion Yuan per year during 
1987-90. Lardy (1992) estimated it as about 23 billion Yuan. The data in World Bank’s are higher than Lardy’s estimate. 
However, in Chinese publications the amount o f  foreign trade subsidies in the period are about 20 billion Yuan.
^  According to a report presented by Chinese economists, the number o f  export commodities subject to licences declined 
from 285 to 133 during 1986-1994 (the period that China was applying for rejoining the GATT). See The Project 
Research Team o f  the UIBE (1995). In this thesis, I take the number from China's Foreign Trade, a journal edited and 
published by the trade authority (MOFERT, now MOFTEC) because most other figures used in this section are directly 
or indirectly from the MOTFEC sources.
^  According to the World Bank, 38 broad categories o f  products still remain subject to export quotas/licenses in April 
1993. See World Bank (1994a), p. 68.
^  According to the MOFTEC (1994), the number o f  export commodities subject to quota and licensing would be 114, 
taking in effect since 1 January 1995. For the convenience o f  management operation, these 114 commodities had been 
further classified into 143. Therefore, I use the number 143 as the total number o f  export commodities subject to quota 
and licensing in 1995.
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Liberalising Import Policies
In the initial stage of the opening-up process, imports and exports were under state 
control. To balance foreign trade, China was used to controlling import volume to maintain 
a favourable balance of payments. By the late 1980s, China’s foreign trade changed in the 
face of market regulation. More autonomous rights to trade have been granted to hading 
enterprises. Trading enterprises were allowed to decide when and how to use their retained 
foreign exchange for imports according to market signals. The change of import rights from 
state control to enterprise autonomy reflected the trend of import liberalisation in China. 
The method of macro-control over foreign trade has been shifting from being 
predominantly administrative measures to being mainly economic policy instruments. 
Import policy reform is becoming an increasingly important ingredient of hade reform.
5.1 T a r if f s
5.1.1 The Use of Tariffs in the Chinese Economy
Tariffs, which refer to the taxes levied on imported or exported products (popularly, 
tariffs on exports are usually called export taxes), are usually used as one of the important 
policy instruments. Import tariffs and export taxes, given their transparency based on 
market mechanisms, are regarded as better instruments than quantitative restraints for 
adjusting trade flows (Greenaway and Milner 1993, p. 64). In most countries, the focus on export 
promotion actually leads to the minimum use of export taxes. In the international hading 
system, therefore, attention is concentrated on tariffs.
As mentioned earlier, generating fiscal revenue and protecting the domestic economy 
are two major functions of tariffs. In the Chinese economy, tariff policies have long been 
emphasised as instruments of economic adjustment rather than as a source of government 
revenue. Basically, the use of tariffs in China so far has involved the following three 
aspects: trade balance, export promotion and hade liberalisation.
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Tariff and Trade Balance
China has implemented an IS strategy for a long time. The role of tariffs in the inward- 
looking regime was redundant, since all imports were controlled by state plans. The only 
function of tariffs in the pre-reform era, though small, was as being a source of government 
revenue. Even in 1980, two years after the beginning of the reform and opening process, 
collected tariffs brought in 3 billion yuan in government revenue (Qiu Deming 1982).
Since 1980, while the opening-up of the economy induced a rapid growth of trade, trade 
deficits were not unusual in China. A greater importance was attached to the use of tariffs in 
adjusting the volume and commodity composition of both exports and imports. With the 
decentralisation of import rights, and the backdrop of an overheated domestic economy, 
imports fluctuated up and down throughout the reform period. Imports peaked in the years 
1984/1985, 1988 and 1993. Some smaller increases showed in the years of 1981, 1986/1987 
and 1989/1990. Trade deficits were not veiy severe before 1984 but worsened in 1984-1990 
and again in 1993.
Figure 5.1 Trade Balance, 1978-1997
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Controlling the volume of imports was a basic way to balance import and export trade. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, dining 1978-1997, trade deficits were recorded in ten years out of 
the total twenty years. Among them, nine occurred before 1990. Based on the trade balance 
policy, the volume of imports was thought to be restricted. Traditionally, China’s import 
control relied very much on the use of administrative forces. However, high tariffs were 
also used as an instrument to help balance hade flows. In particular, tariffs on imported
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consumer durables, such as television sets, electronic calculators, radio/video recorders, 
motorcycles and cars, were raised sharply to control the volume of these imports. Tariff 
rates were in fact adjusted frequently after 1980, beside two large adjustments in January 
1982 and June 1987. In July 1985, China introduced an adjustment import tariff 
(“regulatory import duty”) to restrict the increasing imports of some commodities. Tariff 
rates have become more important determinants of the volume and composition of 
commodity imports and have fluctuated over time. By 1986/1987, China’s unweighted 
average tariff rate in 1986 was 38.1% and the weighted average tariff rate in 1987 was 29% 
(Dean et al. 1994). Even in the 1990s, high tariffs on consumer durables were not the targets 
of tariff reductions.
Tariff Exemption
While the imports of consumer goods were tightly restricted in China’s tariff system, 
the imports of production facilities received a very different treatment. This was fully 
reflected in the policies toward foreign investment in China. Encouraging the development 
of foreign-funded enteiprises in order to expand exports was an important ingredient of 
China’s export promotion policy. Foreign-funded enterprises could enjoy many preferential 
policy measures, including tax reduction or exemption, tariff-free imports, simplified 
approval procedures and other benefits. Besides foreign-funded enteiprises, many domestic 
enterprises involved in export activities could also enjoy tariff exemptions.
Most preferential policies were implemented first in SEZs and ETDZs. With regard to 
the implementation of duty exemption, the main categories which benefited were: (1) 
Machinery and equipment, and other materials imported for the infrastructure facilities 
within SEZs and ETDZs; (2) Equipment imported by foreign-funded enterprises for 
investment; (3) Materials and equipment imported for inward processing including “inward 
processing with supplied materials” {Lai Liao Jia Gong) including “inward assembling with 
supplied parts” (Lai Jian Zhuang Pei), “inward processing with imported materials” {Jin 
Liao Jia Gong) as a form of “processing according to buyer’s samples” {Lai Yang Jia 
Gong) and “compensation trade” {Bn Chang Mao 7z);[l] (4) Export products processing 
domestically supplied materials, and with 20% and over value-added in SEZs and ETDZs, 
can also be exempted from export taxes (Lin Hanchuan 1993; World Bank 1994a, pp. 58-60). These 
tariff exemptions, to different degrees, were extended to other open cities and areas, and to
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other trade forms (for example, border trade could enjoy a 50% tariff concession) in the 
period between mid-1980s and before 1994.
Figure 5.2 Collected Tariffs as a Percentage of Imports
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The preferential tariff policies adopted led to China’s real tariff rates being much lower 
than nominal tariff rates, due to an extensive system of import duty exemptions and rebates 
designed to promote exports. As shown in Figure 5.2, the actual tariff rates (collected 
tariffs/imports) were in a range between 10-16% during 1978-1986, veiy close to the 
average tariff level of the developing countries. Since the mid-1980s, this tariff ratio to 
imports has continuously declined to about 3% in the mid-1990s. This reflected an 
unsuitable deviation between tariff policy and the results of implementation.
5.1.2 Tariff Policy Reforms
Prior to the tariff policy adjustment in 1996, China’s tariff system was self­
contradictory. Compared with the average levels of developed and developing countries, 
China’s nominal tariff rate was very high. However, to stimulate foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows and the imports of advanced technology, various tariff exemptions were 
applied to a great range of imports. In such circumstance, China gained less tariff revenue 
than would be consistent with the nominal tariff rate, although it was frequently criticised 
for its high tariff protection. To correct these distortions of the tariff system and, further, to 
liberalise the whole import system, China has taken a series of measures to cut the tariff rate 
and to adjust its FDI policies. Through reforms along these two lines, China’s tariff system 
has been moving towards a normal pattern based on the market economy.
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Tariff Reductions
Prior to 1991, the trend of tariff rates seemed to increase the average rate of protection. 
As a result, China’s tariff rates remained at relatively high levels. A possible explanation is 
that China tried to shift some non-tariff import barrier protection to tariff restriction, given 
that many administrative measures for controlling imports were abolished in the process of 
decentralisation. Since 1991, however, China has launched a series of tariff cuts, due partly 
to the further opening-up of the economy and partly to the pressure from other countries.
At the start of the series of consecutive tariff reductions, China reduced the tariff rates 
on 265 import connnodities of 43 tariff lines in 1991 (People’s Daily 16/11/1993, 17/11/1993; Fan 
Baoqing 1994). Subsequently, tariff reductions were seen in the sustaining years from 1992 
through 1997 (at the time of writing this thesis).
On 1 January 1992, a sizeable reduction of 225 tariff lines was implemented. According 
to GATT’s estimate, these items accounted for 4.4% of China’s total import tariff lines at 
the time (World Bank 1994a, p. 49). Moreover, in April 1992, all regulatory tariffs were 
revoked and the tariff rates for video cameras and cars were also adjusted, in accordance 
with the decision of the Customs Tariff Commission (CTC) of the State Council. With the 
cancellation of the regulatory duties, the actual tariff burden for 16 categories of import 
commodities was reduced in scope from 28% to 61.5% {People’s Daily 15/3/1992). Another 
tariff reduction was introduced on 31 December 1992. The reduction involved 3,371 import 
commodities, accounting for 53.6% of all items covered by customs import tariffs {Beijing 
Review 21-27/12/1992). Among major commodities affected by the reduction were (1) raw 
materials which China has been importing for a long time, (2) advanced products which 
China lacked the technology to produce, (3) some products made in developing countries, 
and (4) some products in which China was highly competitive on world markets.
In November 1993, the General Customs Administration (GCA) announced that China 
would lower import tariffs as from December 31, 1993. The reduction involved 2,898 
import commodities which included some raw materials in short supply in China, and 
equipment in great demand. In addition, the duty rates on some articles, pennitted to be 
earned to the country by tourists and goods sent from abroad were also lowered. These 
commodities covered about half the country’s import items {People’s Daily 16/11/1993, 
17/11/1993). The reduction meant that the average rate of China’s customs duty was lowered
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by 8.8%. The average tariff rate (unweighted) decreased from 39.9% to 36.4% {People’s 
Daily 16/11/1993, 17/11/1993).
Almost at the same time as the reduction at the end of 1993, on 1 January 1994, the 
Customs Tariff Committee of the State Coimcil decided to reduce the tariff rates for 
imported cars and impose temporary tariff rates on 234 import commodities. The rates for 
imported cars with gasoline engines less than 3.000 millilitre exhausts and cars with diesel 
engines less than 2,500 millilitre exhausts were reduced from 220% and 180% to 110%. 
The rates for cars with gasoline engines over 3,000 millilitre exhausts or with diesel engines 
over 2,500 millilitre exhausts were lowered from 220% to 150% {People's Daily 2/1/1994), 
The temporary lowering of tariff rates was extended to some imported metal raw materials, 
chemical materials and products, agricultural materials, and components and parts of 
machineiy and electronic products for one year (1/1-31/12/94).
On 1 July 1995, China adjusted the preferential import tariff rates on video tapes and 
minibuses (10-29 seats), while the nominal tariff rates remained unchanged. At the end of 
1995, the State Council announced a sizeable tariff reduction which was implemented from 
1 April 1996. At this time, China had 6,265 tariff lines. This reduction affected more than 
4,000 tariff lines, accounting for about 64% of all items covered by customs tariffs. With 
this reduction, China’s tariff level (unweighted average tariff rate) fell from 35.9% to 23%, 
with a decrease in tariffs of about 30% {China’s Foreign Trade, No. 4, 1996; China's Scholars 
Abroad, electronic edition, 12/4/1996). The concentration of the reduction was still, as before, on 
the imports of important raw materials, agricultural products, advanced technological 
equipment, and goods in short supply in domestic markets.
The latest tariff reduction took place on 1 October 1997. According to the Customs 
Tariff Committee of the State Council, this tariff reduction involved 4,800 commodities, 
covering more than 73% of existing tariff lines. Through this reduction, China’s average 
tariff rate would decrease by 26%, from 23% in 1996 to 17% in 1997 {China’s Scholars 
Abroad, electronic edition, 19/9/1997). Chinese leaders announced that China would take 
effective steps to further reduce customs tariffs to the average level of other developing 
countries {Beijing Review 29/4 - 5/5/1996).
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Table 5.1 Changes of China’s Average Nominal Tariff Rate (%)
Average nominal tariff rate Items o f tariff reduced in the year
1950-1984 52.9
1986 38.0 -
1990 42.5 -
1991 47.2 down to 42.8 265
1992 42.8 down to 39.9 225 in January, 16 in April and 3,371 in December
1993 39.9 down to 36.6-36.4 2,898
1994 36.6-36.0 234
1995 36.6-35.9 4
1996 35.9 down to 23.0 over 4,000
1997 23.0 down to 17.0 4,800
Note: For some years, tariff rate data provided by Chinese writers are variable. In this table, the differences o f  the 
various data are considered as a range o f  the tariff rates in the years (1993, 1994 and 1995).
Source: Dean et al. (1994) for 1986; World Bank (1994a) for 1992; Xu Yu and Ma Lijun (1996), Feng Cuncheng 
(1996), Pei Changhong (1996), Jiang Xiaojuan (1996), Lin Guijun (1996), China's Foreign Trade (No. 4, 
1994), People's D aily  (16/11/1993) and C hina’s Scholars A broad  (electronic edition, 19/9/1997) for the 
remaining years.
Through several tariff reductions and the phase-out of tariff exemptions, China’s tariff 
system has effectively been set on the right track. Although the present average nominal 
tariff rate is still high, a general decline of 30.2 percentage points in the average tariff rate 
(Table 5.1) was realised within a period of less than seven years (1991-1997). Taking 
account of the 1997 tariff reduction, China’s average tariff rate has already moved close to 
that of developing countries.
The Elimination of Preferential Tariff Policies
In recent years, China has taken some measures to narrow the gap of policies granted to 
state-owned and foreign-funded enteiprises. In 1993, the rights of foreign-funded 
enteiprises to import tariff-free transport vehicles and office equipment were eliminated. 
After a short period of amortisation, in 1994, the tax system reform was rapidly extended to 
foreign-funded enteiprises. In the newly unified tax system, both foreign-funded and 
domestically-funded enterprises are treated equally. In 1995 China introduced a deposit 
system for tariff collection on the imports of raw materials imported by foreign-funded and 
process enterprises. From 1 April 1996, the preferential policy which had allowed tariff-free 
imports of machinery and equipment by foreign-funded enteiprises was eliminated (Zhu 
Wehui 1996b). At the same time, China has made efforts to improve the environment of 
investment for foreign investors by providing them with national treatment. Some 
economic sectors, such as retail commerce, banking and insurance, are being gradually 
opened up to foreign investors. The unification of the dual-rates exchange system has
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basically met the requirement of foreign-funded enterprises to balance their earnings and 
expenditures in terms of foreign exchange.
When the 1996 tariff reduction was launched, China also declared that its import 
policies would be further reformed. In its Circular on Reforming and Adjusting China's 
Import Taxation Policies (1996), the State Council pointed out that some preferential tariff 
policies, mainly formulated at the end of the 1970s and the 1980s, no longer conformed to 
common international practice and the principle of equal competition under the market 
economy. It also argued that China must further reform and readjust its tariff policies, if it is 
to participate in international competition and international economic co-operation in a 
more open maimer (Beijing Review 5-11/2/1996).
The main target of the tariff policy adjustment is to cut down the distance between legal 
and actual tariff rates. According to the State Council’s notice, tariffs and import taxes 
would be levied on imported equipment and raw and semi-finished materials in accordance 
with the legal tax rates, beginning on 1 April 1996. The main measures include; (1) newly- 
approved foreign-funded enterprises are subject to tariffs and import taxation on equipment 
and raw materials imported as a part of their investment; (2) newly-approved technical 
transformation projects are subject to tariffs and import taxation on their equipment 
imports; (3) key construction projects approved by the State Council are subject to tariffs 
and import taxation on their equipment imported; (4) tariffs and import tax must be levied 
for all equipment imported by special zones including SEZs and Pudong area; and (5) the 
provision concerning the exemption of tariffs and import tax as for barter trade and 
economic and technological co-operation projects with peripheral countries are cancelled. 
The circular also noted that in line with related stipulations of international conventions, 
and in reference to common international practices, some regulations on import tax 
reduction and exemptions will be retained and readjusted (Huang Bian 1996).
5.1,3 The Economic Analysis of China’s Tariff Policies 
The Effects of High Tariffs
Prior to the intensive tariff reductions in the 1990s, China adopted a policy which 
featured high nominal tariff rates and massive tariff exemptions. The effects of this high 
tariff policy were as such that follows.
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First, given the structure of the tariff rates and the implementation of tariff exemptions, 
this high tariff policy aimed at restricting the import of consumer goods and some other 
imports. For the imports not enjoying tariff exemptions, high tariffs have proved a major 
obstacle. For example, the imports of television sets in 1980s were heavily influenced by 
the high tariff rate, and administrative control as well. The nominal tariff rate for imported 
television sets was set at 80%. The implementation of the “regulatory tariff’ in 1985 
imposed another 70% tariff on imports of television sets. The implicit import tariff rate 
therefore was as high as 150%, about twice the average rate of import tariff.
Figure 5.3 Imports and Exports of TV Sets
^  1000 J
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Source: State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1995); State Planning Committee et a l  (1997).
High tariff restricted the imports of television sets and, together with other measures, 
provided high protection for import substituting production in China. Consequently, 
production of television set was rapidly developed and, since the late 1980s, television set 
have gradually become one of the main export products. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, TV 
imports declined in 1981-83, due to administrative controls. The introduction of the 
“regulatory tariff’ in 1985 led to an obvious decrease of imports. China had no exports of 
TV sets before 1986. Through a decade of substitution effort in the 1980s, TV set exports 
grew rapidly while imports kept declining. In 1989, China for the first time had net exports 
of TV sets. However, in 1992 when the “regulatory duty” was eliminated, TV set imports 
began to increase. This proved that high tariffs on TV sets have had effect in restricting the 
imports and in protecting import substitution production.
Second, high tariffs have influenced domestic prices. In conventional tariff theory, 
tariffs levied in a large country may drive down the relative world price of imports or raise 
the domestic price, or have both of these effects. However, with regard to the size of 
imports, China was not large enough to affect the world prices in most imported
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commodities. So the effect of high tariff on prices was to raise domestic prices. In 1990, for 
example, most domestic selling prices of imported commodities were higher than the 
market prices of domestic products. This situation still existed for some imported 
intermediate products even where their tariffs had been reduced. For example, the import 
price including tariffs for rolled steel (small size) was 1,916 Yuan per ton. Its actual import 
cost was 1,696 Yuan per ton, taking account of 220 Yuan tariff reduction. It was sold in the 
market at a price of 1,798 Yuan per ton, 298 Yuan higher than the price of the same product 
produced domestically (1,500 Yuan per ton). Consequently the domestic price went up. In 
fact, many imported commodities had the same effect, inducing an increase in the domestic 
prices. Such a situation had been a determining factor in the decision to reduce tariffs on 40 
import commodities in 1991 (Huang Yaohua and Wang Zhengxiao 1991).
The price changes induced by imposing a tariff on imports would generate various 
welfare effects for the tariff-levying country. But, due to the lack of detailed data 
(especially the prices of imported and domestically-produced commodities), it is difficult to 
estimate the aggregate welfare effects of China’s high tariff policy. However, what is 
certain is that China’s high tariffs have led to quite large losses in consumer welfare, given 
that import demand has been restricted.
Third, while import demand was restricted by high tariffs, foreign competition was in 
fact excluded from or minimised in the domestic market. Domestic enteiprises were 
discouraged to improve productivity, because the high tariff policy actually granted a large 
proportion of the domestic markets to them. The consequence was that they enjoyed the 
increase of producer surplus brought by the high tariff policy but contributed less to the 
improvement of consumer surplus.
The Effects of Tariff Exemptions
Tariff exemptions may function as incentives to encourage certain government-targeted 
economic activities. The use of tariff exemption to provide preferential conditions for the 
favoured industries or enterprises is not uncommon in developing countries where high 
nominal tariffs are usually present. In the case of China, tariff exemption, which was used 
extensively in the reform period, has been an important factor contributing to the
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improvement of productive conditions and the increasing inflows of foreign investment, as 
well as to the decline of government revenue.
First of all, for the purpose of industrialisation, China has long been encouraging the 
introduction of advanced equipment and technology from the western countries. Tariff 
exemptions, either partial or total, were in most cases granted to the imports of productive 
facilities. China’s industrial production has a considerably high dependence on the imports 
of raw materials and equipment. During 1990-1992, for example, imports of machinery and 
equipment became an important source of production expansion in some industrial sectors 
(Table 5.2). The ratio of imported supplies accounted for 53.2% in the heavy industries in 
1991.
Table 5.2 Sectoral Ratio of Dependency on Imports (1990-1992) (%)
Im ported equipment as percentage of 
newly purchased equipment 
in the period
Im ported interm ediate products as 
percentage o f all intermediate  
products used in the period
Chemical industry 92* 20-30
Car making industry 81 57
Steel and iron industry 71 20-30
Construction industry 59 20-30
Textile industry 38 11
* Value o f  single item over 50 thousand Yuan (equals to about US$9.6 thousand).
Source: Xu Kangning (1994).
In Chapter 3, the author’s estimation (Table 3.2-b) has shown that the introduction of 
productive facility remained the main feature of China’s import structure in the reform 
period. Given such an import structure, in which more than 80% were productive facilities, 
tariff exemptions were applied to a very wide range of imports. Encouraged by the tariff 
exemption policy, most industries and enterprises took imports of productive facilities as a 
way to improve productivity. Increasing quantities of raw materials and equipment were 
imported to support domestic economic development and exports.
Second, apart from the technological upgrade of the existing industries, tariff exemptions 
were also granted to the imports related to exports, providing that the imported materials 
were for re-export. The rapid development of processing trade has benefited greatly from 
the preferential treatments of tariff exemption. Table 5.3 shows the rapid development of 
processing industry in China during 1991-1996. The value of processing trade doubled 
from US$57.49 billion in 1991 to US$146.61 in 1996, accounting for 50.6% of the national
111
total trade. These tariff exemptions, in this case, acted as incentives encouraging the 
development of low-level labour-intensive industry.
Table 5.3 Share of Processing Trade in China’s Foreign Trade, 1991-1995 (US$ billion; %)
Year National foreign trade
Exports Imports Total
Processing trade  
Exports Imports Total
Share o f processing trade
Exports Imports Total
1991 71.84 63.79 135.63 32.46 25.03 57.49 45.1 39.2 42.4
1992 84.94 80.59 165.53 39.61 31.51 71.12 46.6 39.1 42.8
1993 91.74 103.96 195.70 44.44 36.16 80.60 48.4 34.8 41.1
1994 121.01 115.61 236.62 56.97 47.57 104.54 47.0 41.1 44.1
1995 148.77 132.08 280.85 73.70 58.37 132.07 49.5 44.2 47.0
1996 151.06 138.84 289.90 84.33 62.28 146.61 55.8 44.9 50.6
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996b, 1997b); Yang Shenming et al. (1996); B eijing D aily, 7/2/1997.
Third, still another goal of the tariff exemption policy was to provide preferential 
conditions for foreign investors in China to increase exports. These preferential conditions 
were helpful in attracting foreign investment. As already shown in Chapter 4, China has 
successfully attracted a large amount of foreign investment over the past reform years. 
Foreign-funded enteiprises have made important contribution to China’s export growth.
Fourth, the extensive use of tariff exemptions has resulted in large govemment-revenue 
loss. Figure 5.2 in the earlier part of this chapter shows that China’s actual collected tariff 
only was a small part of the nominal tariffs in the 1990s. Concessional imports accounted 
for 8 5 %  of total imports in 1995 (Zhang Erzheng 1996; Jiang Xiaojuan 1996). The loss of tariff 
revenue (nominal tariffs minus actual collected tariffs) amounted for 93.5 billion Yuan 
(US$19.56 billion) in 1990 and increased to 371.3 billion Yuan (US$44.47 billion) in 1995. 
However, this is only a part of the story. Considering the fact that many state-owned 
enterprises operated on loss-making basis, the govermnent could only collect a reduced 
amount of domestic taxes and had to spend a large amount of govermnent subsidies on loss- 
making enteiprises. Such multiple fiscal losses, though not all, should be attributed to the 
tariff exemption policy.
Finally, given China’s high tariffs in previous years, tariff exemptions were certainly 
measures to relax import controls. However, China’s implementation of the tariff 
exemptions had been biased in favour of productive facilities. While most imports of 
productive facilities were granted tariff exemption, the nation’s tariff structure has in fact 
been changed. It is worth noting that when intermediate goods enjoy lower tariff rates than
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final goods, effective rate of protection can exceed statutoiy rates by a multiple (Dombusch
1992). In China, the nominal tariff rates for producer goods had already been lower than that 
of consumer goods. Tariff exemptions further amplified the difference between tariff rates 
on intermediate goods (producer goods) and final foods (consumer goods). This meant that 
the effective protection has been strengthened. Although it is difficult to estimate the extent 
to which tariff exemptions contributed to the increased effective rate of protection in 
China’s case, the protective function of the tariff exemption policy should be noted.
The importance of the policy change is that both domestically funded and foreign- 
funded enteiprises are now encouraged to compete and seek joint development under equal 
conditions, rather than using preferential policies only to attract foreign capital. The reform 
of the Chinese tax system and the rationalisation of FDI policies are important steps 
bringing the economy into conformity with common international practices.
The Effects of Tariff Reductions
Tariff reductions have been the major measures taken to reform the import system in 
China in the 1990s. Further, in 1996, tariff reduction was combined with the elimination of 
preferential tariff policies. China’s reform of tariff policies has produced some positive 
effects on trade expansion and represent a significant move towards trade liberalisation. .
First, tariff reduction stimulated the growth of imports. For example, China’s imports 
increased from US$53.35 billion in 1990 to US$132.08 billion in 1995. The average annual 
growth rate of imports during 1990-1995 was 19.9%, 6.5 percentage points higher than that 
of the 1980s (13.4%). It was at least true for those importers not enjoying tariff concessions, 
that tariff reductions have helped in reducing the cost of imports. In this sense, tariff 
reduction could be regarded as a useful measure in favour of introducing foreign technology 
and productive resources to improve the country’s industrial structure and production 
capacity.
More importantly, for China, imported raw materials and intermediate products have 
become a pillar supporting fast economic growth. Tariff reductions were certainly a factor 
stimulating the increase in imports. Table 5.4 shows the increase of imports of some tariff- 
reduced commodities. At least it can be considered that the government was intending to let
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more imports in through tariff reduction in order to supplement domestic supply {People's 
Daily 1/1/1994).
Table 5.4 Imports of Some Tariff-reduced Commodities (USS millions)
1990 1993 1994 1995
Crude oil 423.81 2323,41 1573.40 n.a.
Synthetic fibre 554.42 723.45 972.21 1315.94
W ool and w ool top 280.00 701.92 793.97 944.14
Rolled steel 2,508.13 n.a. 8533.32 6511.22
Copper and copper alloys 102.65 n.a. 224.22 406.44
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1992; 1996a, 1996b); Editorial Board o f  Almanac o f  C h in a’s Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade (1996).
Second, China’s tariff reductions should be regarded as part of the effort to establish a 
fair, formalised and rationalised tariff system. China’s tariff system has long been a 
distorted system. It is notable that in the 1990s greater attention has been paid to the 
normalisation of import policies. The adoption of the Harmonised System (HS) and the 
significant reductions of tariff rates since 1992 have demonstrated China’s intention to 
formalise its trade policy in conformity with international trade practice.
China’s sustained adjustments of tariff policies in the 1990s were due to the following 
two factors. The first concerned the decision to join the GATT/WTO. China has been 
required to lower its high tariffs (and other trade barriers as well) to meet the entry 
conditions. The second was that China needs to establish a fair competition environment for 
enterprises, given the goal of economic transition from planned economy to market 
economy. Excessive tariff protection has caused negative effects for the economy. Some 
backward industries were heavily protected by high tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
Furthermore, if foreign-funded enterprises entered the protected industries, they also 
became the objective of protection (Hou Xilin and Xi Fengm 1996). Such foreign-funded 
enterprises have benefited from both receiving tariff concessions and enjoying tariff (and 
non-tariff) protection. To correct the distortions in the tariff system, China’s tariff 
reductions have intended to follow the principles of (1) speeding up the development of 
foreign trade, encouraging the competition of enteiprises on an equal footing and bringing 
into full play the macro-control function of tariffs; (2) rationalising the relations between 
speeding up economic development and protecting national industries; and (3) adjusting the 
tariff burden on different commodities in accordance with industrial policies of the country 
{ch ina’s Foreign Trade, No. 5, 1993, pp. 10-11). Given the several tariff reductions and the
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elimination of the preferential tariff policies in recent years, China’s tariff system has been 
becoming one, with lower protection and discrimination, compatible with the international 
practice.
Third, on the other hand, the significance of China’s tariff reduction should not be 
overemphasised. One reason is that China’s tariff rate is still much higher than the average 
rate of developed countries (4.7%) and even that of developing countries (13-14%). China’s 
tariff reductions have only shown a relative decrease in tariff protection. Besides tariffs, 
there are still many non-tariff barriers to be reduced. Another reason is that China’s high 
rate of nominal tariff was only of superficial significance before the elimination of 
preferential policies in 1996. Given the low rate of actual collected tariff (6.1% in 1990 and 
2.6% in 1996, for example), China has in fact had sufficient capacity to reduce its tariff rate 
to a lower level. The reasons that the possible further reduction of tariff has not been taken 
place were probably due partly to the imperfection of a tariff system based on a market 
economy, and partly to the country’s strategic and political considerations. For example, 
China’s status in the WTO may be one such consideration.
On the whole, tariff reform has played an important role in China’s trade policy 
liberalisation. This can he shown through the following features of reform. First, the extent 
of tariff reductions was very large in the 1990s, involving a total decrease of 30.2 
percentage points in the average tariff rate. Second, the elimination of preferential policies 
enabled the nominal tariff rate to become functional. Although it means that China’s 
average tariff rate may be restored to a higher level, China’s announcement promising to 
reduce its tariffs to the level of developing countries (13-14% at present) within a few years 
could be an equivalent measure of trade liberalisation. What can be appreciated is that 
China may establish an midistorted tariff system through such a reform. Third, the tariff 
reductions in 1996 and 1997 have placed an emphasis on the liberalisation of manufactures 
imports instead of focusing on raw materials and intermediates as in previous reductions. 
This has been consistent with the bend of trade liberalisation in other parts of the world. 
Liberalised manufacturing imports and the corresponding increase of competition will press 
China’s enterprises to improve their productivity.
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5.2 N o n -T a r if f  M e a su r e s
Non-tariff measures used in China to restrict imports included mandatory import plans, 
canalisation of imports through designated national FTCs, foreign exchange allocation, 
import licensing and quotas, and other import controls. After almost 20 years of reforms, 
China’s trade system has moved from a strictly controlled regime to a much freer one, 
where the role of planning has been much diminished, the exchange rate system has been 
unified, and other import controls have been greatly minimised. However, China’s import 
regime is far from completely liberalised. Some non-tariff barriers are still actively used to 
regulate imports.
5.2.1 Import Licensing and Quotas 
Using Import Licences and Quotas in China
China introduced an import and export licensing system in October 1980 and formalised 
the system in state regulation in January 1984 (Wang Shizhen 1990). On the side of import 
licensing system, all imported goods were divided into restricted and unrestricted 
categories. The number of restricted categories was 13 in 1980, increasing to 53 in 1988., 
The number 53 remained until 1993. Besides the requirement for import licences, quotas 
were applied to some import commodities.
Table 5.5 Number of Imports (commodity group) Subject to Licensing (1980-1996)
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1993 1995 1996
Commodities subject to im port licence 13 18 28 45 42 45 53 53 36 36
Source: Shen Jueren (1983); C hina’s Foreign Trade, N o.5, 1986; Garnaut and Huang (1995), p. 9; Xue Rongjiu 
(1995); The Project Research Team o f  Peking University(1996); Lin Guijun (1996); Li Dongsheng (1997).
Of 53 commodity groups subject to import licensing in 1992, the starting year of 
China’s intensive trade policy reform, two-third were planned to be reduced in the 
following period of two or three year's (Liu Xiangdong 1992). A timetable was set up for the 
decrease in the scope of import licences, eliminating 12 (groups of) import licences by the 
end of 1993, 23 by 1994, 9 by 1995, 2 by 1996, and the remaining 7 thereafter (Tong Jiadong 
1994). Looking at the practice, 283 tax items were exempted from quotas and licence at the 
end of 1993. In June 1994, quotas and licences were cancelled for 367 import commodities 
(Meng Xiangang 1997). The actual result by 1995 was that, however, 36 commodity groups 
were still subject to import licences (Table 5.6). This meant that the proposed target of 
licence elimination was not completed.
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Table 5.6 Import Controls, July 1995 (quotas, licences and automatic registration)
Im port control measures Commodity groups covered Com m odity varieties in the group
Quotas plus licences 31 301
General goods 16 133
Machinery & electrical products 15 168
Licence only 5 53
Automatic registration 20 574
Source: MOFTEC, quoted from Lin Guijun (1996).
In 1996, China announced to remove licence and quotas requirements on 176 varieties 
of import commodities, or 30 % of all items subject to import quotas and licences, effective 
from 1 April 1996 (Lin Guijun 1996). Partly as a result of this, three commodity groups were 
taken off the list of quota control system (but still subject to licensing). Therefore, in 1996, 
there were 28 commodity groups subject to import quotas plus licences while 8 commodity 
groups were subject to licensing. The total number of commodity groups subject to import 
licensing remained 36 (Li Dongsheng 1997). The varieties requiring import quotas and 
licences were reduced from 1247 in 1992 to 384 in 1997, accounting for only 5% of total 
tax items of imports (Meng Xiangang 1997).
Liberalisation measures have improved the conditions of access to China’s market. 
However, although the scope of import quotas and licensing has been significantly reduced, 
establishing an effective system for distributing quotas and issuing licences in the 
remaining areas still remained a problem for Chinese trade authorities. After the 1996 
reduction, for example, quotas and licences for the 36 groups import commodities were 
separately issued by several departments including the State Planning Committee, the State 
Office for Mechanical and Electrical Industry and many other ministries (Li Weicheng 1997). 
This situation very often generated conflicts and made for less transparency in quota and 
licensing distribution. Nonetheless, the progress in reducing import licensing at least 
demonstrated China’s move towards liberalisation.
The Significance of the Reforms in Licensing and Quotas System
The initiative of the quota/licensing system was to strengthen the administration of 
import and export trade under the national plans, to protect the economy, and to stabilise 
markets at home and abroad (Shen Jueren 1983). With the progress of trade reforms towards 
the normalisation of trade policy, the system has been used to replace trade plans as the 
principal instrument of trade controls.
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However, China’s adoption of the licensing system could be regarded as a step towards 
standardising and legitimating its trade control system, required for the establishment of a 
market economy in the country. In a market economy, controlling imports using import 
licences and quotas can be regarded as a step away from free trade toward more managed 
trade. But in an economy in which a planned import control system has long been applied, 
such as in China, the adoption of a licensing and quota system should be considered as a 
transition step in the transformation of a trade regime with tight restrictions to one with 
greater freedom on imports.
In the literature of trade policy reform, a common recommendation is to convert non­
tariff measures into tariffs, to enhance the transparency in trade policies. In the same spirit, 
converting planning control over imports into licensing and quota system is also a 
necessary step leading trade policies back to common forms used in other countries. Then 
other reform measures can be earned out one after another to move towards liberalisation. 
The licensing and quota system is more transparent than mandatory plans. In China, 
licensed commodities and license application processes were publicised in newspapers (Fan 
Baoqing 1994), and computers have been used to assist with the management of licence 
distribution, through a network linking the Customs and the Bureau of Foreign Currency 
Control run by the MOFERT (Xu Jianya 1994). These measures have effectively reduced the 
opportunities to distribute licences illegally.
Imposing licensing requirements and quotas on imports may have the same effects of 
restricting trade and the associated welfare losses caused by tariffs in the importing country. 
More importantly, unlike tariffs which rely on the price mechanism, the licensing and quota 
system provides more places where government administrative forces remain active to 
control imports. In the case of China, the use of import licences and quotas was aimed at 
controlling the domestic prices to protect domestic industries. As already noted, the size of 
China’s imports could not influence world prices. Import licensing and quotas were used as 
measures to prevent decrease of domestic price due to the increases in imports. With the 
restrictions of licensing and quotas, a large proportion of restrained demand could only be 
met with higher-cost domestic production instead of lower-cost imports. The consequences 
were of cause the losses of allocative efficiency and consumer welfare.
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In view of the fact that licensing and quotas have been widely regarded as harmful 
protection measures, China has taken steps to reduce the scope of license-and-quota- 
controlled imports. It has also been required for China to make its foreign trade control 
system meet the fundamental rules of GATT/WTO and the general standards of world 
trade. In 1986, the major non-tariff measures including import licences, import quotas, 
import plans and import controls covered 80% of total imports (Wu Jiahuang 1996). By 1992, 
the coverage of non-tariff barriers on imports dropped to about 51.4% of total imports 
(World Bank 1994a, P. 63; Sheng Bin 1994). After 1992, as was mentioned above, some further 
reform measures, including two reductions of import quotas and licences in 1994 and 1996, 
were taken to reduce non-tariff barriers.
Like tariff reduction, the decreasing use of quantitative measures also contributed to the 
growth of imports, improvements in trade structure and the development of the economy. 
However, the more significant contribution of the removal of quantitative restraints has 
been the improved conditions for the establishment of a new system of trade policies based 
on market mechanisms. Reducing the use of import quotas and licences has shown China’s 
confidence in using the market mechanism (tariffs, exchange rate and resulting price 
changes), rather than administrative controls, to adjust import flows. Undoubtedly, the trend 
for China’s import licensing system is to be reduced in the future. How it will be done 
depends on the progress of China’s trade regime reforms, especially on the shift of macro­
control mechanism of the trade system hum administrative control to an overall regulation 
and control by means of tariffs, exchange rates, credit, and interest rates.
5.2.2 Foreign Exchange Control 
Exchange Rate
The exchange rate under the IS regime was actually in favour of imports, due to the 
overestimation of the domestic currency. Since reform, China’s exchange rate has been 
frequently adjusted, in both official rates and the use of “swap” rates. With the depreciation 
of the Renminbi, China’s exchange rate has moved to a relatively realistic level. Given this 
change in exchange rate, the previously favourable position of imports has also been 
gradually weakened.
In particular*, the reform of foreign exchange rate system in 1994 has had important 
effects on trade policy reform. The unification of the dual-tier exchange rates improved the
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function of the foreign exchange rate as instrument for adjusting imports and exports. In 
combination with the elimination of the foreign exchange retention system, the immediate 
effects of exchange rate reform were that exports were stimulated by depreciation of 
domestic currency while imports were restricted. In early 1994, according to some analyses, 
the prices of imported commodities rose by 33.5% while the reduction of export cost was 
no more than 14.5% (the rate of depreciation from the real exchange rate of US$1 — 7.6 
Yuan at that time). Given that in China the price elasticity of demand for import 
commodities is usually larger than that of export commodities, the unification of the 
exchange rate in 1994 had greater effect in restricting imports than in promoting exports 
(Long Guoqiang 1994; Wang Zixian 1994). The growth rate of imports in 1994 was 11.2%, 
compared with that of 1993, and 20.7 percentage points lower than the growth rate of 
exports for that year.
Because of the high inflation rate, however, the stimulation from depreciation was 
basically exhausted by 1995 (Huang Xianhai 1996). The annual growth rate of exports was still 
high but dropped to 24.17%, 7.54 percentage points lower than that of 1994 (31.71%). In 
addition, as was mentioned previously, the marked growth of exports was attributed to 
additional factors, especially the reduction of the duty drawback rate. By contrast, the 
growth rate of imports increased to 15.29% in 1995. The gap between the growth rates of 
imports and exports was reduced. Starting from the end of 1994, the Renminbi has been on 
a trend of appreciation. Meanwhile, the inflation rate stood at 21.7% in 1994 and 14.8% in 
1995. These factors seemed to be beneficial for the growth of imports. In 1996, although 
growth of foreign trade was slow due to the reduction of export incentives (duty 
drawbacks), the growth rate of imports (about 5.11%) was higher than that of exports 
(1.55%).
However, on balance, China’s exchange rate policy had a relatively weaker influence on 
import control than other import policies. There were several reasons restricting the role of 
exchange rate in import adjustment. First, because of the extensive use of export incentives, 
the advantageous position of imports given by the overvaluation of the domestic currency 
was offset. The general trend of trade policies was to encourage the development of import- 
competing industries. Importing was only a channel for obtaining advanced foreign 
production facilities to support import-competing industries, rather than an available source
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of profits. Second, in China’s planned economy, the exchange rate was only an accounting 
tool so that it only had a small effect in adjusting imports. In building the market economy 
in China, the exchange rate has been assumed to be a policy instrument affecting trade 
flows. This was not, however, true until 1994 when the exchange rate mechanism was 
subjected to market forces based on the supply and demand of foreign exchange. This 
meant, in a situation without marketisation of the foreign exchange system, the exchange 
rate could not be an powerful instrument affecting trade flows. Third, as to be discussed in 
the following subsection, China had strict controls on domestic enterprises’ access to 
foreign exchange. The consequence was that even importing could be profitable due to the 
over-valuation of the domestic currency, the restriction of exchange control in fact disabled 
the possible function of exchange rate in encouraging the increase of imports. Or, by way of 
contrast, administrative controls on access to foreign exchange, instead of the exchange rate 
itself, became the major means to restrict imports.
The reform of the foreign exchange system in 1994 restored the role of exchange rate in 
adjusting trade flows. The most important aspect of this reform for import liberalisation was 
that the exchange rate has been elevated to one of the main market instruments based on the 
market forces. The unification of the dual exchange rate contained a large devaluation of 
the Renminbi. Usually, a real devaluation can help reduce quantitative restrictions, given 
that the devaluation makes imports more expensive in domestic currency (Thomas and Nash et 
al. 1991, pp. 157-158). In this sense, an appreciation of the exchange rate replaces the role of 
quantitative measures to restrict imports. However, providing the previously unrealistic 
exchange rate and the removal of excessive export incentives, such a devaluation of the 
Renminbi was by no means a discrimination against imports.
Access to Foreign Exchange
Controlling foreign exchange use for imports was an important means of import 
restriction in China. As a developing country, China has been short of foreign exchange and 
exercised rigid controls over the earnings and use of foreign exchange by state-owned 
enterprises. Most imports were subject to, besides import quotas, exchange quotas 
controlled in accordance with state-approved import plans. With the reforms of trade and 
foreign exchange systems, especially while the foreign exchange retention system was 
implemented throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, government controls over foreign 
exchange have been gradually released.
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As early as 1980, in some localities, companies with excess retained foreign exchange 
were allowed to sell it to other firms who sought access to foreign exchange to purchase 
imports outside the plan. In 1986, some foreign exchange adjustment centres (FEACs) were 
established for the convenience of selling and buying foreign exchange. However, access to 
FEACs was subject to approval by MOFTEC and/or other authorities. This meant that 
domestic enterprises could not freely get foreign exchange from the FEACs. Even for an 
enterprise which had obtained foreign exchange by retention or by swap in the FEACs, the 
use of foreign exchange was still subject to government import controls. The function of 
FEACs in support of import expansion was to aid enterprises which already had import 
plans (quotas) but lacked foreign exchange to realise their imports.
Such a situation was changed in 1988, when the rights of retaining foreign exchange 
were expanded for enterprises and the foreign exchange market was further liberalised. The 
number of FEACs was increased and opened to state-owned and collectively owned 
domestic enterprises as well as foreign-funded enterprises. In addition, quota controls on 
using retained foreign exchange were phased out in the same year. Enterprises became able 
to import goods without quota or licence requirements by using their retained foreign 
exchange. The transactions volume of foreign exchange via FEACs increased rapidly from 
US$6.3 billion in 1987 to US$25 billion in 1992 (World Bank 1994a, p. 32).
By 1994, the previous FER system was abolished and the dual exchange rate system 
was unified. Enterprises no longer bear the mandatory plans to turn over their foreign 
exchange earnings to the central government. Under a newly established system of 
settlement and sales of foreign exchange, enterprises could sell their foreign exchange to 
designated foreign exchange banks. An enterprise in need of foreign exchange can, by 
presenting an import contract or other relevant certificates, purchase foreign exchange at 
authorised foreign exchange bank. The bank would in turn sell all foreign exchange above a 
specified quota (agreed reserve of foreign exchange to be retained in authorised foreign 
exchange bank for banking operations) to the central bank via the China Foreign Exchange 
Swap Centre, thereby forming an inter-bank foreign exchange transaction market. In the 
first year after the Centre began its operation (from 4 April 1994 to March 1995), the 
Centre’s foreign exchange transaction volume reached US$56.8 billion (Li Rongxia 1996).
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With regard to foreign exchange usage, therefore, imports have now basically been freed of 
restrictions.
The latest reform measure was that, from 1 December 1996, China began, in accord 
with the obligation fixed in Clause 8 of International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement, to 
establish the convertibility of Renminbi on current account. This meant that all restraints on 
foreign payments and transactions for foreign economic activities, such as commodity 
imports, payment for services, return of foreign debt interests and the outward remittance of 
foreign investor’s profits, were removed {People’s Daily, overseas edition, 29/11/1996, 3/12/1996).
Over the past twenty years, China’s foreign exchange policy has fundamentally changed 
from the rigid restriction to the (partial) convertibility of domestic currency. Currency 
convertibility is essential to free trade between countries. The extent to which a currency 
can be converted into another reflects the degree to which an economy is integrated with the 
world. With a convertible currency, the linkage with the world markets provides the 
opportunities for the economy to make the maximum use of comparative advantage and 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation. Further, convertibility is a favourable 
condition in attracting FDI since it enables investors to avoid the risk of losses caused by 
the restraints of currency converting. In an economy like China where FDI has been 
important sources of development, demand for convertibility would naturally come from 
the foreign investors for repatriating their income in hard currency. Any control over 
foreign exchange in this sense would be obstacle to the inflows of foreign capital. 
Moreover, convertibility implies a stable financial environment to encourage trade 
expansion. Although international institutions like the IMF and GATT/WTO have no rule 
on full convertibility, the principles of free trade and national treatment have in fact 
included the requirement supporting the freedom for trade flows and capital movements.
It is worth noting that the realisation of the Renminbi7s convertibility was four years 
earlier than promised by China. This represented a reform of China’s foreign exchange 
system supporting trade liberalisation. China previously scheduled making the Renminbi 
convertible at the end of this century. The convertibility of domestic currency has been an 
important step in liberalisation. Over the reform period, the inconvertibility of the Renminbi 
attracted criticism from domestic and foreign economists. Undoubtedly, China’s financial
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system reform will accelerate the process of import liberalisation although full 
convertibility of the Renminbi will still take time.
5.2.3 Other Import Control Measures 
Import Planning and Trading Rights
Before reform, China’s foreign trade system implemented a mandatory plan for over 
3,000 commodities. It was only few national FTCs which had rights to trade with foreign 
countries. Thus, the mandatory planning of imports was at the heart of China’s previous 
system for controlling imports and was a serious barrier to trading partners’ access to 
China’s markets. Therefore, trade plans have been the focus of concern for China’s trading 
partners for a long time.
Following the decentralisation of trading rights, the scope of mandatory planning has 
been significantly reduced. Mandatory plans were replaced by a mixture of mandatory and 
guidance plans, and then market forces were introduced into the adjustment mechanism for 
imports. All importables were divided into three categories. Categories I and II, which were 
regarded as essential for national economic development and for people’s livelihood, were 
subject to import planning and were dealt with by a limited number of designated FTCs at 
national and provincial levels, while Category III was freely handled by any FTC. By 1992, 
plan-controlled import commodities were reduced to 11, accounting for 9.1% of all HS 
lines and 18.5% of total imports. Prices of import commodities were determined by the 
market in 95% of cases and by the State in 5% (Fan Baoqing 1994; World Bank 1994a, p.63).
China’s import plans were implemented with the assistance of canalisation of imports.
It is worthy of note that although the scope of planning was reduced to a minimum level, 
the canalisation of imports was still playing important role in import controls. The World 
Bank’s report (1994a) estimated there were about 32% of total imports under control through 
canalisation in 1992. Although the import plan system has been phased out in 1994, the 
trading enterprises were still under the supervision of their authorities, since these 
designated FTCs were state-owned enterprises which had tight administrative linkages with 
central or local governments. Enterprises had no rights to engage in importing trade 
following market signals and thus remained as government subordinates (Li Dongshen 1997). 
Governmental supervision has been functioning as import planning did before.
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Furthermore, administrative means were sometimes used to directly control the type and 
volume of imports.
As a result of the gradual devolution in foreign trade, enterprises with trading rights 
have increased to 9,206 (excluding foreign-funded enterprises) in 1995. Compared with 12 
before reform, the growth has been explosive. However, if the size of China’s economy is 
considered, this number is still insufficient. In 1995, there were about 45 million industrial 
and trade enterprises in China. This meant less than 1% have been granted trading rights.
Some more comments on trading rights are needed. The right to trade is one of the basic 
rights of an enterprise in a market economy. Trading with other economic units, 
domestically or internationally, is an effective means to maximise the profits of the 
enterprise. Since China’s reform effort was to develop market ingredients in the country (in 
the 1980s) and build a market economy (since the 1990s), the devolution of the previously 
centralised trading rights would have not been in question. However, because in China the 
transition of the economy was a gradual process, the granting of trading rights to localities 
and enterprises has been used as a policy for managing trade reform. Restraints on trading 
rights excluded the majority of the domestic enterprises from direct trade with foreign 
counterparts. Many opportunities selling products to and buying resources from the world 
markets have consequently been lost that might have enabled them to make efficient use of 
resources and improve productivity.
Of comse not every enterprise needs to trade with foreign companies directly. 
However, for large and medium sized enterprises, the availability of trading rights seems 
more important. A survey carried out by The Institute of Market Investigation of Renmin 
University in 1994 showed that, of 1,071 enterprises from nine industries, about two thirds 
of enterprises had no direct trading rights while those with trading rights accounted for only 
39.85%. Among the remaining 60.15% of enterprises, 28.03% claimed that the lack of 
trading rights was the biggest difficulty for the enterprise’s exports (Huang Guoxiong 1994).
More importantly, the trading rights granting system has obstructed fair competition. 
Enterprises without trading rights were in fact discriminated against. They had to obtain 
factors and sell products domestically and accept domestic prices, regardless of how 
attractive the conditions in the world markets were. Alternatively, they could trade with
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foreign counterparts indirectly via a trading agent by paying higher costs for covering the 
agent’s profits. Enterprises with trading rights did not face such problems. The differential 
treatment for different enterprises discouraged competition in both industrial sectors and the 
foreign trade sector. The consequences were losses in allocative efficiency and industrial 
productivity.
hi 1994, China committed itself to phasing out the trading rights granting system and 
adopting an auto-registration system in five years after its returning to GATT. In 1996, the 
WTO China Working Group approved a protocol on China’s trading rights. The transitional 
period was agreed at three years after China’s becoming the WTO member. This represents 
a positive step toward trade liberalisation.
Technological Standards
Another important aspect of import control arising in recent decades concerns technical 
standards, in both developed and developing countries. In some countries, the technical 
standards applied to imported products are extremely restrictive. Tong Jiadong (1994) cited 
from a report of the Trade Office of US Senate presented in 1993 that US has noted that 
China applied strict technical standards and requirements on imported products. For 
example, China requests a certificate showing the fertiliser content when agricultural 
products are imported. But the same rules are not applied to domestic products. Until 1997, 
the USTR has been criticising China for the maintenance of a statutory inspection 
requirement on imported goods. The major problems, cited by the USTR, “include the lack 
of transparency, difficulty in determining the appropriate standard, use of different 
standards on imports from different countries and different standards from domestic goods, 
and adoption of unique standards that differ from international standards for no identifiable 
reason” (USTR 1997).
Techno logical standards reflect the quality requirement of a country for ensuring the 
social security and economic order. It is not smprising that a country applies its prescribed 
inspection standards to import goods. In fact, most countries in the world have such a 
system. The real problem for China is that it should have a unitary, transparent 
technological standard system for both domestic and imported goods. It was also a 
precondition for providing foreign companies with national treatment which is considered 
as an important component of a neutral trade regime.
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5.3 E v a l u a t in g  C h in a ’s I m p o r t  L ib e r a l isa t io n
5.3.1 Effective Rate of Protection
A common method for evaluating the aggregate effects of import liberalisation is to 
measure the effective rate of protection (ERP) rather than looking only at nominal tariff 
rates. However, it is a very difficult task to measure and compare China’s real degree of 
protection, due to the distortion of China’s price system which has meant that 
internationally comparable data unavailable. Of the studies of China’s foreign trade, only a 
few have touched on this aspect.
The World Bank (1994a) provided an estimate of the effective rate of protection to 
Chinese industry based on 1991 data. Of the 16 industries covered in the World Bank’s 
estimate, the chemicals industry had veiy high effective rate of protection and 10 industries 
appeared to have negative value added at international prices. This suggests, 11 of the 16 
industries were highly protected while protection in other 5 industries were negative, 
although accurate measures of the degree of protection are not available in this 
estimation.[2]
Another estimate provides more detailed information for understanding the real degree 
of protection in China. Zhang Shuguang et ciL (1997) in their research project, sponsored by 
the US Institute for International Economics, measured the effective rate of protection in 25 
commodities based on carefully adjusted 1994 data.[3] The results of their estimate show 
that the effective rates of protection (tariff rate plus tariff equivalent of NTBs) in the 25 
commodities were varied, with the highest of 141.40% (sugar) and the lowest of 13.02% 
(micro-computer). The trade-weighted average rate of effective protection in 1994 was 
43.29%, consisting of 21.74% of adjusted tariff rate and 21.55% of tariff equivalent of 
NTBs. The ratio of imports to total supply (domestic products plus imported products) 
reached 35.96%, while the calculated value of total supply is above 1,500 billion Yuan.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the 1994 effective rate of protection in 
China with that of 1991, since the World Bank’s estimate lacks an estimate of average 
levels covering all measured industries. However, Zhang Shuguang et al. in their study 
compared China’s degree of protection with those of Japan and United States. A very
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important conclusion is that China’s effective rate of protection (43.29%) in 1994 was 
higher than that of the USA (35.2%, based on 21 products covering a total value of US$260 
billion) in 1990 but lower than Japan’s (178.2%, based on 5 large categories of products 
covering a total value of about US$442 billion) in 1989 (Zhang Shuguang et al. 1997). If this 
conclusion is correct, it is safe to say China’s market is more open than Japan’s. In addition, 
China’s import ratio (35.96% in 1994) was higher than those of the United States (21,21% 
in 1990) and Japan (11.7% in 1989), suggesting a considerably large proportion of China’s 
market open to foreign countries. This means, at least in the range concerned, China is 
highly dependent on world market supply. Opening up China’s market to the outside world 
is an important condition for China’s economic development.
5.3.2 Remaining Problems of China’s Import Liberalisation
China’s recent intensive effort in reducing import barriers has certainly been 
impressive. With regal'd to trade liberalisation, however, there are still some problems in 
China’s import policy. Of these the main ones are:
First, that import policy reform has lagged behind other trade policy reforms. In the first 
decade of reform, China’s emphasis was put on institutional adjustment (decentralisation) 
and the formation of export incentives (foreign exchange retention system and duty 
drawback system). Changes on import policies were either strictly limited to devolving the 
rights of import controls or simply to increasing restraints to imports. A typical example is 
the import licensing system. Since it was introduced in 1980, the number of imports subject 
to licences increased from 13 in 1980 to 53 in 1988 and the following several years. 
Devolving the rights of licence issuing had never meant relaxation of import controls. The 
real reduction of quantitative control over imports began in 1993/4 and continued in 1996. 
The tariff reductions began a little earlier than licensing system reform but had less 
significance on real import liberalisation because the effects of import tariffs were offset by 
numerous preferential tariff exemptions operative before 1996.
Second, adjustments in tariff policy have led to the restoration of a high tariff system in 
terms of real tariff rate, given that China’s real tariffs were extremely low due to the use of 
tariff exemptions. Tariff exemption policies adopted prior to 1996 made China’s real 
average tariff level much lower than the average nominal tariff rate. This means, 
theoretically, that China had the capacity for committing itself to larger tariff reductions. In
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fact, reducing the nominal tariff rate and bringing it closer to the level of the real tariff rate 
will not harm China’s tariff revenue, trade balance and import structure. Generally, tariff 
reduction may lead to an increase of imports. However, in China’s case, due to the 
implementation of preferential tariff policies, tariffs have been divided between nominal 
rates and real rates. Tariff reduction only refers to a decrease of nominal tariff rates. That is 
to say that the increase in concessional imports might be irrelevant to the reductions of 
nominal tariffs if the tariff concession structure remains unchanged. Only those imports 
which do not enjoy tariff exemptions would be stimulated by a tariff reduction. However, 
this group of imports was small and accoimted for only about 15% of total imports in 1995 
{Economic Daily 12/2/1996). In addition, of course, there would be a requirement to adjust the 
existing tariff structure. If the requirement of structural adjustment is taken into account, 
there would be the possibility of reducing the average tariff rate closer to the level of the 
real tariff.
The readjustment of tariff policies in 1996 seemed to restore the role of tariffs in import 
controls. If the 1996 policies are fully implemented, the distance between the average level 
of the real import tariff and the nominal tariff rate will be largely reduced. This implies an 
increase of barriers to imports, compared to the rates of actual collected tariffs.
Third, quantitative measures still cover a large number of imports. It was estimated that 
in 1992 NTBs (excluding foreign exchange controls) covered about 51.4% of total imports 
in China. Among these, 25.1% of total imports were subject to import licences (World Bank 
1994a, pp. 63, 65). Although two major reductions were undertaken in 1994 and 1996, there 
are at least 200 varieties of commodities still subject to import licensing. In addition, import 
quotas have never been published since it was regarded as commercially confidential. 
China’s promise is that she will publish all import quotas once she is allowed to enter the 
WTO (Wu Jiahuang 1996).
Finally, trading rights continue to be a policy instrument used to control trade flows. 
China insists on controlling imports by limiting the number of enterprises with access to 
foreign trade. There are two kinds of limitation. One is the canalisation system of trade in 
which certain number of import commodities, 12 in 1995 and 14 in 1997, are handled only 
by designated FTCs (Li Dongshen 1997). The other concerns whether or not an enterprise is 
allowed to operate foreign trade. At present, most industrial and commercial enterprises
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have no rights to engage in trade with foreign companies. The founding principle of the 
import and export agent system which was introduced in 1984 has not been enterprises’ 
requirement of balancing profits and costs, but the lack of direct trading rights. The award 
of trading rights has been used as a preferential treatment to favour certain enterprises. This 
process produced some negative results. First and foremost, the very fact that an 
enterprise’s trading rights are subject to administrative examination and approval, reflects 
the fact that government intervention over foreign trade still obstructs trade liberalisation. 
Another problem is that designated FTCs and other enterprises have in fact obtained a 
competitively advantageous position. Fair competition cannot be fully developed between 
enterprises with and those without trading rights. This situation undoubtedly contradicts 
principles of the market economy. Furthermore, the system of trading rights distribution, 
subject to administrative examination and approval, has reduced potential opportunities to 
conduct hade with foreign counterparts since many enterprises are not permitted to engage 
in international trade. Foreign companies regard the present trading rights system as one of 
the most significant obstacles to doing business in China and trading with Chinese 
enterprises (USITC 1997; USTR 1997). China has promised that it would grant trading rights to 
foreign and domestic firms in China (USITC 1997). Some Chinese economists have also 
called for the replacement of the trading rights granting system by a registration system (for 
example, see Wang Zixian 1997a). It is reported that such a registration system will be in effect 
before the year 2000 (Liu Xiangdong 1997). It seems the phasing-out of the trading rights 
granting system is one of the most important steps to liberalising China’s trade regime and 
trade policies.
In sum, China’s import policy reforms fall into two categories: One is the elimination or 
reduction of import barriers; the other is the establishment or normalisation of the import 
adjustment mechanism. Since 1991, China has taken a series of measures to adjust its 
import policies. Import barriers, especially tariffs, have been much reduced. In the mean 
time, with the development of domestic market systems, China has taken actions to 
establish a macroeconomic control system on the basis of market mechanisms.
[1] The trade forms o f  “inward processing with supplied materials” (Lai Liao Jia Gong), “inward assembling with 
supplied parts” (Lai Jian Zhnang Pei), “processing according to buyer’s samples” (Lai Yang Ma Gong) and 
“compensation trade” (Bn Chang M ao Yi) are briefly named San Lai Yi Bu ~  three “L o f’s and one “Bn” in Chinese.
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[2] ERP is simply defined as follows:
ERPj =  (VADj - VAW j) /  VAW j
where VAD equals value added in j  at domestic prices; VAW  equals value added in j  at world prices. For more details 
about the ERP method, see Krueger (1984), Greenaway (1988), and Naqvi and Kemal (1991, Chapter 2).
According to the ERP methodology, when value added at world prices is zero or negative, it implies an extremely high 
rate o f  protection. Therefore, the World Bank has an assessment in China’s case that the industries with negative value 
added at world prices would not appear to be able to survive under full trade liberalisation (World Bank 1994a, p. 75).
[3] Data adjustments involved factors including domestic price policies, import value-added taxes and consumption taxes, 
preferential tariff rates and tariff exemptions, exchange rates, value o f  processing trade, etc. to exclude the abnormal 
influences caused by these factors. For details, see Zhang Shuguang et al. (1997).
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6  Trade Policy Reform and Economic Development
Comparing China’s present trade system with that of some two decades ago, trade 
policy reform has certainly been fruitful. These reforms have effectively made China’s 
economy much more open and improved the nation’s capacity to participate in the world 
economy. The opening of the economy has in turn promoted economic growth. In this 
chapter, I intend to use some econometric methods, in addition to the preceding analyses 
provided, to evaluate the aggregate effects of trade policy reform in China.
6.1 G e n e r a l  E f f e c t s  o f  T r a d e  P o l ic y  R e f o r m
The effects of trade policy reform have been multi-faceted. At the forefront, China’s 
foreign trade has grown rapidly. Meanwhile, trade structure and competitiveness have been 
much improved. With the fast growth of foreign trade and sustained trade policy reform, the 
degree of openness of the economy has also been much enhanced.
6.1.1 Trade Expansion and Openness of the Economy
Statistics presented in Chapter 1 (Table 1.1) shows that China’s trade has grown rapidly 
in the reform period. In relative terms, the openness of the economy also increased. In fact, 
there exists a mutually reinforcing between trade growth and the economic openness.
In order to carry on the discussion, two features of China’s hade growth are worth 
noting. First, China’s foreign trade has been following on a favourable trend of 
development since the beginning of trade reform. Both exports and imports have expanded 
at a rapid pace. The average annual growth rates of exports and imports during this period 
were in the top range in the world. The basic reason behind the rapid growth has been the 
dramatic opening of the country to foreign trade and investment. The opening-up of the 
economy has led to positive policies encouraging the development of foreign trade in 
keeping up with the tide of increasing international interdependence.
Second, the growth rate of foreign trade has fluctuated over time. Figure 6.1 compares 
the growth rates of GDP, exports and imports. To exclude the effects of inflation, values of
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GDP in constant 1990 prices are used. Correspondingly, real exports and imports are 
obtained by adjusting the published figures in US dollars with the US CPI (1990=100). As 
can be seen, while the annual growth rate of GDP during 1979-1997 changed between 5% 
and 15%, the real export growth fluctuated in a larger range from minus 2% to 34% and 
that of real imports fell in the range between minus 15% and 50%. The growth of GDP was 
relatively more stable than that of exports and imports. This in fact implies that the growth 
of exports and imports were affected, in addition to the overall changes of the nation’s 
general economic policies, by the changes in policies specific to trade.
Figure 6.1 Growth Rates o ff
GDP (1990 price)
50 -
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Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996b. 1997b): Wen Wei Po  12/1/1998; C hina’s Scholars Abroad, 9/1/1998,
Although with obvious fluctuation in growth rates, the quick expansion of foreign trade 
indicated that China has been rapidly connecting itself with the world economy. Before 
reform, most products produced by Chinese enterprises were sold domestically, since 
exports accounted for a small proportion of GDP (or GNP). The opening-up of the economy 
changed such a situation. According to a survey of 1,071 industrial enterprises in 1994, the 
proportion of enterprises whose products were sold entirely in the domestic market was 
only 23.28% (Huang Guoxiong 1994). This suggested more than three-quarters of enterprises 
have links to the external markets directly or indirectly. At the nation-wide level, the ratio 
of foreign trade to GDP increased from 9.79% in 1978 to 46.12% in 1994 (36% in 1997). 
The ratio of exports to GDP has reached about 20% in recent years. On the other hand, 
trade liberalisation also led to a rapid increase of imports, both for production expansion 
and to supplement domestic markets. The share of imports to GDP rose from 5.2% in 1978 
to 22.54% in 1994 and dropped to 15.76% in 1997.
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Table 6,1 China’s Ratio o f Foreign Trade to GDP (%)
1978 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Ratio o f exports to GDP 4.62 6.06 9.49 16.59 18.58 18.49 16.70 23.58 21.37 18.73 20.23
Ratio o f imports to GDP 5.17 6.68 14.77 14.21 16.50 17.53 18.93 22.54 18.96 16.77 15.76
Ratio o f foreign trade to GDP 9.79 12.75 24.25 30.78 35.07 36.01 35.63 46.12 40.33 35.50 36.00
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996b, 1997b); Wen Wei P o  12/1/1998; China's Scholars Abroad, 9/1/1998.
These ratios gave an impression that China’s economy has been closely integrated with 
the world markets. In some ways, this is correct, since a large portion of economic activities 
was linked to foreign trade and all data in the table are statistically correct according to 
China’s current statistical standards. On the other hand, however, there are some problems 
in using these ratios to estimate China’s real degree of openness. These problems involve 
the overestimation of foreign trade and underestimation of GDP (or GNP), due to the 
inappropriate range of statistical indicators, unrealistic exchange rates and the special 
pattern of China’s foreign trade {China Economic Times, 11/8/1995; Zhu Lilian 1995).
Measuring China’s GDP (or GNP) in terms of US dollars has become an important 
issue in evaluating Chinese economy, particularly since 1993 when the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) presented a new estimate of China’s GNP {World Economic Outlook
1993). For a long time, the World Bank has been using an Atlas method^ to estimate GNP 
per capita for economies which were covered by the World Development Report, dividing 
them into three groups: low-income, middle-income and high-income economies. By the 
Atlas method, China’s 1990 GNP per capita was US$370.
However, some economists, and the World Bank itself as well, have realised that the 
Atlas method associated with exchange-rate conversion estimate has some shortcomings 
which limit comparability between coun tries.T o  improve the comparability of the data 
across countries, some economists have used the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) method to 
estimate the real level of China’s GDP. The World Bank also began to provide an 
alternative estimate by using the PPP method. Lardy (1994) analysed some estimates and 
came to the conclusion that “China’s real per capita income in 1990 is about three times the 
exchange rate-based estimate —  something around US$1,100 per capita”. That is to say that 
“China’s 1990 GNP would be $1.25 trillion” (Lardy 1994, p. 18). In World Development 
Report 1996, the PPP estimate of China’s 1990 GNP per capita was US$1,000 (World Bank
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1996, p. 2), close to Lardy’s estimate. The reason for previous underestimation of China’s 
GNP (or GDP), as Lardy points out, is that “the Chinese currency depreciated significantly 
during the 1980s. In 1980 the exchange rate averaged 1.5 Yuan per dollar; by 1990 the 
average rate was 4.8 Yuan, The depreciation cut the World Bank’s estimate of per capita 
GNP by two-thirds” (Lardy 1994, p. 14).
Chapter 4 analysed that processing trade accounts for a large proportion of China’s total 
trade. Because of the special requirement of inward processing, the relevant imports and 
exports (processing trade) cannot be regarded as an indicator of the openness of the 
economy. Therefore, to measure the real degree of China’s openness in trade, it is necessary 
to apply an appropriate adjustment to related indicators. Zhu Lilian (1995) developed an 
approach, including borrowing the PPP method1^  to estimate China’s GDP or GNP, 
excluding the value of service trade and using net export value of processing and 
compensation trade, to correct for factors causing overestimation or underestimation.
Regarding this approach, it is understandable that processing trade should receive 
special attention. But, only taking net exports of processing trade into account may also 
lead to underestimate of foreign trade. Apart from net exports which reflects the value- 
added in the processing industries, what should also be included are imports of machinery 
and equipment, which indicate the increase of production capacity in processing industries. 
Although a complete set of data for all years is difficult to obtain, it can be roughly 
estimated by applying a nation-wide ratio of equipment imports to total imports (in 1996, 
this ratio was 17.9%), assuming processing industries had the same ratio of equipment 
imports. By such adjustments, the value of raw materials and intermediate products flows 
for processing trade could be excluded fi*om total trade and the remaining figures could be 
considered as general trade. Further, adopting PPP estimates of GNP also could be a means 
of correcting the underestimation of GNP caused by the unrealistic exchange rates. 
However, in order to conform with international common practice, it is not necessary to 
exclude the tertiary industry from GNP. China’s real degree of openness to trade during 
1991-1995 is recalculated as in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 The Real Degree o f China’s Openness in Trade (US$ billion; %)
PPP  
estimates 
o f  GNP "
National 
exports & 
imports
Ratio o f foreign  
trade to GNP  
(PPP)
Processing  
trade (exports 
& imports)
Equipm ent 
imports in 
processing trade
Net exports 
o f  processing  
trade
Real degree of 
openness in 
trade 0
1991 1,660 135.63 8.17 51.49 9.22 7.44 6.07
1992 2,220 165.53 7.46 71.12 12.73 7.09 5.10
1993 2,504 b 195.70 7.82 80.60 14.43 8.28 5.50
1994 2,986 236.62 7.92 104.54 18.71 8.31 5.33
1995 3,505 280.85 8.01 132.07 23.64 15.31 5.36
Note; a\ Based on World Bank data.
b : Estimated by the author, based on the average o f implied PPP exchange rates in 1992 (US$1 = 
RM B1.20) and 1994 (US$1 = RMB 1.56). 
c: Degree o f  openness =  {(national exports & imports - processing exports & imports +  equipment imports 
in processing trade + net exports o f  processing trade) / PPP estimates o f  GNP} * 100%.
Source: World Bank (1994b, 1996, 1997); State Statistical Bureau (1996b); Yang Shengming et al. (1996).
The ratio of foreign trade to GNP(PPP) around 8% in 1991-1995 seems a reasonable 
indicator of China’s integration into the world economy, compared to the nominal degree of 
openness (ratio of foreign trade to GDP or GNP). If, as some authors suggested, China’s 
GDP would have to be raised two or three times to bring the export (foreign trade) ratio 
within the normal range (Gamaut and Huang 1995, p. 15), most of the ratios shown in Table 6.1 
would be much lower. For example, if GDP in 1978 was doubled, the ratio of foreign trade 
to GDP in the year would be lower than 5%. Considering the ratio in the 1990s were around 
8%, the implicit conclusion is that China has increased its dependence on international 
markets. However, the differences between the ratio of foreign trade to GNP(PPP) and the 
real degree of openness suggest that there were about a quarter to one-third of the ratio of 
foreign trade to GNP(PPP), instead of the near' half in the nominal ratio (Table 6.1), should 
be attributed to the development of processing trade.
6.1.2 The Improvement of Competitiveness
China’s openness toward the outside world increased the importance of the world 
market to the economy. The reduction of trade barriers meant the opportunities for foreign 
companies to access to China’s markets and for Chinese products to enter the world market. 
This situation, on the other hand, also meant that most Chinese enterprises and trading 
companies have had to face intensive competition in both domestic and overseas markets. 
The introduction of foreign competition helped in improving the efficiency of Chinese 
enterprises and trading companies. The competitiveness of Chinese export commodities, 
from an aggregate viewpoint, has been enhanced through the reform period. But the 
changes varied from sector to sector, and from product to product.
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The Change of Export Structure
Before reform, China’s exports were dominated by primary products. This situation was 
changed after the end of 1970s, with the impact of reform and openness. Although China’s 
trade policies have not yet allowed the enhancement of export structure to be the first 
priority, trade policy reform or liberalisation has in fact promoted the improvement of 
export composition.
The share of manufactured exports has exceeded that of primary exports since 1981, 
although labour-intensive manufactured exports accounted for a large part of it. With the 
rapid growth of industrial production and the increasing importance of technological 
progress for economic growth, the proportion of manufactured exports in total exports also 
increased. Of the total exports, the exports of manufactures (SITC 5-8 less 68) increased 
from 47.5% in 1980 to 85.6% in 1996, while primary exports (SITC 0-4 plus 68) dropped 
from 51.3% to 14.4% in the same period.
With regal'd to manufactured exports, the tendency has been to develop high value- 
added manufactures instead of labour-intensive products. For example, exports of 
mechanical and electrical products, which have a relatively higher ability to increase 
foreign exchange earning and have a bigger impetus spurring on the development of 
industry, have grown rapidly since reform (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3 Exports of Textile, Mechanical and Electrical Products (US$ billion)
1978 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Textiles & textile articles* 
M echanical & electrical
n.a.
0.65
3.80
1.41
5.08
1.67
6.90
2.48
9.20
3.80
10.88
6.16
12.63 13.30 
8.32 11.09
16.23 24.62 26.06 35.55 37.97 37.03 
14.12 19.55 22.70 32.00 43.86 48.21
*; Figures prior to 1992 include exports o f  textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles o f  textile materials, and articles 
o f  apparel and clothing accessories. Figures since 1992 refer to HS section XI (Textiles and textile articles). 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1992, 1995); State Planning Committee (1997).
The exports of textile products during 1980-1996 increased about 8.74 times, at an 
average annual growth rate of 15.29%. By comparison, the value of mechanical and 
electrical exports in 1996 was 34.19 times of that in 1980, growing at an average annual 
growth rate of 24.70%. China adopted a number of policy measures to promote 
manufactured exports. The growth of manufactured exports was the result of these 
preferential trade policies toward manufacturing sectors. In 1995, exports of mechanical 
and electrical products for the first time exceeded textile exports and became China’s
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largest category of exports. The ratio of machinery and electrical exports in total 
manufactured exports increased from 12.4% in 1985 to 37.33% in 1996.
The change in export structure, as a result of improvement of the domestic economic 
structure, reflected the positive effect of China’s industrialisation effort. On the other hand, 
the increase in manufactured exports also showed that the external competitive ability of 
Chinese manufactured export has been greatly strengthened. This suggested that the 
China’s pattern of participating in the international economy has been changing, from a 
supplier of primary goods to a competitive supplier of manufactured exports in the world 
markets. However, in order to see to what extent China has changed its export structure, we 
now need to identify the sources of changes in export structure and the improvement in 
comp etitiveness.
China’s Comparative Advantage
For the purpose of measuring a country’s comparative advantage and trade 
performance, a commonly adopted approach is to construct an index of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) which was firstly developed by Balassa (1965) in the 1960s. 
RCA is defined as the share of country z’s exports in world trade of product j  divided by 
that country’s share of world trade, as showing in the following equation:
RAQj = (X0/ X tJ) /  (Xiw / X nv)  (6-1)
where X y  is the exports of commodity j  by country z; Xy is world total exports of 
commodity j; X iw is total exports of country z; X lw is world total exports. If country Vs share 
of world exports of commodity j  (Xy / Xy) is greater than country’s share of world total 
exports, then RCAy > 1 and a comparative advantage is revealed (Ballance 1988; Greenaway and 
Milner 1993).
In addition to the above equation, a net export index can also be calculated to show a 
country’s trade performance. This index is to measure the net exports as a percentage of 
total trade. The equation is:
NXy = (Xy - My) /  (Xy + Mjj) ( - \ < N X y < l )  (6-2)
where NXy refer to net exports index of country i in commodityy, Xy  and My  are country z’s 
export and import values of commodity j  respectively. The range of the NX index will be
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valid between -1 and 1. The closer to 1 the NX index is, the greater comparative advantage 
the commodity has.
Yeats ( 1 9 9 1 )  computed China’s RCA indices in the period of 1965-1987 and concluded 
that China has a revealed comparative advantage in a relatively broad range of labour- 
intensive products. Cheng Huifang (1 9 9 5 )  also calculated China’s aggregate RCA indices 
during 1953-1990 which shows China’s primary exports had revealed comparative 
advantage until the late 1980s, while manufactured exports have developed revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA index exceeded unity) thereafter.N ote  that there was a 
turning point of China’s revealed comparative advantage in the late 1980s, as suggested by 
Cheng Huifang’s result. Yeats’ study only covered the period prior to the turning point. 
Therefore, it is necessaiy to see whether China’s revealed comparative advantage has 
changed since the 1990s. I computed China’s RCA indices for the period of 1990-1995. 
The results at aggregate levels are listed in Table 6.4 (More detailed results at two- and 
three-digit levels can be seen in Appendix Table at the end of this thesis).
Table 6.4 Indices of China’s RCA and Trade Performance (1990,1995)
SITC Description China's Exports China's
Imports
W orld Exports RCA NX Index
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995
0-4 (+68) Primary exports 16.483 23.417 10.432 24.737 913.287 1114.216 0.99 0.70 0.22 -0,03
5-8 (-68) Manufactured exports 33,983 126.156 33.923 106.648 2422.023 3737.989 0.77 1.12 0.001 0.08
0 and 1 Food, beverages & tobacco 6.951 11.323 3.492 6.525 296.463 408.916 1.29 0.92 0.33 0.27
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 3.537 4.375 4.107 10.158 164.396 215.418 1.19 0.68 -0.07 -0.40
3 Lubricants & related materials 5.237 5.335 1.272 5.127 363.995 359.537 0.79 0.49 0.61 0.02
4 Animal & vegetable oils, fats & waxes 0.161 0.454 0.982 2.601 13.336 25.712 0.67 0.59 -0,72 -0.70
5 Chemicals and related products 3.73 9.904 6.648 17.3 303.531 473.406 0.68 0.70 -0.28 -0.27
7 Machinery & transport equipment 5.588 31.391 16.845 52.638 1208.731 1925.093 0.25 0.54 -0.50 -0.25
6 and 8 Other manufactured articles 25.262 86.791 11.009 37.036 984.858 1444.123 1.41 2.00 0.39 0.40
Note: Values o f  world exports and China’s exports and imports are in US$ millions.
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b); MOFTEC (1997); State Planning Committee 
(1997); United Nations (1993, 1996, 1997)
Several points are worth noting from the changes of China’s RCA indices in the 1990s. 
First, at the aggregate level, the results confirmed the tendency suggested by Cheng 
Huifang’s calculation of RCA indices for primary exports to have been declining since the 
1980s and turning to a comparative disadvantage in the 1990s, while a revealed 
comparative advantage has been developed in manufactured exports. By 1995, revealed 
comparative advantage remained in only a few primary products, such as silk (SITC 261,
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RCA 33.65), crude fertiliser and minerals (27, 2.30; crude fertilisers, 271, 1.09), live 
animals for food (001, 1.59), non-alcoholic beverages (111, 1.75) and tobacco (121-122, 
1.42). Instead, the RCA index of manufactured products increased from 0.77 in 1990 to 
1.22 in 1995, The enhancement of RCA in manufactures reflects China’s industrialisation 
efforts since reform.
Second, Yeats’ conclusion that China’s revealed comparative advantage lies in labour- 
intensive manufactures has remained the case in the 1990s. Typical examples of labour- 
intensive manufactures with RCA index larger than unity in 1995 include textile articles 
(SITC 658, RCA 6.73), travel goods (831, 6.59), cotton fabrics (652, 5.48), toys and sport 
goods (894, 5.24), clothing and accessories (84, 4.93), wood manufactures (635, 2.12), 
textile yam (651, 2.14), plastic articles (893, 1.77), furniture and relative parts (821, 1.31). 
Relative trade performance indices (NX indices) were also favourable for most of these 
products. Such a structure of China’s RCA is consistent with its abundant labour force and 
low level industrialisation.
Third, however, there was a favourable tendency in the changes of China’s RCA: RCA 
indices of some relatively higher value-added products have rapidly increased in the 1990s. 
For example, the RCA index of office machines (SITC 751) increased from 0.76 in 1990 to 
1.82 while optical instruments (SITC 871) increased from 0.36 to 1.36, emerging as a 
comparative advantage product. For some other products, whilst not yet proving 
internationally competitive, have had their revealed comparative disadvantage significantly 
reduced in the same period. Examples involve automatic data processing equipment (SITC 
752, from 0.08 to 0.62) and medical instrument (SITC 872, from 0.16 to 0.34). If this trend 
can be sustained and extended to other relatively higher value-added and high-tech 
products, China’s export structure will be certainly improved.
From the above RCA analysis, the conclusion that China has successfully improved its 
export structure and its international competitiveness could be reached. This conclusion 
may also be proven by checking up the share of China’s exports in foreign markets. For 
example, in the United States and Japan, both are China’s major export markets, the shares 
of many China’s export products have expanded. Lloyd and Toguchi (1996), by performing 
a constant market share (CMS) analysis, shows that the shares of imports of these two 
countries from China for almost all manufactures (two-digit manufacturing industries)
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significantly increased in the period of 1980-1993 and the improvement of competitiveness 
became the dominant factor for the market share expansion. By using newer data, it was 
also shown to be the case that China’s exports to these two markets grew fast. In 1990- 
1996, China’s share in United States total imports increased from 3.1% to 6.65% while the 
share of imported manufactures from China increased from 3.9% of US total imports of 
manufactures to 7.32%. In the same period, China’s share in Japanese total imports 
expanded from 5.1% to 11.58% while the share of imported manufactures from China 
increased from 5.7% of Japanese total imports of manufactures to 14.0% (WTO 1995, 1997). 
Interestingly, prior to China, no other country has captured a proportion of more than 10% 
of Japan’s manufactured imports except the United States. Undeniably, the improvement of 
competitiveness has been the most important factor promoting China’s growth of exports. 
The increase of China’s exports to the markets of industrial countries suggests that, by and 
large, China’s manufactured exports have been internationally competitive.
6.2 T r a d e  P o l ic y  R e f o r m  a n d  T r a d e  P e r f o r m a n c e
The goal of trade policy reform is of course, based on the assumption that trade could 
contribute to (or lead to) economic growth, to improve a country’s trade performance in 
order to promote economic growth. For a reforming country, however, it is logically 
necessary to examine the effects of trade policy reform before testing the relations between 
trade and economic growth. In this section, therefore, the task is to discuss the relations 
between trade policy changes and trade performance, referring to the case of China.
6.2.1 The Methodology and Data 
Cointegration Analysis
The Engle-Granger cointegration analysis method is adopted here. The principle of 
cointegration analysis is that two (or more) non-stationary time series are cointegrated if 
there is a linear combination of them that is stationary (Engle and Granger 1987). This is to say, 
there exists a long-run relationship between the two time series. Cointegration analysis 
consists of the following two steps:
(1) Unit root test. A time series is said to be integrated of order one (i.e., 1(1)) if its first 
difference becomes stationary. This time series has a unit root. All time series to be tested 
for cointegration need to be 1(1). To check for the existence of a unit root, we usually 
employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test in the form
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Ay, = a 0 + a xt + a 2y t_l + '£ a 3lAyt_l +ut (6-3)
/= i
where Ay,=y, - yhl is the first difference of time series Yt which is to be tested for unit root; t 
is the time fiend; ut is the error term and k is number of lag tenn(s) used, Hypothesis test 
will be earned out as H0: 0 ,2  = 0 against Hi: ai < 0. A negative, significant /-value for 0 .2  
will reject the hypothesis of unit root (i.e., Ho: 0 ,2  -  0) in the series Yt and imply that Yt is 
stationary rather than integrated.
(2) Cointegration test. If two time series are integrated of the same order,^ the 
cointegrating regression can be run to seek the relation between them. For example, 
whether there is a cointegrating relationship between exports and exchange rate can be 
estimated by regressing exports on exchange rate. In a logarithmic form, the equation is
LX, = j30 + 1BjLEERX, + v, (6-4)
where LX, and LEERX, denote the natural logarithms of exports and effective exchange 
rate respectively, while v, refers to error term.
Based on the regression results, if the cointegration relationship exists between the two 
time series, an error correction model (ECM) is called for to test their long-run casual 
relationship. The general form of the ECM for the above regression can be expressed as:
Ji Til
ALXt = 0O + 6 lecm,_l + 0 2 + 2 ^ 3 ,/A LEERXt_j + e, (6-5)
/= !  M
where ecm,_, is the lagged residuals (i.e., error-correction term v,) obtained from the 
cointegrating regression; et is the new error term while n and m are the numbers of lags 
used. It is said that there should be a causal relationship between two variables if they are 
cointegrated. The ECM provides additional long-run information, through the error 
correction term, for identifying this Granger causality. In this ECM regression, a 
statistically significant 0, (that is, 0, is obviously unequal to zero) suggests that exchange 
rate Granger cause exports. This is to say that exchange rate as a trade-related policy has 
effects on export growth.
Econometric computations for the cointegration analysis in this thesis were carried out 
by using an econometric software Microfit 4.0 (M. Pesaran and B. Pesaran 1997, OUP).
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Implications and Data
Trade performance (growth of exports and imports) could be affected by a wide range 
of trade and trade-related policies. In the case of China, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
these policies involved subsidies, exchange retention, duty drawback, pricing, tariffs, 
quotas and licensing, exchange rates, and so on. All these policies were likely to have their 
influence on trade growth. However, given the fact that there is a lack of sufficient 
published information, especially data on trade restrictions, it is difficult for researchers to 
investigate the relationships between trade policy reform and trade growth in China.
Fortunately, the above described cointegration analysis has provided an approach to 
examine the effects of trade or trade-related policies on trade growth. But there are two 
things which need to be determined before applying the cointegration analysis to the case of 
China. First, what kind of cointegration test can be done? A fact of China’s trade policy 
reform is that many policy measures were temporary, with frequent launching and phasing- 
out. More importantly, data related to these polices have rarely been published. It is 
impossible to construct a complete data set covering all these aspects. Although techniques 
for multivariate cointegration analysis are now available, the lack of data led to the decision 
that only bivariate cointegration analysis be undertaken in this study.
Second, what will be the basic variables to use in the cointegration test? The strategy for 
performing integration analysis here is to establish a bivariate model as a basic model and 
treat other policies as dummy variables for the specific years, when they took effect, so as 
to evaluate their influences. Obviously, while export growth is certainly the dependent 
variable, the most suitable independent variable is the exchange rate because of the 
availability of information and its special position in China’s trade policy system.
Although China’s original decision for economic opening was made in 1978, trade and 
related policy changes actually took effect after 1979. Consequently, exports began a new 
period of high growth and the exchange rate experienced a turning point going from 
appreciation to devaluation. Although the study focused on the post-1978 period, data used 
in the present cointegration analysis has been extended by three years prior to 1979, in 
order to include the 1979 turning point as a policy change in a continuous process of 
development. That is, data used for modelling covers the period between 1976 and 1997.
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Export and import data are from China’s official statistics as in Table 1.1 of Chapter 1. 
Exchange rate data are somewhat complicated. A handy set of data is the nominal exchange 
rates available from official statistical source. However, in a multiple exchange rate system, 
which was the case for China between 1980 and 1993, the nominal exchange rates were not 
always effective for foreign trade activities. Apart from the nominal exchange rate, some 
other forms of exchange rate existed, including “internal settlement exchange rate” and 
“swap exchange rate” or “adjustment exchange rate”. The co-existence of dual (or multiple) 
exchange rates, together with other trade policies, resulted in different effective exchange 
rates for exporters (EERX) and importers (EERm).
To examine the effects of exchange rate on exports, and/or imports, the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) is usually preferred by researchers because it reflects the actual 
devaluation or appreciation of the exchange rate. The standard method for computing 
REER is given by
REER = RER *(1 +tMrtEf+n+p+s+r) = EER *(PS/PU) (6-6)
while the real exchange rate (RER) and EERs can be constructed as:
RER = eltoll*(PVP‘() (6-7)
EER* = e*(l-ta+s+r) (6-8)
EER„, = em*(l+tMI+n+p) (6-9)
where enom is official (nominal) exchange rate (OER) in effect or applied exchange rate 
(AER); ex and em are the exchange rates applied to exporters and importers respectively; tEi 
and tMi are tariffs imposed on exports and imports respectively; s is export subsidies while r 
refers to other export incentives; n is import surcharges while p  refers to other import 
restrictions. P$/Pd is the relative prices index as US CPI to domestic CPI (Edwards 1989a, p. 7; 
Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995, p, 214).
It is inappropriate, for the reason mentioned above, to use the official nominal exchange 
rate to calculate China’s REER. Instead, China’s REER needs to be constructed following a 
multiple-step process which contains (1) compiling the AERs for exports and imports, (2) 
estimating EERs, and (3) calculating REER. While constructing the applied exchange rate,
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the fact was that this rate was the mixed one which combined both the official (not always 
the nominal but also the one called “internal”) exchange rate and the “swap rate”. This was 
achieved by a weighted combination of the official nominal rate and the swap rate. The 
weights of the swap rate were determined as 0.28 for 1980-1986, 0.44 for 1987-1990 and 
0.80 for 1991-1993.[6] Official nominal rates were taken for 1976-1979 and 1994-1997. 
Regarding the estimation of EERs, export taxes can be ignored because they were rarely 
used and had almost no effect on EERX. Besides this, what can be done here is to include 
subsidies in EERX and tariffs in EERm while other factors have to be omitted, due to the 
lack of information. Finally, EERX and EERm were combined with weights of exports and
(p j
imports to form an aggregate EER. Then, EER was adjusted with PTP index to form 
China’s REER. Note that China has only published the data of general consumer prices 
index for the period since 1985. To cover a longer period, there is only a set of CPI in urban 
areas available. However, the difference of figures between the general CPI and the urban 
CPI are quite large, in some compatible years urban CPI was 20% higher than the general 
CPI. Thus there is a danger that the use of urban CPI data is likely to undermine China’s 
REER and affect the results of the cointegrating regressions. Another weakness may be that 
the constructed REER has not included non-tariff factor. But in the sense of evaluating the 
effects of exchange rate policy on foreign trade it is necessary to measure the effects of 
REER on trade.
Nonetheless, given the nature of the above process of data construction, regressing 
exports or imports on these different exchange rates separately can just show the effects of 
related policy. For example, the difference between the nominal and applied rates was the 
function of the swap rate, acting as “other incentive” (r) to exporters and as “import 
surcharge” (n) to importers, implying the effects of the foreign exchange retention policy. 
Similarly, the difference between the applied rate and EERs demonstrated the effects of 
subsidies on exports (5) and tariffs on imports
6.2.2 Results of the Cointegration Test
Following the proposed procedure, the stationarity of each series has been tested for by 
applying Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test for unit root. Critical values are obtained 
from running Microfit 4.0 in which the 95% critical values (01* say, at 5% significance level) 
are computed in the process of ADF test, for any sample size, using the response surface
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estimates given in Mackinnon (1991). The results given in Table 6.5 display the statistical 
properties for each series. The levels of all series are nonstationary. That ADF statistics are 
significant for the first-difference series suggests all these series appear to be 1(1) and 
cointegrating relationships may exist between appropriate variables.
Table 6.5 Unit Root Tests for Variables of Trade and Exchange Rate
Variables Levels F irst difference
(in logarithms) Test statistic Feature o f  test Critical value Test statistic Feature o f  test Critical value
LX -1.0149 Y, N, 1 -3.0199 -3.2642 Y, N, 1 -3.0294
LM -1.9041 Y. N, 1 -3.0199 -4.2412 Y, N, 1 -3.0294
LOER -0.1292 Y, N, 1 -3.0199 -3.2365 Y,N , 1 -3.0294
LAER -0.7121 Y,N, 1 -3.0199 -3.6341 Y,N, 1 -3.0294
LEERX -0.8229 Y, N, 1 -3.0199 -4.2367 Y, N, 1 -3.0294
LEERM -1.0796 Y.N, 1 -3.0199 -3.9258 Y, N, 1 -3.0294
LX -3.2372 Y, Y, 2 -3.6746 -5.4399 Y, Y, 4 -3.7347
LM -3.4062 Y, Y, 2 -3.6746 -4.3113 Y, Y, 1 -3.6746
LREER -1.5403 Y, Y, I -3.6592 -4.3973 Y, Y, 1 -3.6746
Note: Feature o f  test indicates whether intercept, time trend and lags have been used in the ADF regression, 
marked as Y  for included, N  for excluded and numbers for lag(s) in use.
As explained earlier, the constructed data for exchange rates contain different 
information of trade policies. Cointegrating regressions have therefore been run by 
regressing exports (LX) on nominal exchange rate (LOER), actual exchange rate applied to 
exports and/or imports (LAER), effective exchange rate for exporters (LEERX) and real 
effective exchange rate (LREER) separately. Similar regressions have also been perfonned 
by regressing imports (LM) on different exchange rates (effective exchange rate is 
LEERM). Regression results are given in the left part of Table 6.6.
Looking at the results of cointegrating regressions, a preliminary conclusion is 
suggested. That is, there was a significant exchange rate influence on exports and imports. 
For example, the coefficients in equation 6-15 show that every 1% change of EER for 
exporters (devaluation) induced change of exports (increase) of 1.68% in the sample period. 
For all equations, the R2 and R-bar-squared statistics are good, suggesting that more than 
two-third of export growth can be explained by exchange rate changes. However, a 
common feature of these regressions is that the Durbin-Watson statistics are low. The 
relations between exchange rate and exports/imports expressed in the above equations need 
to be further confirmed, by applying the ADF regression to test the stationarity of residuals. 
Since the residuals must have zero mean and no time trend, the ADF test for residuals is to
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regress the change in the residuals on its own lag and a lagged difference term(s). 
Specifically, equation of the ADF test for residuals is written as:
k
Au, = c r + fj,t (6-10)
f= i
where u denotes the residuals from the cointegrating regressions while ju is the new error 
term of this regression. To confirm the relations between exchange rate and exports/imports 
as in the estimated equations, two criteria need to be achieved. The first is that the new error 
term is necessarily led close to white noise (i.e., DW statistic « 2), proving the removal of 
residual autocorrelation. The other is the (-value for coefficient of lagged residuals (ci) 
needs to be greater than the ADF critical value, showing the stationarity of the residuals.
Table 6.6 Cointegrating Regressions
Cointegrating Equations O ther Statistics Stationarity Test for Residuals Other Statistics
(1-statistics in parentheses) R2 RBS DW (/-statistics in parentheses) RBS DW F
LX= 1.81 +1.50 LOER 
(10.96) (12.33)
0.88 0.88 0.41 4**, = -0.49**,./ + 0.494**,./ 
(-4.03) (3.19)
0.53 2.27 22.71 (6-11)
LM= 1.93 + 1.41 LOER 
(11.00) (10.92)
0.86 0.85 0.52 Alii = -0.65 iit-i + 0.32 Au,.] 
(-4.67) (2.11)
0.54 2.07 22.90 (6-12)
LX= 1.52+ 1.55LAER 
(9.46) (14.35)
0.91 0.91 0.82 Ait, = -0.80**,./ + 0.434**,./ 
(-3.86) (2.27)
0.42 2.20 14.55 (6-13)
L M -  1,66 + 1A6LAER 
(9.47) (12.44)
0.89 0.88 0.85 Au, = -0.91 **,./ + 0.544!*,./ 
(-5.63) (3.64)
0.63 2.58 33.28 (6-14)
L X -  1.35 + 1.68LEERX 
(9.69) (17.75)
0.94 0,94 0.77 Ait, = -0.78**,./ + 0.564**,./ 
(-4.45) (3.35)
0.53 2.06 22.27 (6-15)
LM=  1.32 + 1.65LEERX! 
(8.67) (16.35)
0.93 0.93 0.99 4**, = -1.02 u,-i + 0.644**,./ 
(-6.49) (4.62)
0.70 2.59 45.18 (6-16)
L X - 0.79 + 2.05LREER 
(1.84) (6.88)
0.70 0.69 0.28 Au, = -0.10*/,./+ 0.274*/,./- 
(-0.56) (1.02)
- 0.034*/,.2 
(-0.10)
-0.08 2.02 0.33 (6-17)
LM=  0.89 + 2.QQLREER 
(2.25) (7.30)
0.73 0.71 0.49 Au, = -0.22**,./ + 0.284**,./ - 
(-0.97) (1.14)
- 0.194**,. 2 
(-0.72)
0.07 2.09 1.64 (6-18)
Note: RBS =  R-bar-squared. Significance level is 5% except equations 6-17 and 6-18.
The results of residuals tests given in the right part of Table 6.6 show that the long-run 
relationships have not been found between REER and exports/imports. The reason may be 
that the data used has been affected by the incomplete transformation due to the non­
availability of appropriate CPI for China, as already mentioned. From the remaining 
equations, cointegrating relationships between exchange rate and trade performance have 
been confirmed, given that the (-statistics for the lagged term of residuals are greater than
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the associate ADF critical value (3.6765 for the same sample size at 5% significance level, 
obtained from running Microfit 4.0).
As expected, the results for the regression of exports (or imports) on the various 
exchange rates are different, as seen by the coefficients of the different exchange rate in the 
equations. Recalling the nature of the data constructions, these results suggest that some 
other trade policies, rather than nominal exchange rate alone, have undeniable effects on 
China’s trade performance. Approximately, the difference between the coefficients of 
official nominal exchange rate (OER) and applied exchange rate (AER) indicates the effects 
of the foreign exchange retention policy. These effects occurred as the retained foreign 
exchange was allowed to be converted into the domestic currency at a higher rate (swap 
exchange rate). This policy provided an export incentive to exporters but acted as a 
surcharge to importers. However, while the effects of AER on exports have been certain, 
the change of exchange rate (the increase of the domestic price of foreign exchange) did not 
lead to reduction of imports. Explanations may be that: First, China’s imports had a feature 
of “import hunger” and a special structure towards import substitution, which resulted in 
high import demand. Second, for many years in the sample period, the devaluation of the 
Renminbi was not large enough to be restrict to imports. In China, the main restrictions on 
imports were the NTBs, not the exchange rate.
Similarly, the difference between coefficients of AER and EERs shows the effects of 
subsidy and tariff policies. Export subsidies and domestic subsidies enjoyed by the trade 
sectors seemed a stronger incentive to promote export growth: The coefficient of exchange 
rate increased from 1.55 (for AER) in equation 6-13 to 1.68 (for EERX) in equation 6-15. 
On the import side, again, unlike exports, exchange rate could not be said to be the 
detennining factor in import demand. Although the relation between imports and EERm 
contains the effects of tariff reduction in the 1990s, the full explanation for the import 
increase is likely to rely on factors other than exchange rate alone.
Given the above discussion, the following analysis concentrates on the export side. The 
result of the above cointegrating regression has proven the existence of long-run 
cointegration relationship between exchange rates (OER, AER and EERX) and exports. That 
is, as general trend in the sample period, export growth was closely related to the change of
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exchange rate. However, exchange rate policy and other export policies did not change 
equally each year during the period. In particular, some trade policies were effective only 
temporarily. As a result of policy changes, exports also fluctuated drastically throughout the 
reform period. An error correction model (ECM) could provide the necessary infonnation 
for explaining the move of exports from short-run fluctuations to the level of long-run 
equilibrium. By applying equation 6-5, the extent to which export growth derives from its 
long-run relationship with exchange rate is contained in the following ECMs.
Table 6.7 The Error Correction Models Based on Cointegrating Regressions
ECM s (/-statistics in parentheses) R2 RBS DW RSS F
ALXt = 0.10 -  0.22ecini.i + 0.33 ALXt-j + 0.24 ALOER, 
(2.16) (-2.88) (-1.54)* (1.28)**
0.37 0.26 2.11 0.11 3.22 (6-19)
ALX, = 0.17 -  0.18ec™,./ + 0.25ALX,.! -  0.34ALAER,-i -  0.25ALAER,_2 
(3.66) (-1.62)* (1.09)** (-2.51) (-1.76)
0.41 0.24 2.07 0.10 2.41 (6-20)
ALX, = 0.17 -  0.19ecm,-i + 0.28ALX,., -  0.19ALEERX,.t -  0.52ALEERX,.2 
(4.31) (-1.54)* (1.32)** (-1.14)** (-3.01)
0.48 0.33 2,14 0.09 3.17 (6-21)
Note: Significance level is 5% except that * denotes at 10% level while ** at 15% level. ecm,.i in each
equation is lagged residuals from the corresponding cointegrating regression. RBS =  R-bar-squared.
RSS =  residual sum o f  squares.
In establishing the ECMs, the adopted method is to include several lagged terms on the 
right-side of the equation in regression and then delete the insignificant term individually. 
Meanwhile, regressions are required to achieve the approximate white noise of the new 
error terms. The f-values of the coefficients of the lagged residual term are all
significant at either 5% or 10% level, indicating that the coefficients are not zero. Further, 
while regressing exports on lagged exchange rate, the statistical significance that all 
coefficients are not zero also leads to a conclusion that exchange rate Granger causes 
exports. These results show that the fluctuations of China’s exports can be explained by the 
changes of the exchange rate, as well as the changes of exports itself, in proceeding years. 
The coefficients of the lagged residual term {ecm,.,) indicate the extent of correction needed. 
Note that, in the ECMs, the explanation of export growth seems more dependent on the 
change of exchange rate than on the previous situation of exports. This fact implies that the 
growth of exports has very much relied on the change in the exchange rate —  devaluation 
of the Renminbi.
When the cointegration relationship between exports and exchange rate and the 
corresponding ECM have been established, it is interesting to identify how these estimates 
have imitated the real situation in China. A simple way is to add dummy variable into the
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ECM to test the established relationship. To represent the trade policy change in a specific 
year which was excluded from the construction of the exchange rate, a dummy variable is 
set at a magnitude of one in the year, otherwise zero. If the ECM remains unchanged when 
the dummy variable is added, the conclusion will be that the trade policy change 
represented by the dummy variable was working within the established cointegration 
relationship and the ECM is appropriate even when the new variable has been considered. 
Otherwise, there will be a different relationship between exports and exchange rate when a 
new variable is added.
Since the duty drawback policy has not been included in the process of the data 
construction, now let dummy variables DUM85, DUM94 and DUM96 represent the 
beginning of this policy and the adjustments of duty drawback rates.17-1 Broadly, the dummy 
variables represent all policy changes in the year. However, most factors (for example, two 
adjustments of nominal exchange rate in 1985, the unification of exchange rates in 1994) 
have been included in the constructed exchange rates. In this sense, these dummy variables 
could approximately represent the effects of the duty drawback policy. Table 6.8 reports the 
testing results.
Table 6,8 Testing the ECMs Using the Dummy Variables
(6 -22 ) (6 -2 3 ) (6-24) (6-25) (6-26) (6 -2 7 ) (6-28) (6-29)
V ariables coef. t coef. t coef. t coef. t coef. t coef. t coef. t coef. t
constant 0.09 2.05 0.10 2.46 0.18 4.29 0.17 4.50 0.17 6.95 0.18 5.12 0.16 5.33 0.16 5.23
ecnu-i -0.23 -3.11 -0.22 -3.35 -0.18 -1.80 -0.14 -1,60* -0.13 -2.09 -0.18 -1.63* -0.20 -2.11 -0.18 -1.91
DLXi-i 0.39 1.86 0.41 2.22 0.23 1,13** 0.25 1,41* 0.31 2.51 0.27 1.46* 0.36 2.24 0.41 2.58
DLEERXt-i -0.22 -1.48* -0.23 -1.83 -0.28 -2.24
DLEERXt-2 -0.54 -3.54 -0.56 -4.36 -0,46 -3.21
DLAERt-i -0.36 -2.95 -0.35 -3.20 -0.38 -5.24
dlaer,.2 -0.28 -2.14 -0.30 -2.66 -0.29 -3.79
DLOER, 0.35 1.82 0.30 1.74
DUM85 -0.14 -1.67* -0.14 -1.89 -0.15 -1.94 -0.14 -2.14 -0.16 -3.52 -0.16 -2.13 -0.14 -2.42 -0.15 -2.59
DUM94 0.16 2.23 -0.16 3.28 0.16 2.63 0.16 2.64
DUM96 -0.16 -2.19 -0.19 -4.05 -0.10 -1.39*
R2 0.47 0.60 0.54 0.68 0.87 0.61 0.75 0.79
RBS 0.33 0.49 0.36 0.51 0.79 0.46 0.63 0.66
RSS 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03
DW 1.93 1.78 2.24 2.18 1.93 2.47 2.25 2.08
F 3.39 (4, 15) 4.35 (5, 14) 3.06 (5, 13) 4.17 (6, 12) 10.49(7, 11) 4.09 (5, 13) 6.11 (6, 12) 5.92 (7, 11)
Note: Due to the use o f  different lags, equations 6-24 to 6-29 are valid for the period o f  1979-1997 while equations 
6-22 and 6-23 for 1978-1997. In the table, “coef.” refers to coefficients and ‘7” refers to /-statistics. Significance
level is 5% except that * denotes at 10% level while ** at 15% level.
Results in the above table show that DUM85, DUM94 and DUM96 were working well 
within the established cointegration relationship between exports and exchange rate and 
improved the capacity of the model to explain the increase of exports. The conclusion
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implied is that the duty drawback policy, as other factors included in the constructed AER 
and EERX, have effectively contributed to China’s export growth. In addition, since the 
ECMs have remained effective when the dummy variables have been added, it is reasonable 
to consider the present established cointegration relationship and the ECMs, although not 
perfect, the ones reflecting the real situation.
To sum up, the econometric modelling in this section has shown that the changes of 
China’s trade policy in the reform period have been effective, especially on the side of 
export policies. Recalling the facts that export subsidies, the foreign exchange retention 
system and the dual exchange rates system have been ended one after another, it is obvious 
that China’s export incentives now mainly rely on the exchange rate and duty drawback 
system. The proven positive function of China’s exchange rate policy and duty drawback 
system on export promotion became increasingly important. Such a change of export policy 
is in the right direction and also evidence of China’s success in trade policy reform.
6.3 T r a d e  P o l ic y  R e f o r m  a n d  E c o n o m ic  G r o w t h
6.3.1 Empirical Studies on Trade and Growth
The relationship between foreign trade and economic growth has long been a 
controversial topic among economists. The free trade theory as an orthodoxy is founded on 
the basis that developing foreign trade is considered one of the important approaches to 
increase national welfare, improve the allocative efficiency of resources and therefore 
promote economic growth. Trade liberalisation in the post-war period and trade policy 
reform since the 1980s also reflected the recognition of the issue that trade expansion could 
be an important source to economic growth.
The positive relationship between trade (exports) and growth/development is also 
supported by a number of empirical studies. Among them, some influential results from 
various approaches of testing can be found, for example, in Michaely (1977), Balassa (1978, 
1982), Feder (1983,1985), Chow (1987) and Ram (1987).
However, although the view that trade positively contributes to economic growth has 
never lacked theoretical explanation and is widely accepted by economists, some still 
argued that it is not appropriate to overestimate the role of trade in the process of growth. 
The reasons are that, first, there is no systematic pattern, neither positive nor negative,
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between trade and growth. The historical record provides no conclusive evidence of trade 
working as an engine of past economic growth. Favourable world market conditions and 
appropriate trade policy can help, but are neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
economic development to take place (Sundrum 1990; Pomfret 1991). Second, trade does not 
create a wholly new type of situation as far as economic growth is concerned. The effect of 
trade 011 growth will depend on how much a country gains from trade (Chaudhuri 1989). By 
carrying out econometric test, Jung and Marshall (1985) in their study show that the 
correlations between exports and growth found in other previous studies were spurious.
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in exploring the relationships 
between trade and growth. In some studies, especially those based 011 cases of East Asian 
export-led growth, the positive relations between trade and growth were confirmed from 
various standpoints. A World Bank study (1993) pointed out that the emphasis on export 
expansion, together with high savings and investment rates, accumulation of human capital 
and appropriate government interventions, was an important element in the growth 
strategies of the high perfonning Asian economies. The study asserts, by measuring the 
determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) growth, that “openness is consistently 
associated with superior TFP performance” and “both indicators of export performance [the 
average share of manufactured exports in total exports and the share of manufactured 
exports in GDP] are also consistently and positively correlated with higher rates of TFP 
growth” (pp. 316-326). Sengupta (1994) used the “new growth theory” to conduct an 
empirical study on the sources of economic growth in Asian NICs. One of the conclusions 
is that the role of increasing returns to scale, as emphasised in new growth theory, has been 
veiy prominent in successful Asian NICs and more so in the export-oriented sectors. Li 
Xing (1995) argued that international economic and trade transactions generated a “tutor- 
pupil” relationship which created a catching-up effect. With the transfer of technology and 
management to them, East Asian economies strengthened their capacity to grow.
The relationship between trade and growth was also examined at a more general level. 
Lee and Cole (1994), in their empirical study based on extensive cross-country data, 
concluded that exports promote economic growth. Their result also suggested that exports 
probably play a more important role in the growth process than was previously indicated in 
a number of other studies. Drucker (1994) indicated that, by reviewing the experience of the 
last 40 years, increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic
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economic growth. This lesson is not unique to Asian economies but is also the same for the 
developed world. Kitson and Michie (1995) constructed a data series from 1870 through 
1990 and found that there are constantly high correlation statistics between world output 
and trade, both for levels and growth rates. Some other studies, in the context of trade 
policy reform, also confirmed the positive relationship between trade and growth (for 
example, Thomas et al 1991; Papageorgiou et al 1991; Kawai 1994; Ghani and Jayarajaj 1995; Shafaeddin 
1995).
The contrary conclusions from different studies on the same theme of the relationship 
between trade and growth presented the following two sets of problems. First, the 
relationship between trade and growth may vary from country to country, due partly to the 
existing economic structure and partly to the development strategy in an individual country. 
Specifically, whether there is an effective mechanism by which a country’s comparative 
advantage and the resulting gains from trade can be transformed into powers of growth (in 
forms of investment increase and efficiency improvements) may be crucial in affecting the 
relationship between trade and growth. A generalised steady pattern of the relationship 
between trade and growth, if any, remains to be proven. Second, as some researchers 
pointed out, all previous studies on the theme have been affected by the approaches used, 
concerning the choice of samples and estimating techniques (Edwards 1989a, pp. 25-33; 
Salvatore and Hatcher 1991).
With regard to the methods for the statistical investigations, there are two widely 
adopted ways to examine the relationship between trade and growth. One is the 
conventional ordinary least square (OLS) regression, regressing national output (GDP) on 
labour, investment and exports in sense of an augmented neo-classic production function. 
The exports variable is considered as a factor representing the externalities of an open 
economy which in turn generate favourable effects on resource allocation, economy of 
scale, capacity utilisation and technological change. In general, the applications of this 
approach have had supportive evidence in favour of export-led policies, implying the 
positive relationship between exports and growth (Edwards 1989a, p. 28). The other is the 
integration analysis developing fast in recent decades. Researchers preferring this way 
emphasise the quality of the data, which seems a weakness in the conventional use of OLS 
regression. In the past decade, many studies were carried out in this line to test the 
relationship between exports and growth but results varied. It is also worth mentioning that
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the cointegration analysis has been described only showing whether exports change precede 
or follow movements in GDP (GNP), rather than a tine causal relationship (Learner 1994). 
There is still a need for researchers to establish the link between exports and growth.
6.3.2 Statistical Analysis on Exports and Growth: the Case of China
It is not the aim of this study to develop a new model for testing the relationship 
between exports (trade) and growth. Instead, it is the interest to apply the existing 
approaches to the case of China, for exploring the specific pattern of links between trade 
and growth in the economy. Given the above review, both conventional OLS regression and 
cointegration analysis are proposed to be performed in this section, using the post-reform 
data. Basic data are in Yuan and taken from China Statistical Yearbook (various issues). 
Export values are transformed in real terms of Yuan (deflated by China’s urban CPI, 
1990=100). Although data of GDP in 1990 constant price are available in the International 
Monetary Statistics Yearbook, a new set of GDP data has been created by deflating GDP in 
current prices by China’s urban CPI. Other variables are also dealt with in the same way. 
By taking this measure, the levels of the variables may have been undermined, due to the 
fact that the urban CPI is usually higher than the general CPI. However, because of using 
the same deflator, the extent of the possible underestimation in absolute value for all 
variables is also the same, which guarantees the consistency of the data. The problem 
encountered in constructing the REER has not been an obstacle here. No bias or distortion 
has been caused in the process of data conversion.
First, cointegration analysis on the relationship between GDP and exports has been 
earned out in Granger sense. ADF tests for unit roots have proven both variables are 1(1), 
featuring nonstationary in levels but stationary in first-differences. Then, cointegrating 
regression and corresponding ECM have been performed. Results are summarised in Table 
6.9 and Table 6.10.
Table 6.9 Unit Root Tests for Variables of GDP and Exports
Variables Levels F irst difference
(in logarithms) Test statistic Feature o f  test Critical value Test statistic Feature o f  test Critical value
LCGDP 0.06889 Y, N, 1 -3.0401 -3.1135 Y, N, 3 -3.0819
LCXY -1.00290 Y, N, 1 -3.0401 -5.0593 Y, N, 0 -3.0401
Note: Feature o f  test indicates whether intercept, time trend and lags have been used in the ADF regression, 
marked as Y  for included, N  for excluded and numbers for lag order in use. Sample period: 1978-1997.
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Table 6.10 Cointegrating Regression and The Error Correction Model
Equations (f-statistics in parentheses) R2 RBS DW RSS F
Cointegrating regression: LCGDPt =  4.81 + 0.49LCXY,
(51.41) (28.42)
0.98 0.98 0.97 0.10
ADF test for residuals: Aut — -0.83u,.j + 0.46z\«,_/
(-3.1367) (1.9162)
0.38 0.34 1.92 0.06 9.80
ECM: ALCGDP, =  0 .1 2 -  0.52ecm,., +  0.79ALCGDPhJ
(0.71) (-3.67) (4.33)
0.70 0.61 1.98 0.01 7.68
+  0.19ALCXYt - 0 . 1 9ALCXY,.j 
(3.83) (-3.11)
(6-30)
(6-31)
(6-32)
Note; CGDP and CXY are constructed GDP and exports in Yuan, respectively, as discussed in the above 
text. ecm,.j is lagged residuals (n,) from the cointegrating regression (eq. 6-30). RBS = R-bar-squared.
RSS = residual sum o f  squares. Sample period: 1978-1997. Significance level is 5%.
As shown in equation 6-30 (Table 6.10), it can be seen that there was significant 
cointegration relationship between exports and GDP in the sample period. But the low DW 
statistic called for an ADF test for residuals (equation 6-31). Regression result shows that 
the (-statistic for the coefficient of the lagged residual term is -3.1367. If an intercept has 
been included, the ADF (-statistic is -3.0825. Both are slightly greater (in absolute value) 
than the associated ADF critical value (-3.0401, with an intercept but without time trend). It 
is possible to conclude that the residuals have been proven stationary. Therefore, the 
cointegration regression equation could be confirmed as an acceptable expression of the 
positive linkage between exports and GDP. Based on the above results, the related ECM 
(equation 6-32) indicates that, as a long-run trend, the growth of GDP (approximated by 
ALCGDPt) has been affected by the growth in exports, as well as by GDP itself.
Second, the relationship between exports and GDP also has been tested in form of 
conventional OLS regression. The standard model used in many studies is derived from the 
aggregate production function: Y =/(L, K, X), where Y refers to national income (GDP), L 
is labour force, K is capital stock and X is exports. In application, estimation is usually 
made in form of the following equation,
Y = aQ + ayL + a2IY  + a3X  (6-33)
where Y  is annual growth rate of real GDP, L the growth rate of labour force, IY  the share 
of gross domestic investment in GDP in the preceding year (i.e., I /Y t.j where Y denotes 
GDP and I  investment), and X  the growth rate of exports (Lai and Rajapatirana 1987; Edwards 
1989a, pp. 25-26; Lee and Cole 1994).
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Due to the data limitation, estimation has been made for China over the period of 1979- 
1996. The result is as following:
Y = -0.24 -  0.028Z + 0.766/7 + 0.107X (6-34)
(-2.34) (-0.05) (2.96) (2.12)
R2 = 0.49 RBS = 0.38 F(3,14) = 4.51 RSS = 0.02 DW =1.12
Note that, in the regression result, the /-statistic for the coefficient of the labour force is 
insignificant, indicating that GDP growth did not rely on the growth of the labour force. In 
contrast, /-statistics for both investment and exports are significant at 5% level, proving 
their positive contribution to the growth of GDP. Several points can be drawn from analysis 
of the coefficients in the equation. First, China’s GDP growth seems to be of the 
investment-driven type. A percentage point increase in investment explains 0.77% of GDP 
growth, while the contribution of export growth is much lower than that of investment. This 
is consistent with feature of development in developing countries and with the general 
impression from China’s statistics. In 1981-96 period, for example, China’s average annual 
growth rate of gross domestic investment was 19.8%, higher than annual growth rate of 
exports (14.2%). Moreover, investment has direct effects in promoting GDP growth, while 
exports are only an indirect source of growth. Second, the function of exports in promoting 
GDP growth seems to be at a reasonable level. In some other similar' studies based on the 
experience of developing countries, regression coefficients for exports were in a range 
between 0.055 and 0.160 (see Lee and Cole 1994). The coefficient of 0.107 for exports in 
China’s case could be an acceptable explanatory factor for GDP growth. Third, the low WD 
statistic is another unsatisfactory aspect of the regression equation. This implies China’s 
GDP growth may have been affected by some other factors which have not been included in 
the regression equation. Some researchers tried to use additional explanatory variables in 
the standard production function, seeking more complete specifications for explaining GDP 
growth. For example, Edwards (1989a, 1992) uses a number of variables, including the 
measure of gap of knowledge stock, index of trade intervention, index of openness and 
index of political instability, to modify the regression equation. Unfortunately, such an 
approach cannot be adopted in this study, for the reasons that constructing these indices is 
an expensive task and, in China’s case, data for index construction are in severe shortage.
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Interestingly, when equation 6-34 was re-estimated by dividing investment into 
domestic-funded investment and foreign investment while exports were distinguished 
between those from domestic-funded enterprises and those from foreign-funded enterprises, 
the regression result had the same basic pattern as equation 6-34. However, foreign-funded 
investment and associated exports were not reliable explanatory variables for GDP growth. 
Calculated /-statistics for the coefficients of these two variables are both insignificant while 
/-statistics for the coefficients of domestic investment and exports are similar to those in 
equation 6-34. This implies that both growth of foreign investment and growth of exports 
from foreign-funded enterprises did not significantly contribute to the growth rate of GDP, 
although they grew surprisingly fast in the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. To be 
sure, if foreign investment and associated exports have functioned as promoters of the GDP 
growth rate, there should be a faster GDP growth rate consistent with the rapid growth of 
foreign investment and exports from foreign-funded enterprises. However, such a situation 
does not appear. Given the fact that exports from foreign-funded enterprises accounted for 
about 40% of China’s total exports, an conclusion implied by the above regression may be 
that the growth of foreign investment and associated exports have contributed significantly 
to China’s export expansion but less to GDP growth. This is not to say that foreign 
investment and associated exports have made no contribution to China’s economic growth. 
It is only indicating that no significant linkage between the growth rates of them has been 
found.
6.3.3 Approaches in Which Trade Works
Although foreign trade (exports) is not the main source of growth, its positive function 
in promoting economic growth should not be underestimated. The rapid development of 
foreign trade enabled China to escape the constraints of extreme “self-reliance” and to be a 
new and important player in the world economy. Simultaneously, positive foreign trade 
activities induced a new path to economic development. That is to say, it accelerated 
domestic economic growth by increasing the extent of foreign involvement in the economic 
process and by utilising overseas resources, technology and markets. Specifically, trade 
(exports) expansion created impacts on GDP growth by improving efficiency of resource 
allocation and increasing total factor productivity.
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Efficiency of Resource Allocation
The significance of foreign trade development in economic growth has two major 
aspects: technological progress and market expansion. Both have effects on the 
improvement of resource allocative efficiency. On the import side, growth of productive 
materials and technology imports enables a country to produce some goods that could not 
be produced earlier, or to reduce the cost of products by using the more efficient production 
approach. The surplus capital can then be used to expand production by reinvestment. On 
the export side, the part of GDP growth resulting from the growth of exports is mainly due 
to the fuller utilisation of existing productive capacity. Export growth promotes the growth 
of productive capacity by inducing faster technological progress, with the aim of competing 
with other producers in world markets. The growth of exports leads to the growth of 
productive capacity by expanding the opportunities for profitable investment or increasing 
return of economic scale. To take the advantage of the fact that trade expansion improves 
economic performance, it is essential to liberate trade from various restrictions.
In the case of China, the change of trade policies loosened the tremendous potential for 
developing the national economy. First, opening the country to foreign investment has 
filled in the gap in capital within the country. Most of these foreign investments, in the 
forms of imported equipment and productive materials, were used to establish new 
production and services entities, or to improve the production conditions of existing 
enterprises. Both activities may increase total GDP. Second, China’s export income was 
mainly used for the imports of capital goods, especially machinery and equipment and some 
raw materials. The logic is that exporting served to finance import requirement, the final 
aim being to strengthen the capacity of the nation’s production and to meet the need to 
improve the standard of people’s life. So the development of foreign trade, on both sides of 
export and import, is closely concerned with national economic growth. Third, the 
expansion of the export sector induced related industries to increase the size of production. 
Fourth, some advanced, and appropriate, technologies were introduced into the economy in 
the process of utilising foreign capital and of importing equipment and assembly lines. This 
has accelerated the industrialisation of the country and eventually enhanced the technology 
levels on both ranges of enterprise and of sectors.
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TFP Effect
Improved efficiency of resource allocation can be reflected in GDP growth resulting 
from those factors other than increases in capital and labour forces inputs. Total factor 
productivity (TFP), showing the overall improvement of resource utilisation, is defined as 
“a residual of output change obtained by subtracting the changes in inputs from output 
changes” (XJrata 1994). Export expansion will raise TFP by virtue of the favourable effects on 
resource allocation, capacity utilisation, technological upgrade and economies of scale.
In the simplest way, the measurement TFP = Y/LaKr<x can be rewritten as
where Y, L and K are output (GDP), labour force input and capital input, respectively.
The calculated TFP in fact contains the effects of technological changes. Put it in 
another way, the effect of technological changes indicates the improvement of total factor 
productivity (TFP). Measurement of technological changes can be derived from an
where Y, L and K  are output (GDP), labour force and capital, respectively; A is constant 
term; t is time trend and r represents the contribution of technological changes on the 
growth of Y. Differentiating the equation, we have
Approximating the differentiated equation into difference equation where At = 1 when 
annual data are used:
TFP, = EXP[//?7, - alnL, - {l-a)lnK^ (6-35)
aggregate production function Y — AertLaK1"a in logarithm form as 
InY = InA + rt + alnL + (l-a)lnK (6-36)
(6-37)
In computing TFP and the technological change r, a crucial step is to determine the 
output elasticity of labour and capital inputs. For convenience, directly observed factor 
share(s) can be used as approximate measures of these elasticities to estimate TFP growth. 
By adopting an estimated factor share for labour income in China for the period of 1979- 
1994, a  = 0.453, from Hu and Khan (1 9 9 7 ) ,  we calculated China’s growth of TFP and r for 
the period of 1979-1996, based on unadjusted aggregate data as used above. Results from 
the calculation show that, in 1979-1996, the average rate of TFP growth was 2.66%. The 
contribution of technological changes (r) to GDP growth increased from 26.32% in 1979 to 
43.13% in 1995 (and 41.94% in 1996).
Table 6.11 Average Annual Growth Rates of GDP and TFP (%)
GDP
1970-80 1980-90
TFP
1970-80 1980-90
G DP
1970-80 1980-90
TFP
1970-80 1980-90
Asia Latin America
Korea 8.3 8.9 0.8 2.8 Chile 2.5 2.8 0.5 -0.1
Taiwan 9.3 7.4 5.1 3.9 Argentina 2.6 -1.2 0.1 -1.6
Singapore 8.6 6.8 0.7 1.6 M exico 6.4 1.6 1.1 -2.1
Thailand 6.5 7.5 1.2 2.6 Brazil 8.2 1.5 0.4 -1,9
Malaysia 7.6 5.8 2.5 0.7 Colombia 5,3 3.4 0.8 0.4
Indonesia 7.0 5.5 3.1 -0.1 Peru 3.7 -1.1 0.3 -3.0
Philippines 5.7 1.6 0.8 -2.2 Venezuela 3.1 0.7 -2.4 -0.6
India 3.0 5.4 -0.9 2.1
China 6.0 8.3 1.1 2.8
Source: Kawai (1994).[S]
Table 6,12 Sources of China’s Economic Growth (%)
Li & L i’s estimate
1952-79 1979-90
Hu & K han’s estimate 
1953-94 1953-78 1979-94
(1) value added (growth) 5.96 8.35 7.2 5.8 9.3
(2) capital input growth 5.48 4.27 6.8 6.2 7.7
(3) labour input growth 1.19 1.55 2.6 2.5 2.7
(4) productivity increase (TFP) -0.71 2.53 2.1 1.1 3.9
(2 )/(l)  contribution o f  capital input to growth 92.00 51.00 55.6 65.2 45.6
(3 )/(l)  contribution o f  labour input to growth 20.00 18.50 14.9 16.8 12.8
(4 )/(l)  contribution o f  productivity to growth -12.00 30.29 29.5 18.0 41.6
Source: Li Jinwen and Li Jun (1993); Hu and Khan (1997).
Some other estimates of China’s TFP growth are listed in Tables 6.11 and 6.12. Note 
that there are differences in these estimates, due to their adoptions of different approaches. 
The most important feature is that all these estimates have a common identity showing the 
positive role of improved productivity in transforming China’s economy.
Table 6.11 shows the economic performance in terms of GDP and TFP growth in some 
Asian and Latin America countries, based on 1970-1990 data. As can be seen, for the
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period of 1980-90, China recorded a high GDP growth rate, as well as Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand, and also registered a high TFP growth rate. Table 6.12 shows that, after reform, 
the factor of technological progress (represented by the rate of TFP) has made a much 
bigger contribution to economic growth. According to Li Jinwen and Li Jun’s estimate, the 
average annual rate of economic growth between 1979 and 1990 was 8.35%, 2.39 
percentage points higher than that of 1952-1979. The growth rate of productivity has been 
turned from negative (-0.71%) to positive (2.35%), increasing by 3.24% per year. The 
contribution of productivity growth to economic growth reached 30.29% during 1979-1990. 
Hu and Khan’s estimate seems much stronger, suggesting that TFP growth contributed 
41.6% of the output growth in the period 1979-1994 while average annual TFP growth rate 
increased from 1.1% in 1953-78 to 3.9% in 1979-94. Hu and Khan state more directly that 
“the opening up to foreign trade and investment, the gradual price decontrol, the rise of 
rural township and village enterprises (TVEs), and the expansion of new private businesses 
brought competitive forces into the Chinese economy and helped make the economy more 
efficient during the reform period” (Hu and Khan 1997).
Of course the growth in TFP is attributed to a number of factors. Trade expansion is 
only one of these factors. However, it is also worth noting that a feature of China’s 
economy in the reform period was that the growth of foreign trade surpasses the growth of 
gross domestic production. The rapid growth of the export sector implies the increasing 
importance of the external market to output growth. The intensive competition in the world 
market required exporters to improve the quality of their products, as well as to reduce the 
cost of those products. In such circumstances, the increase of TFP became the key point of 
enterprises’ further development. So most Chinese exporters made a great effort to meet the 
challenge of the market, shifting from domestic markets to international markets. 
Consequently, with the progress of technology, TFP has been gradually increased in most 
industries. Technological progress has made a significant contribution to industrial 
development and to the growth of the national economy.
6.4 C o n c l u sio n
With statistical and econometric evidence, this chapter shows that China’s trade policy 
reform has so far been effective and become a source of China’s fast economic growth. In 
order to carry out the econometric test, great effort has been made to construct data series. 
Regarding the analytical method, regressing exports on different exchange rates is also a
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significant attempt to make better use of cointegration analysis in testing the relationships 
between trade and exchange rate based on the case of China. In particular, the constructed 
data successfully identified the policy factors consist in the different exchange rates and 
enabled the author to evaluate the effects of some of different kinds of trade policies 
including foreign exchange retention, subsidies and tariffs, rather than simply testing the 
official exchange rate.
Based on the above analysis, China’s experience could be considered to support the 
view that trade may positively contribute to economic growth. From the standpoint of neo­
classical theory, China has, through the process of opening up toward the outside world, 
developed her comparative advantage in order to increase export earnings. Increased 
income of foreign exchange has helped China to introduce foreign investment and advanced 
technology into the economy. The expanded access to foreign resources for the increasing 
investment and production has therefore been a contributing factor leading to rapid 
economic growth. In the view of new growth/trade theory, which stresses the role of 
openness in trade and export externalities as positive factors in promoting long run growth, 
China has also enjoyed the benefits of openness in trade and export externality. Foreign 
trade has been the channel through which foreign advance technology and equipment were 
introduced and diffused across other sectors. Not only the export sector but also other 
sectors have had the capacity of their productive technology enhanced. The increase in TFP 
showed the real growth of the economy, which was partially due to the development of 
foreign trade promoted by the sustained trade policy reforms.
About the Atlas  method, a technical note in World Development Report 1996  explains it as follows:
“The A tlas conversion factor for any year is the average o f  a country's exchange rate (or alternative 
conversion factor) for that year and its exchange rates for the two preceding years, after adjusting them for 
differences in rates o f  inflation between the country and the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States). The inflation rate for G-5 countries is represented by changes in the 
SDR deflators. This three-year averaging smoothes annual fluctuations in prices and exchange rates for each 
country. The A tlas conversion factor is applied to the country's GNP. The resulting GNP in US dollars is 
divided by the midyear population for the latest o f  the three years to derive GNP per capita.” (World Bank 
1996, p. 236)
For details o f  the formulas for computing the conversion factor and calculating GNP per capita, see the Technical Notes, 
World Developm ent Report 1996  (World Bank 1996, p. 236).
^  As the World Bank recognised, the main obstacles in using the Atlas method are, first, the differences in national 
accounting and demographic reporting systems and in the coverage and reliability o f  underlying statistical information 
among various countries and, second, the use o f  official exchange rates for converting GNP data from national currencies 
to the US dollar (World Bank 1994b, p. 231).
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^  It does not mean an official adoption o f  the PPP method. The World Bank itself has recognised that the Atlas method 
associated with exchange-rate conversion estimate has numerous shortcomings causing an incomparability between 
countries. The main obstacles in using the Atlas method are, first, the differences in national accounting and demographic 
reporting system and in the coverage and reliability o f  underlying statistical information among various countries and, 
second, the use o f  official exchange rates for converting GNP data from national currencies to the US dollar (World Bank 
1994b, p. 231). Because o f  the unrealistic exchange rate, traditional method tends to underestimate China’s GDP or GNP. 
On the other hand, the PPP method is relying on a comparable price system. Since there are still severe distortions in 
China’s price system, It is also difficult to compare the real purchasing power between China and other countries.
Cheng Huifang uses the concept “relative export performance”(REP) but the equation for calculation is the same as 
that o f  RAC. The results o f  Cheng Huifang’s calculation are as the following:
China *s R E P  Index (1953-1990)
1953 1955 1965 1970 1975 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Primary exports 130 124 125 150 130 140 126 118 112 106 96
Manufactured exports 50 72 84 72 75 82 94 96 100 104 118
Source: Cheng Huifang (1995).
[5] This condition is necessary for bivariate cointegration analysis but not for multivariate regression, see Mukheriee et al. 
(1998), p. 406.
[6] The weights 0.44 for 1987-1990 and 0.80 for 1991-1993 are taken from an IMF paper (Khor 1994). The weight 0.28 
for 1980-1986 is estimated by the author, based on the fact that the total foreign exchange retention in 1980-1986 was 
US$46.7 billion, accounting for 27.9% o f foreign exchange income in the period (Song Hai 1988), and on the following 
considerations that (1) holders o f  retained foreign exchange might be allowed to sell their foreign exchange to others; and 
(2) all this retained foreign exchange would be, legally or illegally, transformed to importers because the demand for 
foreign exchange was always greater than supplies. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that swap rate could be applied 
to this part o f foreign exchange.
[7J Although the duty drawback rate was cut down in 1995 which should be an unfavourable measure to export promotion, 
exports however increased at an uneven growth rate in the year. This strange phenomenon was due to the flexible 
measures adopted in practising this adjustment and to the exporters’ reflections to the other coming adjustment in 1996. 
Exporters made the greatest effort to increase exports before the end o f  1995, to get the unchanged high rate o f  duty 
drawback. Therefore, it is inappropriate to set a dummy variable for 1995.
[8] The method to calculate TFP is described by Kawai as follows:
The growth rate o f  TFP as defined by the ratio o f  total output to total input is given by: 
d in  TFP dlnG D P  d h \L  d ln K  
dt dt 1 dt K dt
where: GDP -  GDP in real term; L  =  labour input; K  =  capital input; VL-  labour share in value added; Vk= capital share 
in value added, and t — time.
Therefore, the growth rate o f  GDP is given by:
d  In GDP d \n L  d ln K  dlnTF P
i ,  ~ r '- ^  dt + ~ d i ~ ~ -
which can be broken down into three factors: (1) labour contribution, (2) capital contribution, and (3) TFP contribution, 
(see Kawai 1994)
In computation, both o f  these equations may be approximately rewritten by replacing the differentiated terms with their 
first-differencing terms. For example, the growth rate o f  TFP can be calculated using the follow ing equation:
InTFP(t) - InTFP(t-l) =  InGDP(t) - InGDP(t-l) - V,[lnL(t) - InL(t-l)] - Vk[lnK(t) - InK(t-l)],
as used in this chapter.
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China’s Trade Policy Reform in International Context
The aim of the open-door policy is to connect the Chinese economy with the outside 
world. Apart from its domestic aspects, China’s trade policy reform was unavoidably 
affected by its external environment on the one hand, and simultaneously had an important 
impact on international economy on the other. It was the increasing importance of China 
that attracted wide attention from international society. Vaiious responses from different 
countries encouraged and/or pressed China to refonn its trade policies. This chapter intends 
to examine China’s linkages with world trade, and with some specific countries and areas.
7.1 C h in a  a n d  t h e  W o r l d  E c o n o m y
Since the adoption of the open-door policy, the promotion of external trade and 
economic co-operation with other countries has been one of the central tasks for China. 
From 1979 to 1997, as mentioned in Chapter 1, China’s average annual growth rate of 
foreign trade was 15.61%. Compared with other countries, China’s foreign trade 
development has been impressive (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Average Annual Growth Rate of Exports (%)
W orld USA Japan H K K orea Singapore Taiwan M alaysia China Brazil
1978-90 8.66 8.62 9.37 17.85 14.56 14.74 14.93 12.17 16.48 7.87
1990-96 7.63 8.01 6.13 14.04 12.20 15.47 9.50 17.71 15.99 7.23
1978-96 8.32 8.42 8.28 16.56 13.77 14.98 13.09 13.99 16.32 7.66
Source: IMF (1997).
Table 7.2 China1s Share in World Total Exports
1978 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
W orld total exports (US$ billion) 1297.4 1990.6 1927.7 3470.0 3700.0 4168.3 5033.0 5270.0
China’s exports (US$ billion) 9.75 18.12 27.35 62.09 84.94 121.04 148.77 151.1
The rank in world exporters 32nd 26th 17th 15 th 11th 11th 11th 11th
Share in world exports (%) 0.75 0.91 1.41 1.79 2.30 2.90 3.00 2.90
Source: The Editorial Board (1995), p. 404; WTO (1996), Vol. II, p. 3; WTO (1997), Vol. II, p. 3.
The effect of the rapid foreign trade growth enabled China to become a major player in 
the world economy. In 1996, China was for the fifth year ranked 11th in world trade. As 
shown in Table 7.2, the share of Chinese exports in the world total exports increased from
164
0.75% in 1978 to 3.0% in 1995. Growth rate of exports in 1996 for China was only 1.5%, 
resulting in a decline in its share of world trade. In 1997, however, fast growth of exports 
was restored, with an annual growth rate of 20.9%.
Since the beginning of reform, the size of China’s market has expanded rapidly. In 
terms of total consumption (adjusted with GDP deflators, 1990=100), the average annual 
growth rate was 9.62% in 1979-1996. Total investment (adjusted) grew at an average 
amiual growth rate of 10.54% in the same period (State Statistical Bureau 1996b, 1997b). This has 
been one of the most favourable conditions for stimulating the development of foreign 
trade. With the opening-up of the economy, China’s imports have also greatly increased, 
from a share of 0.87% in world total imports in 1978 to 2.6% in 1995 and remained in 1996 
(IMF 1995; WTO 1996, 1997). The above data imply that China has successfully enhanced its 
degree of integration into the world economy.
The significance of China’s integration with the world economy has two main aspects. 
On the one hand, for China itself, the integration with the world economy extended the 
possibilities for obtaining necessary production and management resources to improve the 
allocative efficiency and productivity. More importantly, in the course of integration, many 
internationally common practices have been adopted and become vital forces in promoting 
the establishment of an open market-type economy in China.
China has benefited from the opening of her economy to the outside world. Besides 
obtaining foreign technology, equipment and production materials that may improve 
China’s industrial capacity, the increase of trade-related investment from the outside world 
and various economic transactions with foreign countries has also provided China with an 
impulse to accelerate the economic growth. The participation of foreign investment in the 
Chinese economy, together with China’s efforts in developing foreign trade and opening up 
its markets, accelerated China’s integration with the world economy and promoted China as 
an increasingly important pail; of the global economic system.
Introducing the market competition mechanism into its previously centrally-controlled 
economy is also a goal of China’s open policy. With the gradual reforms, especially since 
the late 1980s when China confirmed that its target was to establish a market economy, the 
increasing role of the competitive mechanism in the Chinese economy has pushed
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enterprises to improve their efficiency. Traditionally, China’s exports relied highly on low- 
efficient primary and labour-intensive products. Even in the post-reform period the rapid 
growth of exports was still mainly of these kinds of products, although the proportion of 
manufactured goods was greatly increased. In recent years, however, China has begim to 
transform its export pattern, from encouraging expansion in size to concentrating on growth 
in (both allocative and productive) efficiency, to improve the competitiveness in both 
domestic and foreign markets. The change in the trade growth pattern means that China has 
to pay more attention to technological improvement in export production. Meanwhile, as 
China’s participation in the world markets became deeper and deeper, the domestic demand 
for liberalising foreign trade and the external pressures for conforming China’s trade 
practice in accordance with international principles emerged as China’s trade reform 
strategy. A result of China’s trade policy liberalisation was that the functioning of the 
market mechanism in China became wider and deeper. In turn, competition was tightened 
and efficiency, again, was improved.
For the rest of the world, on the other hand, several impacts can be noted. First, the 
growth of the Chinese economy and the increasing openness of the economy provided, and 
will continue to provide, other countries with a huge market, injecting vital energy into the 
world economy. Second, the rise of China means that an increasingly strong competitor has 
emerged in world markets, prompting necessary trade policy adjustment for other countries. 
Third, China’s participation in the world economy may have significant influence in the 
development of the world trade system and international economic order.
China’s involvement in international competition has generated a positive effect in 
stimulating the adjustment of the international division of labour. The growth of China’s 
competitiveness has also become a stimulation that encouraged further adjustment and 
innovation in other countries to improve their competitiveness. Many labour-intensive 
enterprises have been transplanted from developed countries and the NIEs to China since 
the end of the 1970s. Developed countries and the NIEs have had a good opportunity to 
upgrade their production and trade structures while China itself also benefited from 
introducing relatively advanced technology from the outside world and thus enhancing its 
capacity for industrial production. In this sense, China’s growing competitiveness is a 
positive force promoting the development of the world economy, given that many countries 
have to take counter measures to improve their competitiveness.
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Undoubtedly, an open and growing China market will benefit all China’s trading 
partners. It is why most industrial and developing economies around the world are now 
interested in accessing China’s market. The growing economic interdependence between 
China and the outside world, in turn, requires China to carry out further trade policy 
reforms. China’s shift of trade reform from institutional adjustment to trade policy 
liberalisation since the 1990s demonstrated that China has had a more positive attitude 
towards the integration of its economy into the world economic system.
7.2 C h i n a  a n d  t h e  GATT/WTO
For a deeper involvement in international trade, China made a great effort to develop its 
trade relations with other countries and the linkages with international economic 
organisations. The most important, and the most difficult, was its re-entry to GATT (now 
managed by the WTO) which sets and enforces the main rules of international trade.
7.2.1 China’s Application to Rejoin GATT
China was one of the 23 initial Contracting Parties which signed the Protocol of 
Provisional Application (PPA) on 21 April 1948. On 6 March 1950, the Nationalist 
government of China informed the General Secretary of the United Nations that China was 
withdrawing from the GATT. After China had restored all its rights at the UN, China was 
granted observer status in the GATT in 1982. On 10 July 1986, China made its official 
application for the resumption of its GATT Contracting Party status. In February 1987, the 
Chinese government presented a memorandum on its foreign trade to GATT. In the 
following month, GATT established a China Working Group to deal with the issue of 
restoring China’s status in GATT. Since then, China’s trade reform has drawn unexpectedly 
great attention from the main economies in the world.
Since March 1987 until the end of the Uruguay Round in December 1994, the China 
Working Group met some 19 times to discuss the issue of China’s re-entry to GATT. In the 
first seven years after China’s application, the China Working Group concentrated on 
examining China’s foreign trade system. In the second half of 1992, the negotiations on 
China’s re-entry turned to a discussion of the Protocol of Accession, and the negotiations 
on tariff reduction were conducted with some Contracting Parties on a bilateral basis. By 
October 1994, nearly 25 countries and the EU had negotiated with China but the talks with
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the US made little progress (Walker and Wolf 1994). This situation lasted imtil the end of the 
year. China failed to re-enter the GATT before the establishment of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and consequently could not become a founding member of the WTO.
Soon after the failure of China’s entry to GATT/WTO at the end of 1994, during 9-19 
May 1995, an informal negotiation about China’s accession to GATT/WTO was held in 
Geneva, which signalled that the process of China’s entry to the WTO was resumed. Since 
then, a series of formal and informal negotiations have been held. In July 1995, the WTO 
accepted China as an observer to the organisation. In 1997, three meetings of WTO China 
Working Group were held, in March, May and August. Until now (June 1998), 12 years 
after its submission of application, China is still not a member of the WTO.
Regardless of the differences in China’s process of liberalisation compared to other 
countries, it is fact that China has kept moving toward trade liberalisation. In March 1997, 
China announced that it would eliminate a requirement that imports and exports be handled 
by state-approved enterprises. Two months later, in May, China announced that it would 
adhere to the WTO principle of non-discrimination (USITC 1997). In August 1997, China 
presented its new offer on market access which included the abandonment of export 
subsidies to agricultural products, a renewed timetable for the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers in a shorter period, and a further reduction of tariffs (Wen Wei Po 5/8/1997). These 
offers demonstrated China’s commitment to conforming with the international trade 
practices. Once China has fulfilled its promises, its foreign trade system will have been 
liberalised significantly.
7.2.2 The Political Economy of China’s GATT/WTO Accession
In the contemporary world economy, countries become tightly interrelated and mutually 
complementary. Now all countries promote international economic co-operation and 
exchanges. For each individual country, there is a need to integrate its economy within the 
international community. The impetus for the resumption of China’s GATT status derives 
from the need to develop elements of outward-oriented strategy. GATT (as part of the WTO 
since 31 December 1994) has become the most important body regulating international 
trade. Trade between GATT Contracting Parities covers more than 90% of total world 
trade, China, whilst still not a member of GATT/WTO, carries out nearly 90% of its foreign 
trade with GATT Contracting Parties.
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Something Benefiting All Sides
For an economy like China in the course of economic opening-up, the importance of the 
GATT/WTO status can be easily understood. By participating in GATT/WTO as a 
developing country, China would receive all the benefits of GATT/WTO membership while 
it undertakes relatively smaller obligations. Of those benefits the main ones are:
First, as a member of the GATT/WTO, China could legally participate in the 
construction of the international trade regime and would have a voice in negotiating the 
rules of the world trade. China’s position in the world trading system could be much 
enhanced and the external environment for China’s economic development would be 
improved.
Second, China can enjoy the benefits of multilateral Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatment, instead of the present bilateral MFN with some individual countries. The 
multilateral MFN is stable, has a wide-ranging coverage and is unlimited in time. 
Furthermore, a GATT/WTO member can also enjoy the most preferred tariff system that is 
helpful for the expansion of foreign trade. Therefore, becoming a member of GATT/WTO 
would help China to increase its exports and widen its external markets.
Third, China can avoid most unfair trade treatments encountered in the present 
situation. In the multilateral trading system under the rules of GATT/WTO, China’s trade 
benefits and economic interests can be protected much better. For example, if China as a 
full GATT/WTO member was not given MFN treatment by the United States, it could 
claim a violation of GATT rules. Membership of GATT/WTO would also provide China 
with an easier access to other developed country markets.
Fourth, joining the GATT/WTO means domestic industries must compete with foreign 
companies. It thus pushes domestic enteiprises to improve their technological ability, to 
improve operation management and to increase economic efficiency. It can help to enhance 
the competitiveness of Chinese products.
Fifth, the root of the GATT/WTO is a market economy. To integrate the economy with 
the international society and to follow the principles of GATT/WTO, China needs to persist 
in its reform and open-door policy. With the openness of the economy and the introduction
169
of international competition, enterprises have to transfer their operation mechanism from 
administrative supervision to a mode of “self-development”. It will accelerate the transition 
of China’s economic system from the planned or semi-planned economy to a “socialist 
market economy”. In this sense, membership in the GATT/WTO is an accelerator speeding 
up the transformation of the Chinese economy.
On the other hand, China’s application for its GATT/WTO membership has, and will 
have, a momentous influence on the development of world trade. China’s application for 
GATT/WTO entry is a measure to integrate its economy with the rest of the world. 
Certainly, the opening-up of the Chinese economy may provide many opportunities to other 
countries for their economic and trade development. Moreover, China’s entry would enable 
GATT/WTO to be a truly world-wide trade organisation. Global trade liberalisation could 
be effectively extended to a wider range. As a member, China would further open its huge 
market to all other members, according to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rule of 
GATT/WTO. As one researcher indicated, “a country of China’s resource and potential, 
committed to maximising the productivity of its own economy through reliance on market 
forces and participation in the world economy on the basis of its own evolving comparative 
advantage, could boost world trade and world economic growth as well as its own” 
(Hartland-Thunburg 1990). Given this, almost all main countries in the world have recognised 
the importance of China’s participation in the world economy. For example, the USTR 
stated that China is the world’s fastest growing major economy and, by early in the next 
century, may have the world’s largest economy. “For the United States, it is certainly true 
that China offers unmatched ‘potential’” (Kantor 1996). Bilateral trade played a very 
important role in China-US relationship. The EU, Japan, Australia and many developing 
countries also appreciated the market opportunities relating to China’s economic opening- 
up and GATT/WTO status.
Arguments on China’s Re-entry into GATT/WTO
Since China plays such an important and growing role in world trade, there should be a 
common foundation on all sides with regard to China’s re-entry. However, due to the 
differential criteria for China’s entry held by China itself and a few WTO members, 
negotiations on China’s status in GATT/WTO have not yet reached a successful 
conclusion.
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Worries about China’s participation have been raised, whilst the importance of China’s 
application is recognised. Concerns mainly centre on China’s trade regime and trade policy. 
China has claimed that, after more than a decade reform, its economic and trade regime has 
basically been consistent with the principles outlined in the GATT and the conditions for its 
re-entry have been fulfilled {People’s Daily 23/12/1994; Wu Yi 1995). But some GATT/WTO 
members, led by the United States, insist that China still has much to do before becoming a 
member of GATT/WTO {Trade News 1/9/1994, 2/11/1994, 8/11/1995, 9/8/1996).
When it presented its application to GATT, China claimed three main principles which 
reflect its attitude towards the resumption of GATT status. First, China is to re-enter GATT 
instead of joining the institution as a new Contracting Party. That means China’s intention 
is to resume its signatoiy status of GATT. Second, China will pay for its “ticket of 
accession” mainly by reducing tariffs rather than committing import obligations, since 
China is becoming a market-oriented economy. Third, China will rejoin GATT as a 
developing country (Zhou Hanmin 1995). These principles, however, together with relevant 
economic and trade policies, have encountered serious challenges from some Contracting 
Parties, particularly the United States.
The re-entry issue has become outdated in the context of the WTO, established as a new 
organisation managing the GATT and other international hade agreements. The only 
approach for China’s participation in this organisation is to join it. The “ticket of accession” 
is a flexible concept which depends highly on China’s negotiations with WTO members. In 
fact, China has to commit herself to more obligations in hade liberalisation than simply 
reducing tariffs, given firstly that reduction of non-tariff measures has been the focus of 
trade policy in and out the WTO and secondly that China’s trade system needs to be 
liberalised. As parts of trade liberalisation, China has taken many measures to reduce its 
tariffs and non-tariff restrictions. China has also signed the Uruguay Round final documents 
that cover a wider range of trade barrier elimination. China’s cost for entering the WTO has 
gone far* beyond tariff reduction.
The crucial issue once being controvertible is whether China should be counted as a 
developing country or not. There are several reasons for Chinese to hold out for developing 
country status. First, the pattern of development is an important factor in judging the 
economic situation of a country. Once a country has completed its industrialisation, it can
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be regarded as a developed country. China is just at its transition from an agricultural- 
industrial society to an industrialising society. Furthermore, the process of industrialisation 
takes a considerable time to complete. In this case, China can be regarded as a developing 
country. Second, a country’s real level of development may be measured by some aggregate 
economic indicators. The most important one is GNP (or GDP) per capita which shows the 
real level of average income in each country. China’s GNP per capita in 1992 was 
estimated at US$470 (World Bank 1994b). If China’s GNP per capita of US$ 470 was 
admitted, China would be accepted to the WTO as a developing country. Even giving 
consideration to the estimates based on the PPP method, as discussed in Chapter 6, China’s 
GNP per capita is still at a relatively low level, hi the World Development Report 1994, for 
example, the PPP estimate of China’s 1992 GNP per capita was US$1,910. Among 121 
economies in the table, China ranked 92nd, lower than Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines and many other typical developing countries.[1] Therefore, it is not appropriate 
to identify China as a developed country even according to the PPP estimates. Moreover, 
since the result of the PPP method “would naturally be higher than the exchange rate-based 
estimates” (World Bank 1995), the criteria for defining developing country status should also 
be readjusted as well. If a country such as China with a GNP per capita of US$1,910 in 
1992 can be identified as a developed country, the logically extended conclusion would be 
that most countries in the world are developed countries. The concept of developing 
country will become insignificant or even meaningless in development economics.
If GNP per capita does not represent the level of economic development in a country, 
then what criteria can be used? The United State argued that China should be treated as a 
developed country, according to the following arguments: firstly, China’s aggregate 
economic indicators rank in the top range in the world and China’s foreign trade has rapidly 
grown over past years, generating a huge trade surplus with the United States; secondly, no 
developing country has a modernised capital city like Beijing; thirdly, no developing 
country except China can launch satellites for developed countries; and finally, no 
developing country had such a good performance in applying to be host for the 2000 
Olympic Games (Economist 6/8/1994; Zhou Hanmin 1995). Considering these criteria, some 
questions have been raised in measuring China’s development situation. One is that the 
total economic indicators have a tight link with the size of the economy. In the case of 
China, although China’s total GNP in 1994 ranked the second in the world and China’s 
exports and foreign exchange reserves ranked 11th and 5th in the world respectively, this by
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no means shows that China has reached the place of a developed nation. The other is that 
China’s rapid economic and trade growth and good performance in certain aspects only 
showed China’s potential and advantage in certain industries and areas. High growth rates 
did not mean that a high level of development has been reached, especially when the 
growth was from a low base. For example, by 1994, although China’s exports grew at a 
high growth rate over time, it only accounts for less than 3% of the world total exports, 
compared with the United States’ share of 12.3%. If the population factor was considered, 
the average export per head in China was only about US$100 in 1994 while the figure for 
the United States was more than US$2,500. China is becoming stronger but has not yet 
been strong enough to be regarded as a developed country.
Behind these arguments, the real concern is the trade benefit potential. China seemed 
eager to enjoy all preferential treatment for developing countries but intended to minimise 
its liberalisation commitments. Also, China wanted to pursue gradual reform of its trade 
regime and trade policies to keep pace with its overall economic transition. Less and slower 
removal of trade protection was thought to be helpful in avoiding major upheavals and 
market disruptions in reform process and maintaining rapid economic growth. More 
importantly, if China accepted the condition that it is counted as a developed country, it 
would lose the eligibility to enjoy all existing preferential treatments as a developing 
country including financial supports from the World Bank, IMF, and general system of 
preferences (GSP) treatment from all developed counfries except the USA. In addition, as a 
developed country, China would have to accept obligations like other developed countries. 
These include accepting the international payments balance clause, eliminating all NTBs 
and offering preferential treatment to developing members. The consequences for China 
would be that China’s rights and obligations in the WTO would be severely unbalance in 
terms of its current economic conditions and the level of development. China’s domestic 
industries would have to compete with mature western industries. China’s economic 
development would face a more difficult environment and the pace of growth would most 
probably have to slow down. Being aware of these factors, China unequivocally stands by 
her application to join the WTO as a developing country.
On the opposite side, the United States, and a few other developed members, have 
aimed to use GATT/WTO as a tool to open China’s huge markets. The United States, for 
example, has been pressing China to increase its offer for GATT/WTO accession. All the
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conditions the United States has asked for are related to the hypothesis that China should be 
treated as a developed country. If China were successfully counted as a developed country, 
it could no longer take the advantages of preferential treatment from the world trading 
system enjoyed by other developing countries. The development of her growth potential 
would be greatly weakened. The “China threat” could be postponed and even disappear. 
Furthermore, by giving a developed country hat to China, all other developing countries 
also could be “upgraded” to developed countries. The real distance between developed and 
developing countries may be fixed at present levels and extended into the future, while the 
nominal difference between the countries will be eliminated by reducing the application of 
the concept of developing country. The United States could have “fair” competition with 
those new “developed” countries based on its economic superpower and so further her own 
interests.
Obviously, developed economy status for China in the WTO was a strategy to ensure 
substantial economic liberalisation in China. As some indicated, whether China enters the 
WTO as a developed economy or as a developing country is not of the extreme importance. 
The imminent problem is to reach an agreement on a short timetable for China’s trade 
liberalisation (Garnaut 1995). “The United States should moderate its demands for refonn as a 
precondition for China’s membership in the WTO. In exchange the United States should 
expect China to agree to a schedule that would gradually bring the country into compliance 
with WTO standards” (Lardy 1996). What concerns the WTO members is the possibility of 
maintaining and/or increasing access to China’s rapidly growing domestic markets, as well 
as avoiding the possible market disruption in developed economies caused by China’s 
expansion of manufacturing exports. The aim of identifying China as a developed country 
was to ensure that China achieved a liberalised trade system. However, if China could 
commits herself to building a liberalised trade system, it would be not necessary to force 
China to accept developed country status. Following long-lasting argument, the US finally 
accepted in principle China’s request to join the WTO as a developing country (Trade News 
25/5/1995). US officials, however, insisted that China must go further in its commitments to 
reduce tariffs, open markets, eliminate exclusive trading rights and liberalise investment 
(Trade News 9/8/1996). In other words, the acceleration of trade liberalisation is a core 
requirement for China to enter the WTO.
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Different opinions held by China and other WTO members were also concretely shown 
in the implications for trade policies. The major differentials regarding trade policy reform 
in China are shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Discrepancies in China’s Trade Policy Reform (up to 1997)
W TO m embers’ demand C hina’s opinion
Trade regime 
transparency
All trade laws and regulations, and hade At least at present, not all hade measures should 
policy measures such as quotas should be be published due to commercial confidentiality, 
made public.
Trading rights Foreign enterprises should be allowed into Trading rights w ill be granted to domestic 
the hading sector. State m onopoly and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises with 
canalisation need to be removed. designed scope o f  business. A  registration system
for foreign trade has been promised.
Foreign
exchange
system
All exchange controls need to be removed Certain exchange controls will remain. The 
and the domestic currency be fully complete convertibility o f  the Renminbi is subject 
convertible as early as entering the WTO. to the official timetable.
Tariffs Overall tariff level should be reduced to less Tariffs will be lowered to the average level o f 
than 10%. China needs to participate in the developing countries. Like some other developing 
Uruguay Round zero-for-zero tariff countries, China does not have to join the zero-for- 
reductions and tariff harmonisation agreed by zero tariff reductions and the tariff harmonisation 
the Quad economies (The US, Canada, the since they have been proposed for developed 
EU and Japan). economies.
Non-tariff
barriers
China must eliminate major non-tariff China intends to retain som e non-tariff measures 
barriers in a short time. (quotas, licences), particularly in some infant or
special industries (automobile, agriculture).
Safeguards China needs to accept an “alternative China opposes this special safeguard mechanism  
protection clause” as a condition for its on the grounds that it is regarded as a 
GATT/WTO accession before it has discriminatory measure. As a developing member 
completed reforms on price and foreign o f  the WTO, trade policy should be evaluated 
exchange systems. China must agree to be every four years in accordance with the W TO’s 
evaluated on trade policy every half a year. rule o f  “trade policy evaluation mechanism”.
Multilateral
trade
agreement
China must sign multi-lateral trade According to the Agreement o f  Uruguay Round, 
commitments on individual commodities the member o f  the WTO has to accept all exist 
reached at the Tokyo Round as a precondition multilateral trade agreements but join any multi- 
o f  its GATT/WTO accession. lateral trade commitment on any individual
commodity on a voluntary mode.
Trade in 
services
China should open a wider range o f  service China insists that the opening up o f  the Chinese 
sectors, including finance, insurance, service sectors should match China’s overall level 
telecommunication, retail and wholesale, and o f  development, according to the General 
audio-visual industry. Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
conducted in the Uruguay Round that the opening 
up o f  the service sectors in developing countries 
will be determined by individual countries 
according to their policy goals and economic 
development situation (GATS A rticle XIX).
Trade-related
investment
China should eliminate investment China has provided foreign investors with better 
restrictions such as local ingredient, export treatment than domestic enterprises. Foreign- 
proportion, self-balance o f  foreign exchange funded enterprises w ill be gradually granted 
earning and expending, and foreign exchange national treatment, 
controls, and provide national treatment to 
foreign investors.
Source: Author, based on Economist 14/5/1994, 6/8/1994; Financial Times 6/10/1994, 5/12/1994, 22/12/1994; 
Zhong Dajun (1995); Zhang Li (1995); Ma Jianchun (1995); Zhou Hanmin (1995); Tang Haiyan (1995); 
Xue Yongjiu (1995); Li Zhongzhou (1996a, 1996b); Wu Jiahuang (1996); Yang Yongzheng (1996); Lardy 
(1996); Kim (1996); Wang Zixian (1997); Yao Shufeng (1997); Li Yushi (1997); US1TC (1997).
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Most of WTO members’ demands are reasonable on the grounds of trade liberalisation. 
The problem remains as to what extent China could, and should, reach them. This also 
relates to China’s prospective status in the WTO and to China’s capacity to commit itself to 
a rapid pace of hade policy reform. After its application to rejoin GATT, the foreign trade 
system reforms were accelerated in China. Trade policies have been changed significantly 
to conform with GATT/WTO rules. Despite the various difficulties in trade reforms, China 
has made great efforts to accelerate the pace of trade liberalisation in recent years, in order 
to transform China’s trade regime in line with international trade practice.
On the other hand, however, it is also fair to say that China’s trade regime has not yet 
become a liberalised one. Tariff rates are still high. Various non-tariff measures continue to 
be used for regulating exports and imports. The market mechanism has not completely been 
established and all trade-related aspects are heavily influenced by government supervisions 
(Wang Zixian 1997b). Despite China’s repeated claims that its economic and trade systems 
have been basically consistent with the principles outlined in the GATT/WTO (Wu Yi 1994, 
1995; Beijing Review 15-21/7/1996), the fact is that progress in trade policy reform has been slow 
and not enough to cover the gap between China’s offer and the demand of some WTO 
members. US officials insisted that China must go further in commitments to reduce tariffs, 
open up markets, eliminate exclusive trading rights and liberalise investment. The US 
International Trade Commission (USITC) also pointed out that China’s WTO application 
progressed slowly (USITC 1997). China has argued that these measures could increase 
unemployment and domestic social instability {Trade News 9/8/1996). China also claims that it 
will not compromise with any country on its main principles for the WTO entry which 
protect China’s national interests in the world trade system.
Given the different criteria held by China itself and a few WTO members, it seems the 
arguments on China’s entry will continue and negotiation on these issues will be a 
sophisticated and difficult task. Nevertheless, it is clear that China has to further its trade 
reform, for both domestic economic transition and its WTO entry. However, China’s 
integration into the world economy is not a unilateral matter. China’s trade reform process 
has been, and will continue to be, affected by various attitudes and issues of other countries. 
External factors, either encouragement or pressure, have effectively promoted China to 
accelerate its trade policy reform. In dealing with the trade relations with other countries,
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China made its effort in trade policy adjustment to conform with international rules, as well 
as solving the specified hade issues with different countries.
7.3 C h in a  a n d  t h e  U n it e d  St a t e s
7.3.1 Bilateral Trade
Given the position of the United States in the world economy, the China-US economic 
relationship has been an indisputable factor influencing the process of China’s integration 
into the international community. After the normalising of bilateral diplomatic relations 
between China and the USA in 1979, economic co-operation and two-way trade developed 
rapidly and has brought both countries numerous economic benefits.
Table 7.4 China-US Bilateral Trade Statistics (US$ billion)
Year
By China Customs By US D epartm ent o f Commerce
Total Exports 
to US
Imports 
from US
Trade
balance
Total Exports Imports 
to China from China
Trade
balance
1978 0.991 0.271 0.721 -0.45 1.178 0.822 0.356 0.47
1980 4.787 0.962 3.824 -2.86 4.918 3.754 1.164 2.59
1985 7.024 2.652 4.373 -1.72 7.713 3.851 3.861 -0.01
1990 11.770 5.190 6.580 -1.39 20.031 4.807 15.224 -10.42
1991 14.202 6.194 8.008 -1.81 25.262 6.287 18.976 -12.69
1992 17.490 8.590 8.900 -0.31 33.200 7.470 25.730 -18.26
1993 27.652 16.964 10.688 6.28 40.303 8.767 31.535 -22.77
1994 35.430 21.460 13.970 7.49 48.070 9.288 38.782 -29.49
1995 40.830 24.710 16.120 8.59 57.310 11.750 45.560 -33.81
1996 42.840 26.690 16.160 10.53 63.460 11.970 51.490 -39.52
Source: Quoted and compiled from M aX iaoye and Zheng Handa (1996), Wu Yi (1996) and The Press Office o f  
the State Council, P. R, China (1997).
According to Chinese statistics, two-way trade has achieved an annual average growth 
rate of 20%, increasing from US$2.5 billion in 1979 to US$42.84 billion in 1996. At 
present, bilateral trade accounts for 14.5% of China’s gross trade and 4.3% of that of the 
United States. The United States is China’s third largest trade partner, and the United States 
has identified China as the most important emerging market, offering the greatest potential 
(Wu Yi 1996). However, as shown in Table 7.4, the two different sets of data tell very 
different stories for each country. The United States argues that it has suffered a tremendous 
deficit in its trade with China. While China agrees that it has in fact enjoyed a trade surplus 
with the United States, it considers the trade surplus to be a much smaller one than claimed 
by the US.
The discrepancy in calculating trade balances between the United States and China is, 
by and large, related to the different statistical criteria used by each. Based 011 the statistics
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kept by the United States, China was next only to Japan in terms of its surplus with the 
United States, given the trade surplus in bilateral trade appeared for the first time in 1983 
($0.3 billion) and increased to $39.52 billion in 1996. Based on China’s statistics, on the 
other hand, China has only enjoyed a trade surplus since 1993 ($6.28 billion in the year) 
and the amount of surplus in 1996 was only $10.53 billion.
The explanation for the difference in the trade balances estimated by the two countries 
significantly differ. The United States insists that its trade statistics have been compiled 
according to international guidelines (Wu Yi 1996). Some Chinese authors have pointed out 
that such “international guidelines” are a complete US-version of determination which 
depends on United States “Rules of Origin”. The US determination of the place of origin is 
generally based on the customs declaration forms filled in by US importers or customs 
brokers. Many products exported by third places such as Hong Kong and Singapore but 
which were previously processed in mainland China are labelled as originating in China, 
simply due to the requirement in the declaration foim to mention the last stop of the goods. 
These goods, transhipped from third places, were treated as Chinese exports to the US (Ma 
Xiaoye and Zheng Handa 1996). By adjusting the transhipment and mark-up factor, it is thought 
that the United States has overstated its trade deficit with China by $13 billion, or 60% of 
the actual amount in 1995 (Wu Yi 1996). Regarding the 1996 data, China claims that the 
United States has overstated its trade deficit with China by about US$16 billion (The Press 
Office of the State Council o f China 1997),
The US statistical approach has also been criticised in the United States. In the words of 
an American scholar':
“U.S. data on bilateral trade with China are seriously flawed. Although this year U.S. 
firms will sell about $6 billion to China via Hong Kong middlemen, the Department of 
Commerce insists on calling these transactions sales to Hong Kong. But the department 
counts as imports from China all Chinese products reexported from Hong Kong to the 
United States. Unfortunately, the department also includes the value added by Hong Kong 
companies as part of the total value of imports from China. In the process U.S. officials 
will overstate imports from China this year by $7 billion. The upshot is that this year the 
real U.S. trade imbalance with China is likely to total about $25 billion, one-third less than 
a projection of $38 billion based on U.S. government data. That would represent an 
increase of about 10 percent, the slowest rate of increase since the real bilateral deficit first 
emerged in the late 1980s, and one-third less than an anticipated 1996 deficit with Japan of 
$40 billion. In short, the U.S. deficit with China is not increasing rapidly.” (Lardy 1996)
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It is not surprising that different countries have their own rules guiding statistical 
practices. The real risk of discrepancies in trade balance between countries, however, is that 
the large hade deficit may lead the related country to seek protectionist trade policy or put 
pressure onto the counterpart. In the case of China-US trade, the US’s response was more 
sensitive than China’s. Some people in the United States have argued that since mid-1980s 
US bilateral trade deficits were in part caused by China’s import policies restricting US 
export capacities (U S T R 1994). Even in the situation of 1995 when US exports to China grew 
at a more rapid rate, 27%, than US imports from China, which grew 17%, China was still 
regarded as “one of the world’s most closed markets for goods and services”. In the 
USTR’s view, US exports to China “have been artificially restricted by unfair and 
discriminatory trade practice”. “China’s burgeoning economy should be absorbing more 
and more US exports, and not be protected by outmoded barriers” (Kantor 1996). Such an 
assessment has naturally led to the conclusion that the USTR was required to press China to 
liberalise its trade policies.
7.3.2 The Role of the “US Factor” in China’s Trade Reform
The dispute on the trade balance was only one of a series of trade disputes between 
China and the United States. In fact, trade friction and relevant disputes between the two 
countries have erupted one after another since the mid-1980s. The range of these disputes 
covered textile trade, intellectual property right (IPR) protection, market access, the most­
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, the trade deficit and China’s GATT re-entiy/WTO 
accession. These trade disputes blocked the development of bilateral trade and, naturally, 
had a significant influence on China’s opening process.
“Negotiated” Trade Policy Reforms
Trade policy had once been regarded as a matter of domestic concern and, although 
usually with a delay, adapted by the government to the changing circumstance. The motives 
for trade policy reform therefore are usually derived from the changes of a country’s trade 
and development strategy. On the other hand, however, given the features of foreign trade 
and international economic linkages, any change in a country’s trade policy will certainly 
have effects on other economies. In this sense, trade policy reform could not be a pure 
domestic matter of the reforming countiy. This leads reasonably to a situation in which 
some major trade partners and international organisations are involved in the process of 
trade policy reform in the reforming country. Very often, and understandably, the
179
involvement of the external factors is to direct the changes of trade policies in the reforming 
countiy, regardless of whether the reforming country is co-operative or reluctant. If the gaps 
between the reforming country and the external forces exists, the actual consequence may 
be to cany out a “negotiated” trade policy refonn. That is, the targets, the pace or timing, 
and even the measures of trade policy refonn are to be detennined in the process of 
bargaining between the reforming country and the external forces.
Interestingly, China’s trade policy reform has experienced the above described change 
from unilateral trade policy refonn to a “negotiated” one. Before the mid-1980s, China’s 
trade policy reforms were basically self-motivated. All refonn measures like 
decentralisation and the resulting relaxation of trade restrictions were very much 
appreciated by the western world. However, from the late 1980s, especially after China 
made her application for GATT re-entry, external forces became increasingly involved in 
China’s hade policy refonn. Among them, the “US factor” has effectively influenced the 
process of trade liberalisation in China.
There were two approaches in which the “US factor” affected China’s trade policy 
reform. In one way, we just mentioned in the early part of this chapter, the United States as 
a leading GATT/WTO member played a detenninative role in dealing with the issue of 
China’s GATT/WTO accession. In the other way, the United States caught every chance in 
dealing the bilateral trade relations with China to push it toward trade liberalisation. Such a 
function of the “US factor” was fully reflected in the trade disputes between China and the 
United States. The main purposes for both the United States and China, behind the disputes 
and resulting talks, was to push the counterpart’s markets open whilst minimising any 
possible disruption of domestic markets. In the disputes, however, the United States seemed 
stronger and placed continuous pressure on China, demanding a fast trade liberalisation. 
Negotiations on market access and on intellectual property rights are clear examples.
How Important Is the “US Factor”?
The importance of the “US factor” in China’s trade policy refonn can be understood on 
the following grounds. First, the United States captured a special position in the world 
economy. Because of its super economic power and market capacity, the United States 
plays one of the determining roles in international economic affairs. While integrating its 
economy with the rest of the world, China has to face the fact that the US factor operates
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within almost every area of the world economy and most major international organisations. 
Thus the US factor had had, and will continue to have, a strong influence on China’s 
opening-up process. China’s experience in applying for GATT/WTO status bears witness to 
this.
Second, the United States is one of the most important trade partners to China. In 1996, 
trade with the USA accounted for almost one fifth of China’s total trade. Discrepancies on 
trade policy issues between the two countries, once developed to a certain degree, could 
lead to a setback of the growing trade relations. This would be an extremely serious 
obstacle to China’s opening-up and growth process. China’s exports have been very much 
concentrated on a few foreign markets including the USA. Meanwhile, a large part of 
China’s imports of production facility have been from the USA. For these reasons, China 
indeed needed to maintain the trade relations with the USA and give sufficient attention to 
USA’s demand on trade policy reform for China.
Third, and more important, China’s trade policy reform has been directed towards trade 
liberalisation. Significantly, regardless of the motive that led the USA to put pressure on 
China’s trade policy refonn, the USA’s demands are basically on the line of trade 
liberalisation. Here the connection point exists. On this basis, the “US factor” has 
functioned, with great influence, to promote China’s trade policy refonn. The USA’s tough 
stand on the issues of China’s accession to GATT/WTO and of the bilateral trade relations 
has, in fact, forced China to accelerate the pace of trade policy reform.
However, it is equally important that one should not overestimate the role of the US 
factor in China’s trade refonn. China has shown that it will insist on its own principles in 
the key trade issues. Many major trade reforms were initially launched by China itself in 
accordance with the development of the national economy, and controlled by the 
government. The advantage of this situation was that the government could keep the pace of 
trade refonn with the overall economic transition, and ensure that the trade policy reform 
continues to realise its national economic targets and to benefit growth. The disadvantage 
may be that the trade refonn could be slow or even stagnate, given the difficulties in 
reforming the state-owned economy.
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Further, it is also necessary to note that not eveiy kind of USA demand was reasonable. 
As analysed earlier, particularly regarding China’s accession to the WTO, some US 
demands were too excessive for China. Of course, China’s integration with the international 
economy is not a unilateral or internal affair, dependent solely on its own willingness. It is 
also not surprising that a few industrial countries may try to interfere or direct the process 
of China’s trade policy reform. The US factor is just functioning on such a basis. A 
conspicuous intention of US policy towards China seems to be that the United States wants 
to affect the direction of China’s trade reform. This is demonstrated by the US requirements 
on various trade issues. While the United States made requirements on China, US-interest- 
centred objectives became the dominating force throughout the bilateral trade talks between 
China and the United States. The issue is not that the US took advantage of China’s 
integration with the international economy to pursue its specific objectives but that the US 
demands were, as Chinese officials and scholars pointed out, excessive and impracticable 
for China (Zhou Hamnin 1995; Tang Haiyan 1995; Xue Yongjiu 1995; Li Zhongzhou 1996a, 1996b). 
Some western scholars also criticised the excessive demands on China’s entry (Lardy 1996; 
Wall 1996).
In addition, the functioning of the US factor contains US political and strategic 
considerations. The making of US China policy cannot exclude the influence of political 
relations between the two countries and the goals of US global strategy. By examining the 
historical changes of US trade policy towards China, Zhang Zhengyu (1995) pointed out that 
a political element can be seem to have been holding the leading position in the making that 
policy. China is one of the few socialist countries in the world still led by a Communist 
Party. After the end of the Cold War, China became the only counterbalance to the United 
States on political issues because there is a basic difference in the nature of the social 
systems in these two big countries. For its ideological target, the United States has 
employed all its means, of which trade policy is the most powerfiil tool, to try to direct 
China into the capitalist world. Therefore it is not surprising that the United States has 
imposed a series of political conditions on its hade policy toward China. At present, the 
United States is the only developed country that has not granted GSP treatment to China, 
because US laws have special prescriptions for the implementation of GSP to socialist 
countries. Linking human rights with China’s MFN status was another example, which 
showed the political colour of US trade policy. For the United States, as Chinese leaders
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and scholars have argued, China’s re-entry to GATT has been really treated as a political 
question rather than an economic issue (B e ijin g  R e v iew  1 5 -2 1 /7 /1 9 9 6 ; T an g  H aiyan  1 9 9 5 ).
It seems that both China and the USA face their own dilemma. For the USA, a growing 
Chinese economy offers a great market opportunity. China’s integration with and 
involvement in the world economy could further expand such an opportunity in which the 
USA may have greater interest. On the other hand, it is the “rise of China” may increase the 
risk of the “China threat” to USA’s super power position, especially in the absence of a 
complete market system and a liberalised trade regime. US trade policy toward China 
therefore aimed to ensure the real progress of trade liberalisation. For China, integration 
with and involvement in the world economy enables it to create a better environment for its 
economic development but at the expense of hade policy reform. A few years ago, China 
was eager to join GATT/WTO but reluctant to cany out fast trade policy reform. 
Nevertheless, in the view of long-mn development, trade liberalisation has been the goal of 
China’s trade policy reform. The “negotiated” trade policy reform at present stage made 
some progress in trade liberalisation in China, less than the USA expected but fast than 
China prepared.
7.4 C h in a  a n d  t h e  EU
China established fonnal diplomatic relations with the EU (EC) in 1973. A trade 
agreement was signed in April 1978, taking effect in June of that year, which called for the 
promotion of exchange in the field of economics, trade, and industry. In May 1985, a new 
trade and economic co-operation agreement (EEC-China Trade and Economic Co­
operation Agreement) was signed and trade relations between the two sides were 
strengthened. Over the past two decades, although there was a setback due to the event of 
June 1989, economic and trade relation between China and EU countries has improved.
Table 7.5 China’s Trade with the EU (US$ billions)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Exports to the EU  
Imports from the EU
2.314
2.744
2.283
6.151
6.275
9.147
7.127
9.297
8.004
10,863
12.258
15.739
15.418
18.604
19.122
21.257
19.868
19.883
Source: IMF, Direction o f  Trade Statistic Yearbook, 1985, p. 138; 1988, p. 138; 1997, pp. 159.
Compared with the United States, the EU held a more moderate policy towards China. 
The EU coimtries have enjoyed economic stimulation generated by the fast economic 
growth of the East Asian economy. The sound growth of Asian economies increased
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demand for imports which provided EU countries with the opportunity to resuscitate their 
economies. In the case of trade with China, according to IMF statistics, EU exports to 
China (i.e. China’s imports from the EU) increased from US$2,314 billion in 1980 to 
US$19,868 billion in 1996. Even on the basis of EU statistics, EU exports to China also 
increased from 6.9 billion ecu in 1992 to 12.4 billion ecu in 1994, almost doubling in the 
three year period (Tanaka 1996). From the above data, it can be seen that a sharp increase of 
trade between China and the EU began in 1993. An important contributing factor was that 
in 1991 China made a foreign trade strategy decision to develop a pluralistic international 
market (Sheng Danyang 1994). That means, while expanding trade with traditional trade- 
partners, China would develop trade relations with other new and potential trade partners, 
and re-balance China’s trade relations with all trade partners as well. Historically China’s 
foreign markets were concentrated on Hong Kong, Japan and North America, although 
there were some trade linkages with EU countries. Compared with the trade with Hong 
Kong, Japan and the United States, China’s trade with the EU is much smaller. The market 
multilateralisation strategy put China’s trade relations with the EU in a more important 
position, given that its trade relations with the United States have experienced a certain 
amount of friction since the 1990s.
On the side of the EU, it also changed its policy from adhering to political issues to one 
based on the improvement of economic and trade relations. This resulted in a marked 
increase in exchanges and co-operations between the EU and China. In view of China’s 
rapid growth, the European Commission drafted its strategy (A Long-Term Policy for 
China-Europe Relations, released on 5 July 1995 and then formally adopted on 3 October
1995) to build closer ties with China. This was the first time that the EU made an overall 
policy toward China, as an EU leader said (People’s Daily 7/7/1995). The EU has noted that 
there have been dramatic changes in the Chinese economy and society since the full-scale 
promotion of reforms and the adoption of the open-door policy, and the EU also had an 
interest in ensuring that these trends are not to be reversed. Therefore, the EU had set its 
policies to support China’s implementation of refonn and the open-door policy. That is to 
encourage the completion of its transformation from a planned economy to a market 
economy, support China’s involvement in the stabilisation of the international economy and 
China’s membership in the WTO, and encourage EU companies to enter the Chinese 
market for developing economic and trade relations between the two sides and
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strengthening the competitiveness of the EU’s companies {People’s Daily 7/7/1995; Tanaka
1996). Particularly, on the issue of China’s WTO membership, the EU deems that China’s 
entry into the WTO will bring great benefits to all parties. Given that China’s economy is in 
the process of transition, the EU suggested that the WTO should adopt an approach of 
“transitional period” to deal with China’s membership of the organisation. In EU’s opinion, 
China could be first allowed to enter the WTO on condition of accepting the main 
principles of the organisation and then, in an agreed “transitional period”, fulfil the relative 
obligations agreed by China and other WTO members (Wang He 1996).
Undeniably, there are still some discrepancies between China and the EU on some trade 
issues and these may affect the development of trade relations between them. For example, 
in 1970, the EC (now the EU) classified China as a non-market economy (Xiao Zhiyue 1993, 
p.ll). By 1994, the EU still regarded China as a country of “state trade”. This induced the 
EU to apply different policies to China. China’s exports still meet with some NTBs in 
European markets. By the end of 1994, there were 54 catalogue products which had been 
subjected to anti-dumping investigations by the EU (European Department, MOFECT 1995). The 
increase in anti-dumpling proceedings by the EU is a clear signal that the EU wishes to 
protect its domestic industry from low priced competition from China (Xiao Zhiyue 1993). 
Solution of these trade disputes requires a further adjustment of bilateral trade policies on 
both sides. What is clear is that there is a huge potential to improve trade relations between 
China and the EU, with respect to their market size, economic complementarity and, more 
importantly, the significance of expanding bilateral trade relations for the development of 
their own economies.
7.5 C h in a  a n d  E a st  A s ia n  E c o n o m ie s
Over the last two decades more, East Asian economies have achieved an astonishing 
growth. A vast literature has addressed the causes of this rapid growth in East Asia 
economies. The elements discussed cover a wide range of social and economic aspects. The 
success of East Asian economies has been attributed, in addition to the support of an 
appropriate international environment, to their stable macroeconomic conditions, high 
saving rates, accumulation of qualified human resource, well-functioning market 
mechanism, government intervention, and export-led strategies (World Bank 1993; Hughes 
1995; Vaidya and Wang Xinmin 1995; Stiglitz 1996; Cheng Qizhen 1996).
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Discussing the reasons for the achievements of Asian economies on a broad basis is 
beyond the aim of this study. However, it should be noted that growth in these economies 
has been on a background of rapid expansion in external trade. Promoting export 
production to increase exports has been a major impetus for the enhancement of 
productivity in these economies (Vaidya and Wang Xinmin 1995). The rapid growth of exports, 
especially the exports of manufactures, played an important role in the rapid overall 
economic growth of Asian economies (World Bank 1993). While noting the impact of Asian 
economic and trade growth on the world economy, the special significance of East Asian 
economies for China’s economic development and trade policy reform is also noteworthy. 
As a major economy in the region, China contributed to, and benefited from, the fast 
growth of the Asian economy.
7.5.1 The Rapid Growth of China’s Foreign Trade with East Asian Economies
With regard to the size and components of China’s trade with East Asian economies, in 
particular with Japan and Hong Kong, it is more important than with many others countries. 
Several aspects show this unusual importance. First, as shown in Figure 7.1, China has 
important hade linkages with the other economies in East Asia. Trade with ten major East 
Asian economies (Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and six ASEAN economies) 
accoimted for over a half of China’s total trade (55.25% in 1996). Among them, both Hong 
Kong and Japan are among the first three of China’s trade partners (The USA was the 
second in recent years except in 1995 when it was in the first place). Hong Kong has long 
been one of China’s most important export destinations and import sources. The share of 
Hong Kong in China’s total trade grew from 12.91% in 1980 to 29.42% in 1988. By the 
early 1990s, when China’s external trade was affected by the event of June 1989, near half 
of China’s exports (44.74% in 1991) and more than a quarter of imports (27.50% in 1991) 
were traded with Hong Kong’s enterprises. In recent years, although the share of trade with 
Hong Kong has declined relatively (15.88% in 1995 and 14.05% in 1996) due partially to 
the development with more direct trade with other countries, its importance as China’s 
major trade partner has remained. China-Japan bilateral trade has increased rapidly since 
the normalisation of the bilateral diplomatic relation between the two countries, from about 
US$1 billion in 1972 to US$10 billion in 1981 and US$20 billion in 1991. Since the 1990s, 
China-Japan trade has been expanded in a high speed and reached US$60 billion in 1996, 
accounting for one-fifth (20.72%) of China’s total foreign trade. Japan is now China’s 
largest trade partner and China stands in the second place on Japan’s trade partner list.
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Besides trading with Japan and Hong Kong, China’s trade with other Asian economies has 
also increased rapidly. Trade with Korea and Taiwan, in particular, registered veiy high 
growth rates since the 1990s.
Figure 7.1 China's Trade with T en  M ajor E ast Asian E conom ies
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Note: ASEAN6 includes Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Viet Nam. 
Source: IMF, Direction o f  Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Second, the fast growing East Asian economies have been important sources of capital 
inflows to China. Since 1978 through the end of 1995, China had approved 259,379 
foreign-funded projects, involving a total negotiated foreign investment of US$395.12 
billion. The total amount of foreign investment actually used had reached US$135.08 
billion (Li Bin 1996). Most of these foreign investments came from Asian economies, 
especially from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. For example, in 1979-1991, the percentage 
of foreign investment from Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and 
Thailand were 62,2%, 5.7%, 5.5%, 1.7% and 0.6% respectively, accounting for 75.7% of 
the total foreign investment in China during the period (Zhu Wenlmi 1996b). In 1996, half of 
FDI in China came from Hong Kong (49.56%), followed by Japan (8.82%), Taiwan 
(8.33%) and USA (8.25%). The growth of FDI accompanied or induced continuos increase 
of trade between China and other East Asian economies. In addition, Japan also provided 
China with a large amount of government loans to support her economic development.
Third, along with the development of commodity trade, many advanced and appropriate 
technologies have also been introduced into China. Of those foreign-funded industrial 
projects in operation, more than 80% have introduced foreign advanced technology, with 
one-third of that introduced technology being the latest level in the world (Shun Jiaheng 1994).
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In introducing foreign technology into China, some East Asian economies have played veiy 
important roles. Japan as a developed country has become a major exporter of technology to 
China. In 1995, for example, Japan was China’s second largest source of technological 
equipment imports. Although not all equipment and technology from Japan were, and were 
not necessaiy to be, the most advanced, they have become the means for improving China’s 
industrial capacity. Hong Kong, Singapore and some other East Asian economies, although 
they are not the origins of advanced technology, have bridged a lot of technology transfers 
between China and the developed world. The Chinese government has noted the function of 
foreign investment and technology in China’s economic development and will keep its 
markets open to foreign capital and technology. Undoubtedly this policy will provide many 
opportunities for foreign investors, especially for those from East Asian economies, to 
access to the huge China market.
Finally, large amount of raw materials from East Asian economies have also positively 
supported China’s fast economic expansion. Given the facts that near a half of China’s trade 
were processing trade and more than a half of China’s trade were intra-regional trade in 
East Asia, the importance that East Asian economies are as a main resource of productive 
materials does not need further explanation.
China’s economic development over past decades has witnessed the development of a 
veiy important dependence on economic relations with East Asian economies, as well as 
with the developed world. The above description shows the fast development of China’s 
trade with the East Asian economies. However, the statistical evidence above does not 
demonstrate fully the special significance of the China-East Asian trade. Therefore, I now 
turn to the following further analysis.
7.5.2 The Special Significance of China-East Asia Trade
The rapid development of China-East Asia economic and trade relations resulted from 
the mutual benefits between the economies. The East Asian economies are highly 
complementary. The openness of China’s economy through its trade policy reforms 
generated significant influences on the development of East Asian economies.
First, the growing Chinese markets, and the increasing opening-up of these markets, 
was one of the positive factors promoting the regional trade growth in East Asia. As a large
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developing country, China has abundant natural resources, low-cost labour force and a huge 
market of 1.2 billion consumers. China’s rapid economic growth over the past decades 
increased domestic demand which enlarged China’s market capacity. For industrialisation, 
China opened its market to the rest of the world. During 1990-1995, the intra-regional trade 
between Asian economies (including East Asia and other Asian economies) increased from 
42.0% of their total exports in 1990 to 50.9% in 1995. In the same period, while Asian 
intra-regional exports grew with an average annual rate of 16% and the average growth rate 
of world trade was 12%, exports from other Asian economies to China registered a much 
higher annual growth rate of 26% (WTO 1996). China’s exports to the above mentioned ten 
other Asian economies also grew with an average annual rate of 15.43% in 1990-1995, 
although lower than that of its imports from other Asian economies but close to the average 
growth rate of Asian intra-regional exports. From this data it is evident that China has 
contributed to the fast growth of Asian intra-regional trade. Of cause, as analysed earlier, 
this increase in China’s trade capacity must be attributed to its sustained trade policy reform 
over the past years.
Second, China’s trade policy reform promoted the upgrade of trade structure in Japan 
and Asian NIEs. Trade policy reforms improved the investment enviromnent in China. By 
creating some new trade forms, such as compensation trade, China has introduced a large 
number of labour-intensive plants from Japan and Asian NIEs. It provided a chance for 
Japan and Asian NIEs to upgrade their technological capacity in order to strengthen their 
competitiveness in the world markets. By moving some labour-intensive industries to 
China, and some other South Eastern counfries else, Japan and Asian NIEs adjusted their 
structures of production and trade, and more capital and human resources could be put in 
technology-intensive industries to improve their comparative advantages. At the same time, 
the inflows of production factors from Japan and NIEs also accelerated the development of 
Chinese economy, brought China a large amount of capital and increased employment 
opportunities for Chinese people. A so-called “flying geese pattern” of development has 
been successful in Asia.[21 Concerning China’s performance, export structure has been 
increasingly enhanced. For example, about a half of China’s exports to Japan in 1990 were 
non-manufactured products, but this proportion dropped to below one-fourth in 1995 
(ESCAP 1997, pp.91-92).
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Third, the opening of China's market has become a balancing factor in Asian 
economies, reducing their dependence on developed country markets. Historically, the 
development of exports in most Asian economies depended highly on the import capacity 
of developed countries. Although this trend has remained, dependence on developed 
country markets has been relatively reduced, while the increase of intra-regional trade 
enabled Asian economies to realise a plural market strategy.
The Asian economies have different features with reference to their resource 
endowments and market capacities. Japan and Korea have undeniable advantages in 
advance technology, while other economies have stayed at a relatively low level of 
technology. Japan and the “Four Little Tigers”, after the rapid development of the past 
decades, have been important capital suppliers in and out of the region, while other 
countries are still experiencing capital shortage. While the cost of labour in Japan and the 
“Four Little Tigers” became expensive due to improved living standards, China and other 
Asian countries continue to benefit from the advantage of low labour costs. The regional 
market, given the fast growth in this region, has been greatly expanded. China’s opening-up 
and participation has undoubtedly been a positive force in promoting the development of 
regional trade linkages in Asia. At present, it is safe to say that, parallel to the global 
division of labour in which Asian economies have been involved through various forms, a 
regional system of the division of labour has also been formed in Asia.
Fourth, China is becoming a strong competitive force in the world markets. This has in 
the first place generated significant impacts on its neighbour areas. China’s trade policy 
refonn, especially the export promotion policies, strengthened the competition between 
Asian exporters. Although many differences exists in Asian developing economies, there 
are also a lot of similarities among them. The fact that many of them are in similar stage of 
development generated many overlaps between these economies. For example, labour- 
intensive industries account for a considerable proportion of these economies except Japan. 
All economies have a strong emphasis on an export-led strategy. Most exports from these 
economies are concentrated on the markets of developed countries. Therefore, the existing 
labour-intensive industries in some Asian economies could be affected by China’s rising 
market share.
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Oil the other hand, however, it is worthy of note that the shares of manufactures from 
East Asia economies to developed countries greatly increased in the 1980s and the early 
1990s. Lloyd and Toguchi (1996) pointed out a notable phenomenon that all East Asian 
economies had successfully increased their market shares in developed countries. In 1980, 
only 1.15% of developed country markets were supplied from East Asia. By 1993, the 
percentage increased to 3.74, accounting for 15% of total imports of manufactures from all 
foreign countries into these markets. This means that China’s growth of exports might not 
be considered as a severe threat to other East Asian exporters. China’s exports did, 
however, grow at a double-digit rate of growth over the post-reform years, becoming the 
single largest supplier of Asian developing economies in developed country markets. 
China’s participation in export competition will stimulate other East Asian economies to 
improve their competitiveness. With some necessary trade policy adjustments and the 
increasingly strengthened economic and trade co-operation, East Asia should maintain its 
highest rate of economic and trade growth over the longer term.
Finally, China’s trade policy reform has benefited from the rapid growth of Asian 
economy and trade. On the one hand, the expanding Asian economies absorbed a large part 
of China’s exports and supplied lots of materials for China’s imports. The fast development 
of China-East Asia trade provided impetus for China to speed up its trade policy reform and 
has also helped in maintaining China’s rapid growth of foreign trade which has alleviated 
the shock of trade policy changes. In addition, the trade reform experience of some Asian 
economies, such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan, has enlightened China’s reform approach. As 
mentioned earlier, East Asia’s approach of trade policy reform is different from that of 
many other countries, typically with heavier government intervention. China has actually 
been in favour of this pattern of trade policy reform. This pattern should not be considered a 
extremely bad thing in a transition process from the previously central planning economy, 
given that reform would move to fine trade or liberalisation. China has followed such a way 
to reform its trade policies and, after a period adjustment, turned to intensive reform in the 
1990s. The past two decades of reform have now proven successful in many aspects. Of 
course, it is arguable whether China should adopt a “big bang” approach to reform. The 
answer to this is eventually political and thus be beyond the scope of this study. What is 
certain is that, in Asian tradition, a gradual change in a steady socio-economic environment 
has always been preferred. In this sense, China’s adoption of the East Asian approach of
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reform has been understandable and acceptable, for Chinese people and people in other 
Asian economies.
7.6 C o n c l u sio n
To sum up, China’s reforms of its domestic economy and foreign trade policy have 
generated significant impacts on its trading partners and the world economy as a whole. The 
changes in China’s trade regime and trade policies have induced a series of policy 
adjustments in the rest of the world. Simultaneously, demands and pressures from trading 
partners have also had important influences on China’s economic and trade policy reforms. 
An important lesson from China’s trade policy reform experience, particularly from the 
development of China-US trade relationships, is that China should have a well-designed 
blueprint for its trade policy reform in order to escape from being forced into a passive 
position. In the next stage of trade policy reform, it will be necessary to give sufficient 
consideration to changes in the world trade system. The basic trend in China’s future trade 
policy reform should be to liberalise its trade regime and the whole economy further in 
accordance with international norms.
[1] China’s GNP per capita (PPP estimate) in 1996 was U S$3,330, ranking 88th in the world (World Bank 1998, p. 17).
[2] For a brief explanation regarding the significance o f  the “flying geese pattern” for China, see Fukasaku and Wall 
(1994), p. 71.
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Conclusion and Perspectives on China’s Trade Policy Reform
8.1 The Aggregate Evaluation of China’s Trade Policy Reform
8.1.1 The Basie Characteristics of China’s Trade Policy Reform
Almost two decades have passed since the beginning of China’s trade reform. In the 
course of reform, China has made, and will continue to make, a great effort in exploring its 
own way toward trade liberalisation. While the international experience of trade policy 
reform has certainly provided significant encouraging for China’s reform, much of China’s 
attention has also been focused on the adoption of effective measures to meet the demands 
of the gradual opening-up of the economy. It is just because of such an effort that China’s 
experience has become a noteworthy case.
First, because China’s institutional setting was initially formed to fit the planned 
economy, trade policy reform inevitably regarded institutional reform as a first step. Only if 
the institutional structure has been made compatible with the market economy, can trade 
policy reform be effectively liberalised. That is why China’s trade reform was begun with a 
phase of decentralisation of the trade regime.
Second, in the early stage of China’s hade reform, there was no clear plan concerning 
the target and corresponding measures of reform. This is veiy different from those trade 
reform programmes sponsored by international organisations. The model of China’s trade 
reform was adjusted throughout the 1980s and finally confirmed as trade liberalisation 
based on a market economy in the early 1990s. This suggests that China’s trade reform 
experienced a relatively long "trial-and-error” process in the 1980s. The significant trade 
policy reform began only as late as the 1990s with a series of intensive trade liberalisation 
measures.
Third, unlike many other developing countries that launched trade policy refoim in 
response to a heavy debt crisis, the initiative for China’s trade reform was to modify the 
existing centralised economic system. China’s trade reform at the beginning appeared as a 
unilateral effort to participate in the world economy. A turning point was China’s
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application in 1986 to rejoin the GATT. After that time, external factors began to have an 
increasing impact on China’s trade reform. The increasing influence of external factors was 
relative to China’s growing position in the world economy. Consequently, some countries 
have placed increasing pressure through multilateral or bilateral trade talks on China to 
reform its trade regime and trade policy, while China itself has also unilaterally speeded up 
its reform process.
Fourth, China’s trade policy reform was conducted under different ideological 
perspectives and economic conditions from those found in many other developing 
countries. The aim of China’s economic refonn was never capitalism, nor the previous 
socialism that existed in China in the past. Trade policy reforms in China cannot be 
explained within the context of traditional concepts of capitalism and socialism, or a simple 
mixture of the two. Very probably, the Chinese leaders intend to create a new type of 
economic system and foreign trade regime.
Finally, the Chinese government tried hard to control the reform path. The Chinese 
special economic and political situation also enabled China to adopt the path of least 
resistance or gradual reform in its economic system and foreign trade. On the domestic side, 
efforts were made to maintain social and economic stability, in order to provide a stable 
socio-economic environment to cany on trade policy reforms as well as the refonn of the 
whole economy. Although this attempt, and corresponding measures, sometimes retarded a 
speedy reform, the risk of a sharp shock to the economic transition process has been 
successfully avoided.
Some of the above features may be shared by other reforming countries. However, the 
combination of all these features enabled China’s trade policy refonn to be unique. In other 
words, China’s trade policy reform has been a particular case of trade liberalisation. This 
uniqureness is reflected in that China’s trade policy reform has produced undeniablly 
positive results which direct China towards trade liberalisation, while maintaining its 
ideological requirement and relatively strong goverment intervention. Given the 
achievements and the special nature of trade policy reform, China’s experience may 
represent a different path for trade liberalisation in transitional economies.
194
8.1.2 Assessing China’s Experience of Trade Policy Reform
As already mentioned, trade policy reform involves various factors. Among them, the 
main ones concern the choice of trade strategy, the establishment of a market mechanism 
system, institutional reorganisation and the implementations of trade policy measures. What 
has China achieved of these aspects of trade policy refonn? What are the significance of 
these policy changes? What are, if any, the lessons that can be drawn from China’s 
experience of trade policy reform?
Foreign Trade Strategy
For a less-developed country, the path of development is always a central problem of 
policy-making. Various trade strategy models, either inward-looking or outward-looking 
economy versions, are only workable at certain stages in a country’s development. The 
assessment of the role of foreign trade in development will strongly influence a country’s 
policy choice. However, it is notable that, as the importance of trade and the conditions for 
policy implementation are changeable, trade strategy will be adjusted to match the changing 
objectives. In this sense, trade policy reform result from the shift of trade strategy.
In the present world, international economic linkage requires countries to adopt a more 
open strategy for utilising external resources to support domestic growth. A number of 
countries (areas) have successfully demonstrated the great significance of shifting trade 
strategy away from the state of isolation. Given the advantages of open trade, the 
emergence of trade strategy shifts and trade policy reforms were seen in developing 
countries in recent decades. China, like many reforming countries, also experienced a trade 
strategy shift from a closed, inward-looking type to an open, outward-looking one.
China’s adoption of the open-door policy signalled the change of foreign trade strategy. 
China has made a great effort to develop its external economic linkages and expand its 
exports. Since 1978, China has been experiencing a change from a “strongly inward- 
looking” to a “moderately outward-looking” regime (Xue Jingxiao et al 1989). Specifically, as 
analysed in this study, China’s previous overall import substitution strategy has been turned 
into a basically neutral strategy integrating export promotion with import substitution. 
During the course of refonn, a series of measures were adopted to make China’s foreign
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trade regime conform to international trade norms. A multi-layer directional pattern of 
opening-up of trade has been developed in China.
It is important to note that China’s hade refonn was by no means an across-the-board 
liberalisation. Analysis in this study has shown that China’s present economic and trade 
structures still have characteristics of import substitution, although the IS strategy has lost 
its previously dominant position. The debate on trade strategy among Chinese economists 
and policy-makers in the reform period led to a reconsideration of the choice of an 
appropriate approach to industrialisation. For China, it would be impracticable to eliminate 
import substitution totally at the present stage of economic development. This is by no 
means suggesting that China prefers the protectionist policy of the IS strategy. Any choice 
of trade strategy should fit the initial conditions in the transforming country to ensure the 
best effect of strategy change. China is a big country in which there is a relatively complete 
structure of industries on the supply side and a huge consumption requirement on the 
demand side as well. The domestic circulation is the main aspect of development. 
Developing the ingredients of an outward-looking economy is only one way through which 
China can optimise and accelerate its economic development.
However, it is equally important that trade plays a significant role in the process of 
industrialisation. Protectionist policies are frowned on within the international community. 
Given the changes of its internal and external environment, the development of foreign 
trade may be a key for the transition of the economic structure. The experience of Japan, 
Korea and some other successfril NIEs showed that outward development is a necessary 
stage in the course of industrialisation. A late-comer country can make good use of the 
functions of trade to transfer foreign advanced production forces into its own economy, 
improve its abilities on technology development and export expansion, promote and 
upgrade domestic economic structure, and realise industrialisation. This suggests that China 
needs more open policies to stimulate foreign trade in order to obtain stronger stimulus for 
industrialisation.
It is possible to conclude that a mixed trade strategy combining export promotion and 
import substitution ingredients has been the right choice for China at present stage of 
development. The shift of trade strategy from import substitution to export promotion has
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given trade a more important role to play. It was the shift in trade strategy that has led 
China on the road of development with greater dependence on trade. More importantly, the 
change of trade strategy has motivated China to build an open regime and to integrate itself 
within the world economy.
The Domestic Economy and Foreign Trade
In the course of economic and trade reform, the domestic economy has two roles. On 
the one hand, the domestic economy determines the initial conditions for trade reform. On 
the other, the domestic economy reflects the effects of trade reform. In the latter, trade 
refonn acts as a factor inducing the reforms in the domestic economy. Ideally, trade policy 
refonn is expected to make full use of the interactions between trade reform and the 
domestic reforms to promote development on the both sides. However, in China’s 
experience, the relationships between trade refonn and the domestic reforms have 
witnessed very different situations.
From the view of the domestic economy as a precondition and support to trade policy 
reform, China’s experience has not been advantageous due to the relatively slow transition 
of the economy from plan to market. The success of trade policy reform requires supports 
from other sectors. Any lag in the relevant policy adjustment may delay the pace of trade 
policy reform. China has a relatively long history of a planned economy in which the 
market mechanism was severely restrained. The reforms since the end of 1978 have 
involved the expansion of enterprise autonomy and the introduction of the market 
mechanism. But the progress in establishing a market system seemed behind the demand of 
trade policy refonn. Moreover, the refonn timing has not been clear for a quite long time. 
The beginning of trade refonn was much behind the reforms in other sectors. Many crucial 
domestic reforms including foreign exchange regime refonn, price refonn and taxation 
reform have not been in place until recent years. To obtain an appropriate environment, 
trade policy refonn has had to be delayed. The long-lasting dual exchange rate system and 
the rarity of tariff reductions in the 1980s, were due a great extent to the stagnated reforms 
in some related domestic sectors.
Regarding the effect of trade policy reform on the domestic reforms, as analysed in this 
study, trade policy refonn has in fact triggered a series of domestic reforms. Because of the
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openness of trade, the domestic market encountered increasing competition which shook 
the previous closed-type regime. The most important contribution of trade reform to 
China’s economic development was that trade has been an effective channel in which a lot 
of advanced technology and managerial knowledge were introduced into the economy. By 
reforming the trade regime and trade policies, the prices, fiscal, taxation, finance, exchange 
rate, customs systems and enterprises all had to change to match the trade liberalisation 
strategy. Through refonn, many international nouns have been applied in these fields. Even 
the adoption of the dual exchange rates, the foreign exchange retention system, the subsidy 
policies were all to compensate for the weakness of the IS strategy bias. In turn, with the 
progress in the marketisation of the domestic economy, trade policies were gradually 
nonnalised in the course of refonn. As analysed in the preceding chapters, trade has been an 
important source of China’s rapid economic growth.
In balance, a conclusion which can be reached here is that the gradual reforms in 
China’s domestic economy have provided a solid ground for the success of trade policy 
refonn. However, the relatively slow pace of the domestic reforms resulting from the 
gradualism have obstructed a fast deepening of trade policy reform. By contrast, trade 
policy refonn has been a positive driving force inducing a number of the domestic reforms. 
Trade policy refonn, in this sense, has become the crucial touchstone of China’s market 
reforms.
The Role of Government
The role of government in economic development has become a popular subject in 
recent decades. More than a few economists have argued that governments have to play an 
important role in the development process (and in economic transition), whether their 
perception of the government’s role was in the broad or in the narrow range. At least, 
appropriate economic policies and effective government administration may lead in the 
direction of development/transition. It is, then, not surprising that trade refonn will be 
significantly influenced by governmental policy guidance.
As discussed, the role of government seemed more important in China’s trade refonn. 
China has been transforming its economy from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy. The importance of the central plan has declined considerably as the process of 
decentralisation has progressed. However, it is important to note that the appropriate role of
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government has not yet been defined. China’s market economy is still under construction. 
The market mechanism is far from complete so that the “market” cannot provide complete 
signals for enterprises. Economic adjustments have to rely partly on administrative 
measures. Most importantly, China’s political conditions and the ideological perspective 
still demand that the government keeps control of economic and trade reforms.
Now the question remains as to why China’s hade policy refonn with strong 
government intervention has been effective? Is it because the role of government has been 
well-defined? The answer to the second question is certainly not. As shown in the analysis 
in the preceding chapters, China’s trade policy reform has featured excessive government 
intervention and many of these interventions were administrative and operating against 
market forces. On the other hand, however, it was by administrative intervention that China 
has introduced market forces into the economy to give a more important role to trade 
policy. The fact that the government commits itself to a dual role, regulating foreign trade 
on the one hand and liberalising hade policy on the other, reflects the very special nature of 
China’s transitional economy. A very important factor contributing to the success of refonn 
was a balanced use of administrative intervention and market forces, aimed at a gradual 
transition of the economy. The art of refonn, increasing the function and scope of market 
mechanisms while reducing the range of government control, has kept producing a 
increasingly better policy environment to stimulate trade growth. In this way, trade policies 
have been reformed one after another. Looking at the whole course of refonn, trade policy 
has gradually moved towards liberalisation. In this sense, the govermnent has played an 
important role in promoting trade liberalisation in China.
In sum, the old system has not been totally denounced in China. Reform means change. 
But the direction of change in China is by no means toward a capitalist system. In other 
words, since the beginning of reform, China has been exploring a new way to combine 
socialist ideology with market mechanisms. For the reasons mentioned above, it is not 
surprising that China will maintain the role of government in guiding its trade reform. The 
predictable change seems only in the form of intervention, moving from direct intervention 
to a more indirect one.
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Changes of Trade Policy
As with other economic reforms, there are two paths along which the hade policy 
reform can be carried out. One is the “big bang” and the other is gradualism. The 
experience of different countries reflect these different models. Chile’s trade reform 
represents the case of an across-the-board liberalisation in shock therapy mode. In Russia, 
the big bang approach was adopted for the aggregate economy except for foreign hade. 
Trade reform in Russia was much slower than the reforms in other sectors. Japan and 
Korea, and China too, have conducted their hade reforms following the path of gradualism.
China is a typical example of gradual trade reform in the contemporary world. However 
China’s reform process also had different paces in the past reform years. Reform seemed to 
lag behind the overall economic reform in the 1980s but has been accelerated in the 1990s. 
In the 1980s, China’s hade policy was concentrating on the creation of export incentives. 
Some strong promotion measures including export subsidies, foreign exchange retention 
and duty drawback were alternatively used to stimulate export growth while imports were 
still strictly controlled. Planning control over hade decreased along with an increase of 
some quantitative restraints, such as the application of an import licensing system. In the 
1990s, the emphasis of reform has turned to trade policies. Reforms include the abolition of 
export subsidies, the reduction and elimination of mandatory trade plans, the reductions of 
tariffs, the unification of foreign exchange rates, the phase-out of the exchange retention 
system, the rationalisation of the licensing system, and the adjustment of trade-related 
taxation and foreign investment policies.
It is worth noting that the real hade liberalisation, particularly import liberalisation, was 
able to be started much later than reforms on export side, as occurred in Japan and Korea in 
the past decades. In addition, a similar feature of trade policy refonn shared by Japan, 
Korea and China is that hade liberalisation was started under heavy international pressure, 
although the domestic economic situation was also a determinant of liberalisation. China 
has tried to follow the Japanese and Korean models to reform its trade regime and trade 
policies gradually. However, the changing international environment has altered China’s 
expectation. Linked to its desire to participate in the international economy and to join the 
GATT/WTO, China, unlike Japan and Korea, has had to accelerate its process of 
liberalisation before the completion of industrialisation. This suggests that the Japanese (or
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Korean) model of industrialisation may only have been a historical success story. China 
could not simply follow this model in the refonn of its trade regime and trade policies.
The main conclusion therefore is that: China’s trade policy refonn has been proven to 
be effective and has moved in the right direction towards liberalisation. First, as shown by 
the statistics and the econometric analysis in this study, China’s trade policy refonn has 
generated a positive contribution to economic growth. The domestic reforms have also 
benefited from the sustained trade policy reform. Through the efforts of trade liberalisation, 
China’s economy has become more open than it was. Second, China began its trade policy 
reform as a trial based on gradualism but this has been turned into a fast overall reform in 
the 1990s, in contrast to the relatively long adjustment period after the big-bang transition 
in Russia. Regardless of the preference for the gradual approach, the pace of China’s trade 
policy reform reflected the underlying factor for a successful reform to fit the special 
conditions in the reforming country and to adapt the refoims to the changing environment 
of the world economy. Third, China changed its reform emphasis from one compensating 
for the policy distortions under the IS strategy, by creating various export incentives in the 
1980s, to one establishing a neutral trade regime in the 1990s. This move with significant 
reductions of export incentives and import banders has been in the direction of trade 
liberalisation. China’s increasingly open trade policy regime with a commitment toward 
liberalisation has provided a solid basis on which to integrate herself into the world 
economy. Finally, it is worth noting that there were many difficulties in the course of 
China’s trade policy refonn. The issue of China’s unsettled status in the GATT/WTO 
implies that the external factors will have significant influence on a country’s refonn 
process on the one hand, but also indicates that there is still much to be done with China’s 
economic and trade refonn on the other.
8.2 The Challenge Facing China
China’s insistence on an open-door policy has been the motor for reform in the trade 
system and trade policies. The refoims of the foreign trade system and trade policies have 
brought great changes to China’s economic development. China is now a major player in 
the world economy. In recent years, China has faced a new challenge: How to more fully 
bring China into the role of major foreign trader (Reporter of China's Foreign Trade 1993). The
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target for the year 2000 has set total import and export volumes to surpass US$400 billion, 
with each surpassing US$200 billion (X ia o  Q iang 1995).
To achieve this goal, China must actively participate in global hade and develop 
multilateral trade and economic relations. If China wants to accelerate its economic 
development by taking advantage of internationally oriented strategies, it has to deepen its 
foreign trade reform and widen its open door policy continuously.
8.2.1 Free Trade versus Chinese Characteristics
No matter what kind of economic pattern is preferred, the effective way to participate in 
international trade deeply is to formalise foreign trade policies in accordance with common 
international practice. Liberalising hade policy is necessary to further China’s reform and 
opening up process.
Since the late 1970s, China has been continuously emphasising the open-door policy 
although the pace was small and slow at the beginning. Each step implemented, including 
the granting of trading rights to enterprises, the establishment of SEZs, the introduction of 
foreign capital, and various measures to improve trade conditions, reflected the attempt to 
open the economy to the outside world and reform the foreign trade system. In particular, 
trade policy refonn in China since the 1990s, such as the readjustment of some abnormal 
trade policies, the implementation of the unified policies of foreign trade and economic co­
operation, and the enhancement of the transparency of trade policies, were evidence that 
China has been moving closer to international nouns.
For China, however, the biggest challenge is to find a way to integrate its “socialist 
economy” with an international economic system which is based on capitalism, by means 
of its so-called “socialist free hade system”. This leads a further discussion back to the 
essential and debatable question of reform approaches presented at the beginning of this 
study. Analysis in this study showed that China has followed a hade policy reform 
approach different from that of neo-classical free trade theory, but has achieved great 
progress in trade liberalisation.
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China’s major achievements in the reform and opening-up period were highly 
correlated with the liberalisation of economic policies, including trade policy. While the 
target of Chinese economic refonn has been set up as a “socialist market economy”, the 
trend of trade liberalisation has gradually become clearer. The pace of liberalisation has 
also been speeded up. Predictably, the trend of trade liberalisation in China seems 
irreversible because of the external environment of trade refonn and domestic economic 
development. While the fruits of refonn are being enjoyed, further refonn should be 
considered as well. The key factor for the acceleration of liberalisation is that the economy 
should be an open market economy in which liberal economic policy prevails. Wu Yi, the 
last minister of MOTFEC, proclaimed that China will open its domestic markets to all trade 
partners and is against all trade protectionism (Jiang M in  1 9 9 4 ) . The Chinese government has 
called for the establishment of a free trade system in China. In its Foreign Trade Law 
(1994), China announced that it will maintain a “fair and free foreign trade system”. In this 
sense, the direction of China’s trade refonn is to establish a “socialist free trade system” (G u  
Y on g jia n g  1996; L iS iy u  1 9 9 6 ).
China’s “socialist free trade system” has a two-fold task to complete. On the one hand, 
China’s trade system is required to comply with the customaiy rules of international trade 
practice. To develop China’s foreign trade and to integrate China’s economy with the world 
economy, China needs to establish a trade regime that is compatible with the international 
trading system. Basically, an open, efficient market mechanism should be the foundation of 
such an outward-oriented trade system. Although the trade systems of developing and 
developed countries vaiy greatly, there is a common foundation of a market economic 
system and its operation mechanisms on which the customary rules of international trade 
have been formed. This means the Chinese trade system must also be based on the 
operating mechanisms of market economies and that trade policies will basically have a 
neutral pattern. As many Chinese realised, if China wants to integrate with the world 
economy, the only way is to develop a market economy to replace the old system under the 
monopoly of the State (L i S iy u  1996; X u  Y u  and M a Lijun 1 9 9 6 ).
On the other hand, as a part of the national economy, China’s foreign trade system has 
to have Chinese socialist characteristics, as claimed by the Chinese government. More 
specifically, public ownership and trade planning guidance will be major features of the
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new trade system, under the tenns of the socialist market economy. China has clearly stated 
that it “will never go in for privatisation”, since public ownership plays a dominant role in 
the socialist market economy (L i L anq ing 1 9 9 6 ). China’s stance regarding privatisation is that 
“privatisation would not necessarily help to perfect the country’s market economic system” 
(L i Z h o n g zh o u  1 9 9 6 ). In the foreign trade sector, the real situation is that almost all units with 
trading rights, apart from foreign-funded enterprises, are state-owned FTCs and state- 
owned industrial enterprises (T h e  P roject R esearch  T eam  o f  P ek in g  U n iv ersity  1 9 9 6 ). In other 
words, public ownership has been the dominant ingredient of property ownership in the 
foreign trade sector, while the private economy has been developed to a relatively large 
scale in other sectors. Although in 1997 a few Sino-foreign jointly-funded foreign trade 
corporations were approved to be set up,[l] this situation is unlikely to be fundamentally 
changed in the near future because that the Chinese government is firmly holding the stance 
of maintaining the dominant role of public ownership.
8.2.2 The Connecting Point
It is necessary to appreciate the nature of the Chinese “socialist market economy”. One 
definition is as follows: “A socialist market economy means the establishment of such an 
economic system in which public ownership integrates with the market economy internally, 
the market mechanism plays a fundamental role in the development of resources under the 
positive and effective macro-adjustment by the state, and efficiency and equitableness are 
fulfilled at a high level” (G a o  Shangquan 1 9 9 3 ) .[2] A concise explanation is that the system 
incorporates (1) public ownership, (2) rational distribution according to one’s contribution, 
and (3) macromanagement through state planning (L iu  R ix in  1 9 9 4 )J 3] In a wider view, the so- 
called “socialist market economy” describes the market economy having (1) the foundation 
of public ownership of property, (2) the aim of common prosperity, (3) the compatible 
guidance of flexible plans, (4) transparency and no corruption, (5) peasants as the majority 
of participants, (6) labouring people as master, (7) active state-owned enterprises, and (8) 
relatively low productivity in the primary stage of socialism (Y a n g  S h en gm in g  1 9 9 6 ) .[4] 
Among these characteristics, most are related to socialist ideology. Concerning the market 
operation mechanisms, the key points are the type of property rights and the role of plans 
(or the state). China’s insistence on non-privatisation and the planning guidance will make 
its market economy different from those of other countries.
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Considering the need to place such characteristics in China’s future trade regime, it is 
worth thinking about the way in which China can realise its so-called socialist free trade 
system. These characteristics require China to choose a different way towards trade 
liberalisation. International society’s worries about the nature of China’s trade liberalisation 
is simply concern about its insistence on public ownership and trade planning management. 
In the existing economic theoiy, there is no full explanation of this kind of trade reform. In 
practice, China’s concept is unique. However, Chinese experience over the past years of 
reform of following just such a “unique” route to refonn has achieved undeniable success. 
The realistic attitude in promoting China’s trade refonn perhaps is to explore the way to 
harmonise the goals of Chinese characteristics and trade liberalisation.
The crucial difference, and the connecting point as well, between China’s socialist free 
trade system and that existing in the world economy is the view on the role of government. 
Public ownership is to be the foundation of government controls over trade and the 
economy. In many Chinese leaders and economists’ view, government needs to play an 
important role in the process of trade policy refonn and economic transition. However, the 
real risk behind the China’s experience in the past reform period is that trade policy refonn 
has been obstructed by excessive government intervention based on administrative forces. 
If such a situation cannot be changed, further trade policy refonn will be less significant, 
because enterprises that are assumed to be major entities in the market economy cannot act 
fully independently in response to market signals.
Theoretically, states (governments) can be classified according to with their 
interventionist tendencies. The “minimalist state” tends to be a liberal non-interventionist 
state; intervening in the economy only in case of market failure. Otherwise, economic 
activities are independent from government regulations. Traditional capitalist countries are, 
by and large, of this kind. The “maximalist state” is one in which the state’s political power 
in the economy is reinforced by state ownership of the means of production. Most socialist 
countries before the end of the Cold War belonged to this category. The third kind of state 
is neither the minimalist nor the maximalist, but falls loosely between these two extreme. 
This state goes beyond correcting market failure or simply setting the rules of the game; 
meanwhile, it does not allow complete control of the economy through political authority. 
Japan and East Asian NIEs basically fit into this fonn of state (L e e , K . 1 9 93 , p. 1 3 ).
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Trade policy liberalisation in China has actually been led by governmental guidance. 
Regarding the role of planning guidance over foreign trade, China argued that it will make 
the Chinese trade regime different Rom those of other countries. Referring to the 
experience of East Asian economies, an effective combination of market and government 
forces may create a more favourable environment for trade refonn. China’s market 
operation mechanism seems to be one closer to that of Japan and some other East Asian 
economies (T h e  P roject R esearch  T eam  o f  U IB E  1 9 9 5 ). This alternative reflects the need for 
planning guidance in a socialist market economy and the preference of Chinese people for 
management planning. Most Chinese leaders and economists have however realised that 
administrative controls over foreign trade need to be transferred to a market-based indirect 
control system. Superficially, China has phased out mandatory trade plans since 1994. 
However, due partly to imperfect new indirect macro-control over foreign trade and partly 
to the inertia of the old trade management system, trade planning has still been playing a 
major role in foreign trade. In addition, as pointed out in Chapter 2, most trade enterprises 
have not been converted into truly independent market entities due to the incompleteness of 
a full-functioning market system in China. With the administrative interventions through 
the remaining linkages between trade enterprises and their administrative authorities, it is 
not surprising that guidance trade plans have effects like that of the previous mandatory 
plans.
How can China continue its trade liberalisation while allowing necessary government 
intervention? A common policy recommendation for China’s refonn is that China needs to 
reduce government intervention over economic activities in line with the principle of a 
minimalist state, as in the cases of many western countries. Since a trend towards a 
minimalist state is regarded as an essential precondition for the establishment of a market 
economy, China has greatly reduced government supervision over economic operation 
during its refonn and opening process. However, the minimalist state is not the goal of 
China’s economic and trade reforms. The problem is not how to choose a maximal state or 
a minimal state because these two extreme forms of state are not found in practice in the 
real world. Most states in the world are mixed. The difference between various mixed states 
is the different degrees of intervention in their economies. It is important to realise that the 
change in the government’s role may generate either positive or negative effects for
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economic development. Every adoption or elimination of an economic policy implies a 
changing role for the government. From this standpoint, the changing role of the Chinese 
government during the reform period has provided strong stimulation to push the reform 
and opening forward. The reduction of government intervention has become the 
precondition of trade policy liberalisation in China. Thus, without the relaxation of 
government controls, any trade policy liberalisation is unimaginable in China, especially 
considering of the high level of control over the economy before the refonn and opening 
policies were adopted.
To deal with the relations between the state and the market, the key problem is to seek 
an optimum combination of these two factors. In East Asian cases, and to a lesser extent the 
developed countries as well, a workable model is to make appropriate use of government 
intervention on the base of a market economy. All government interventions are carried out 
as compatible with, or at least as not severely destroying, market principles and through the 
use of economic instruments (not in the form of administrative command). This is an 
extremely important experience which should be considered an enlightenment for China, 
given that relatively strong government intervention is likely to remain present in China’s 
future trade policy reform.
At the current stage of trade policy refonn, China really needs to adopt a “market first” 
refonn strategy. The lack of a complete market system has been a “dead-weight” weakness 
in China’s economic and trade refonn. Distinguished from the refonn strategy adopted in 
China for the whole refonn period so far, by which only some selected market mechanisms 
were transplanted into the administrative-force-based economic and trade systems, the 
“market first” strategy would ensure that market mechanisms would be the real forces in 
economic operation. Even allowing for the continued necessity of some government 
interventions, it is necessary to complete the establishment of the market systems first. If 
necessary and appropriate, government intervention can be developed 011 a market basis, 
through the effective use of market levers and with the least damage to the market system. 
Only with the foundation of an efficient market mechanism can trade policy refonn ensure 
a move toward liberalisation and appropriate government guidance be effective. In other 
words, trade liberalisation and government guidance can only be effectively combined in a 
market economy.
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[1] In July 1997, China for the first time approved two Sino-Foreign jointly-funded trade corporations to be set up (China 
Economic Times 3/9/1997). It was reported the number o f  such Sino-Foreign jointly-funded trade corporations was four 
in Shanghai by the late 1997 (Yao Sufeng 1997). This measure represented that the foreign trade sector, which has been 
remained state-owned for the past reform years, has also been opened to foreign investors.
[2] Gao Shangquan was formerly Vice-Minister o f  the State Economic Reform Commission.
Liu Rixin is research fellow  o f  the Macroeconomic Research Institute o f  the State Planning Commission.
^  Yang Shengmin is Director o f  the Institute o f  Trade and Finance, the Chinese Academy o f  Social Science.
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Appendix
Table 1: Exchange Rates and Trade Bias Ratio
OER AER EERX EER m EER m/EER x R E E R ADCOFE
1976 1.94 1.94 1.9445
1977 1.86 1 .86 1.9351
1978 1 .68 1 .68 1.8629
1979 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.73 1.1064 1.8897 2.40
1980 1.50 1.50 1.94 2.16 1.1116 2.4861 2.31
1981 1.71 2 .8 8 2 .8 8 3.29 1.1434 3.9671 2.48
1982 1.89 2 .8 8 2 .8 8 3.25 1.1303 4.1304 2.67
1983 1.98 2 .8 8 2 .8 8 3.24 1.1273 4.1778 3.07
1984 2.32 2 .8 8 2 .8 8 3.35 1.1621 4.2455 2.80
1985 2.94 3.24 3.24 3.77 1.1652 4.4231 3.24
1986 3.45 3.66 4.02 4.03 1.0041 4.7535 4.00
1987 3.72 4.46 4.58 4.56 0.9971 5.5318 4.13
1988 3.72 5.08 4.90 4.93 1.0048 5.4163 4.41
1989 3.77 4.92 4.79 4.87 1.0165 4.7338 4.85
1990 4.78 5.18 5.24 5.35 1 .0 2 1 0 5.1848 5.19
1991 5.32 5.74 5.56 5.77 1.0381 5.2744 6 .0 0
1992 5.51 7.40 6 .2 0 6.47 1.0436 5.1865 7.09
1993 5.76 8.11 6.60 6.87 1.0409 4.7720 7.60
1994 8.62 8.62 8.62 8 .8 6 1.0274 6.2461 8.65
1995 8.39 8.39 8.39 8.61 1.0263 5.3370 8.30
1996 8.31 8.31 8.31 8.53 1.0262 5.0211 8.43
1997 8.28 8.28 5.0269
Note: OER denotes official exchange rate, AER the applied exchange rate, EERX the effective exchange rate on 
exports, EERM the effective exchange rate on imports, and REER the real effective exchange rate. ADCOFE is 
the average domestic cost o f  foreign exchange (Chukou Huanhui Pingjun Chengben), which can be considered 
an alternative approximate EERX according to their definitions. As can be seen in the table, the constructed 
EERX are quite close to the ADCOFE.
Source: OER are from China Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and International Financial Statistics (various 
issues).
ADCOFE are compilled by the author based on various sources as follows: Figure for 1979 is from Chen 
Biaoru (1992, p. 18); data for 1980-1984 are from Wang Zhengzhong (1986); figure for 1985 is from Sung 
Yun-W ing (1992), considering Guangdong's figure as nationwide level; figure for 1986 is from Yuan Gangming 
(1987); data for 1987-1990 are from Qiang Yongchang (1993), taking Shanghai's data as nationwide levels; 
figure for 1991 is from Tang Haiyan (1991), with considering Nanjing's level as reference (Zhu Tonghua et al. 
1991); figure for 1993 is from Wang Zixian (1994); data for 1994-1995 are from Huang Xianhai (1996); figure 
for 1996 is estimated based on Qiu Ren and Wang Zhenzhi (1997).
Other exchange rates are constructed by the author. The method o f  data construction is described in Chapter
6 .
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Table 2: Indices of China’s RCA and Trade Performance
S1TC
Code Description
China's
Exports
China's
Imports
W orld Exports RCA NX Index
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995
0-4 (+68) Primary exports 16.483 23.417 10.432 24.737 913.287 1114.216 0.99 0.70 0.22 -0.03
5-8 (-68) Manufactured exports 33.983 126.156 33.923 106.648 2422.023 3737.989 0.77 1.12 0.001 0.08
0 and 1 Food, beverages & tobacco 6.951 11.323 3,492 6.525 296.463 408.916 1.29 0.92 0.33 0.27
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 3.537 4.375 4.107 10.158 164.396 215.418 1.19 0.68 -0.07 -0.40
3 Lubricants & related materials 5.237 5.335 1.272 5.127 363.995 359.537 0.79 0.49 0.61 0.02
4 Animal & vegetable oils, fats & waxes 0.161 0.454 0.982 2.601 13.336 25.712 0.67 0.59 -0.72 -0.70
5 Chemicals & related products, nes 3.73 9.904 6.648 17.3 303.531 473.406 0.68 0.70 -0.28 -0.27
7 Machinery & transport equipment 5.588 31.391 16.845 52.638 1208.731 1925.093 0.25 0.54 -0.50 -0.25
6 and 8 Other manufactured articles 25.262 86.791 11.009 37.036 984.858 1444.123 1.41 2.00 0.39 0.40
9 Products not classified elsewhere 11.625 0.007 8.99 0.693 86.703 132.844 7.39 0.00 0.13 -0.98
22 Oil seeds, oleaginous fruit 0.619 0.522 10.621 12.685 3,21 1.37
26 Textile fibres 1.096 0.753 1.839 3.818 24.52 33.387 2.46 0.75 -0.25 -0.67
27 Crude fertilizers & minerals 0.516 0.979 12.688 14.182 2.24 2.30
28 Metalliferous ores & metal scrap 0.211 0.163 0.95 37.309 48.67 0.31 0.11 -0.64
65 Textile yam & fabrics 7.219 13.918 5.426 11.177 111.047 161.213 3,58 2,88 0.14 0.11
67 Iron & steel 1.283 5.161 2.776 6.979 110.409 156.721 0.64 1.10 -0.37 -0.15
68 Non-ferrous metals 0.597 1.93 0.579 75.097 104.633 0.44 0.61 0.02
84 Clothing & accessories 9.669 24.049 0.048 0.959 110.808 162.476 4.81 4.93 0.99 0.92
001 Live animals for food 0.429 0.473 0.014 0.018 8.599 9.907 2.75 1.59 0.94 0.93
041-045 Cereals 0.54 0.076 2.32 3.58 33.086 37,392 0,90 0.07 -0.62 -0.96
057 Fruit, nuts, fresh, dried 0.259 0.445 0.023 0.084 19.06 27.512 0.75 0.54 0.84 0.68
111 Non-alcohlic beverages nes 0.117 0.229 0.018 0.002 2.338 4.373 2.76 1.75 0.73 0.98
121-122 Tobacco 0.17 0.999 0.13 0.359 17.86 23.502 0.52 1.42 0.13 0.47
251 Pulp & waste paper 0.002 0.029 0.287 0.845 17.704 26.947 0.01 0.04 -0.99 -0.93
261 Silk 0.453 0.353 0.004 0.016 0.742 0.602 33.65 19.54 0.98 0.91
263 Cotton 0.318 0.049 0.718 1.487 9.009 13.68 1.95 0.12 -0.39 -0.94
266 Synthetic fibres to spin 0.007 0.031 0.554 1.316 3.557 5.947 0.11 0.17 -0.98 -0.95
271 Fertilisers, crude 0.012 0.042 0.018 0.01 1.37 1.282 0.48 1.09 -0.20 0.62
333-335 Crude Petroleum & petroleum products 4,472 3.243 1.054 4.613 288.615 272.014 0.85 0.40 0.62 -0.17
541 Medicinal & Pharmaceutical products 0.643 1.582 0.417 0.407 37.753 71.59 0.94 0.74 0.21 0.59
562 Manufactured fertilisers 0.025 0.13 2.603 3.732 13.933 14.789 0.10 0.29 -0,98 -0.93
591 Pesticides 0.068 0.234 0.178 0.16 7.346 10.364 0.51 0.75 -0.45 0.19
635 Wood manufactures nes 0.254 0.849 0.026 0.112 7.45 13.322 1.88 2.12 0.81 0.77
651 Textile yam 1.008 2.111 0.593 2.461 23.088 32,941 2.41 2.14 0.26 -0.08
652 Cotton fabrics 1.823 3.457 2.989 1.529 15.559 21.01 6.46 5.48 -0.24 0.39
658 Textile articles nes 1.376 2.561 0.058 0.045 8.373 12.673 9.06 6.73 0.92 0.97
673-674 Iron & steel shapes, plate, sheet, etc. 0.498 1.18 1.812 4.537 56.505 78.194 0.49 0.50 -0.57 -0.59
721-722 Agricultural machinery 0.056 0.1 0.115 0.149 16.714 18,862 0.18 0.18 -0.35 -0.20
724 Textile & leather machinery 0.215 0.404 1.204 3.181 21.436 23.763 0.55 0.57 -0.70 -0.77
736 Metalworking machine-tools 0.25 0.335 0.544 2.344 24.201 27.452 0.57 0.41 -0.37 -0.75
751 Office Machines 0.161 0.851 0.115 0.082 11.725 15.595 0.76 1.82 0.17 0.82
752 Automatic data processing equipment 0.097 2.302 0.366 1.051 67.028 123.84 0.08 0.62 -0.58 0.37
761 Television receivers 0.556 0.808 0.14 0.335 16.056 22.633 1.91 1.19 0.60 0.41
821 Furniture & relative parts 0.322 1.765 0.072 0.102 28.282 44.881 0.63 1.31 0.63 0.89
831 Travel goods and handbags 0.385 2.87 0.006 0.042 7.618 14.514 2.79 6.59 0.97 0.97
871 Optical instruments 0.025 0.315 0.019 0.151 3.827 7.731 0.36 1.36 0.14 0.35
872 Medical instruments nes 0.029 0.168 0.05 0.154 10.133 16.519 0.16 0.34 -0.27 0.04
893 Plastic articles nes 0.32 2.566 0.188 0.895 27.274 48.3 0.65 1.77 0.26 0.48
894 Toys, sport goods, etc 1.971 5.862 0.833 0.472 20.721 38.737 5.24 5.04 0.41 0.85
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b); MOFTEC (1997); State Planning Committee (1997); United 
Nations (1993, 1996, 1997).
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